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is a well-accepted principle that ... a criminal defendant is bound by his attorney's tactical decisions unless the attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.’). … [W]hile a determination that some of Payne's counsel provided some form of ineffective assistance may be implicit in the trial court's granting motions for out-of-time appeal, Payne has not identified which periods of delay are attributable to those errors, nor did he elicit testimony from those appellate counsel to support his ineffectiveness claims. See Chatman, 280 Ga. at 258–59, 626 S.E.2d 102 (rejecting the argument that ineffective assistance caused the appellate delay because the appellant did not elicit the testimony from his counsel necessary to overcome the presumption of strategic delay). Responsibility for the delay, therefore, is largely Payne's. The defendant's assertion of his appellate right: … [N]owhere does Payne explain what specific steps, if any, he took to press for his appeal during this time, including any attempts to contact his two allegedly inactive attorneys. See Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 827, 693 S.E.2d 490 (2010) (rejecting defendant's delayed-appeal due process claim partly because he failed to specify when he attempted to contact his counsel about his case). Payne's failure to vigorously assert his appellate rights for several years weighs against him. Prejudice: … [Defendant] asserts that his lawyers' protracted incompetence led him to represent himself in the hearing on his 2008 motion for new trial, suggesting that his own ineffectiveness deprived him of evidence to support his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. But the trial court warned Payne extensively about the dangers of self representation, and Payne even turned away an attorney who was available to him at the hearing. He cannot complain now of prejudice from his own properly informed decision.” “Finally, Payne says that he cannot secure a fair retrial because witnesses' memories have likely faded and evidence has probably been lost. But any prejudice a defendant might suffer in a retrial is irrelevant unless he first shows prejudice to his appeal. See Chatman, 280 Ga. at 260, 626 S.E.2d 102. And in any event, Payne's generalized speculation about the delay's effect on witness memories and evidence is not the kind of ‘specific evidence’ required to show prejudice in the appellate-delay context. Loadholt v. State, 286 Ga. 402, 406, 687 S.E.2d 824 (2010). For these reasons, we conclude that the lengthy delay in Payne's appeal has not deprived him of due process.” Loadholt v. State, 286 Ga. 402, 687 S.E.2d 824 (January 25, 2010). Defendant’s murder conviction confirmed; no prejudice shown despite nine-year delay in processing defendant’s motion for new trial. Delay resulted “due to inaction on the part of Loadholt's succession of post-conviction attorneys who did nothing to press his motion, despite Loadholt's attempts to assert his right to a ruling. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Loadholt's due process rights are implicated by the delay, thus triggering a due process inquiry.” However, “Loadholt failed to show that he was prejudiced by the delay, and that considering all the Barker factors together, Loadholt's due process claim must fail. ‘[T]he prejudice necessary to establish a due process violation based on post-conviction direct appeal delay is prejudice to the ability of the defendant to assert his arguments on appeal and, should it be established that the appeal was prejudiced, whether the delay prejudiced the defendant's defenses in the event of retrial or resentencing.’ (Citations and footnote omitted.) Chatman, supra at 260(2)(e). ‘“[A]ppellate delay is prejudicial when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the appeal would have been different.” [Cit.]’ Id. Furthermore, where ‘the enumerations ... raised on appeal are without merit; there can therefore be no prejudice in delaying a meritless appeal.’ Cail v. State, 287 Ga.App. 547, 554(5) (652 S.E.2d 190) (2007). Loadholt's only claim of prejudice is the bare assertion that by the passage of time ‘counsel and witness[es]' memories [as to] the events of [the crimes] are less clear.’ Thus, he has failed to offer the specific evidence required to show that the delay has prejudiced his appeal or that the result of the appeal would have been different but for the delay.” Accord, Payne (September 12, 2011), and Singleton (March 27, 2014), above. Breazeale v. State, 290 Ga.App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (January 23, 2008). No violation of due process in the two-year delay in ruling on defendant’s motion for new trial where defendant moved for continuance. “A request for a continuance following a demand for a speedy trial operates as a waiver of the demand under Georgia law. Rice v. State, 264 Ga. 846, 847 (452 S.E.2d 492) (1995) (principle applied to demand under OCGA 17-7-170). We apply the same approach to this constitutional claim and hold that by moving for a continuance, Breazeale waived his due process rights.” Threatt v. State, 282 Ga.App. 884, 640 S.E.2d 316 (November 21, 2006). Seven year delay of appeal, caused by joint inaction of appointed appellate counsel (“disgraceful,” says Court of Appeals), District Attorney and trial court did not result in denial of due process because defendant failed to show prejudice . Every other Barker factor is met, however. Length of delay, “at 90 months is presumed prejudicial.” Reason for delay: “‘Any failure of the indigent defense system in representing its clients is directly or indirectly the responsibility of the State and the trial courts as overseers of the criminal justice system.’ Spradlin v. State, [262 Ga.App. 897, 901(3), 587 S.E.2d 155 (2003).]” “When, as in this case, the State knows that a defendant is languishing in confinement while his appellate counsel is doing nothing to advance his client’s cause, the State has a responsibility to bring the matter to the attention of the trial court, and, if all else fails, seek a hearing on its own motion. What the State cannot do is effectively do nothing. When the State receives or is aware of