☢ test - Í

Burdett v. State, 285 Ga.App. 571, 646 S.E.2d 748 (May 25, 2007). 1. Defendant was bound by counsel’s withdrawal of his speedy trial demand. “Burdett cites no legal authority that would require that the withdrawal of his speedy trial demand be disregarded more than a year after it was filed because he, as the client, claims to have been unaware of it. It is a basic tenet of our judicial system that a trial court is entitled to rely on pleadings filed by an attorney on behalf of his client, and to presume that the client is aware of and consents to such pleadings. To hold otherwise would allow parties to ‘retract’ pleadings previously relied upon by the court and opposing counsel, simply by changing lawyers.” 2. Withdrawal of speedy trial demand requires no order from trial court. “[T]here is no procedural or substantive law that requires such a withdrawal be made by a motion. Rather, the accepted practice is that a party file a notice of such a withdrawal with the court and serve the same on opposing counsel. See, e.g., Price v. State, 245 Ga.App. 128 (535 S.E.2d 766) (2000); Ringo v. State, 219 Ga.App. 753 (466 S.E.2d 660) (1996).” State v. Hitchcock, 285 Ga.App. 140, 645 S.E.2d 631 (April 17, 2007). Trial court did not err in dismissing defendant’s arson prosecution when State announced “not ready” for trial; State was not entitled to seven days’ notice pursuant to USCR 32.1 where defendant demanded a speedy trial. “Where ‘compliance with the notice requirement of USCR 32.1 would cause the State to violate a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial in accordance with the defendant’s speedy trial demand.’ (Citation omitted.)” quoting Kellibrew v. State, 239 Ga.App. 783, 785(2) (521 S.E.2d 921) (1999). No abuse of discretion here “especially in light of the trial court’s effort to afford Hitchcock’s counsel and the State an opportunity to dispose of the case by agreement. … compare Clark v. State, 259 Ga.App. 573, 576 (578 S.E.2d 184) (2003) (court’s noncompliance with USCR 32.1 wholly inadequate where no evidence showing court did not have ample time to comply and still meet time requirements of defendant’s demand for speedy trial).” Dingler v. State, 281 Ga.App. 721, 637 S.E.2d 120 (October 3, 2006). “[A] demand for speedy trial in a non-capital case does not impose a requirement to announce ready for trial. OCGA § 17-7-170; compare Ciprotti v. State, 190 Ga.App. 639, 641 (379 S.E.2d 802) (1989) (Pope, J. concurring specially) (‘A defendant demanding a speedy trial in a capital case, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171, is required to announce ready when the case is called for trial. However, such a requirement is not imposed ... in a non-capital case.’).” Rivers v. State, 279 Ga.App. 906, 633 S.E.2d 74 (June 20, 2006). Defendant’s speedy trial demand was complied with where his first trial ended in mistrial and he was re-tried in next succeeding term. “OCGA § 17-7-170(e) … expressly provides: ‘If the case in which a demand for trial has been filed as provided in this Code section results in a mistrial, the case shall be tried at the next succeeding regular term of court.’” State v. Edminson, 265 Ga.App. 91, 593 S.E.2d 18 (December 11, 2003). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal pursuant to a speedy trial demand. Defendant met his evidentiary burden of showing that jurors were available during the terms in question in the form of “the affidavit of the jury manager of the Gwinnett Judicial Circuit… which stated that jurors were summoned for both state and superior court.” Compare Cown v. State , 259 Ga.App. 8, 576 S.E.2d 20 (2002) (affidavit did not “‘show whether the jurors were summoned to superior court or to state court.’”) State v. Varner, 277 Ga. 433, 589 S.E.2d 111 (November 26, 2003). Defendant filed a speedy trial demand pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171(a) on his charges of murder and other related offenses. On the last day of the last eligible term, a jury reached verdicts as to the related charges but could reach no verdict as to the murder charge and a mistrial was declared. “The State announced it was ready to commence a trial on the unresolved charges immediately,” but no jurors were available. On the following Monday, the first day of the next term, the Court granted the defense motion to discharge defendant based on his speedy trial demand. Held, trial court erred in discharging defendant; “the State meets its obligation under the demand statute when it re-tries the defendant during the remainder of the term of mistrial, provided there are jurors impaneled and qualified to hear the case and, if not, in the next succeeding regular term of court, again provided there are juries impaneled and qualified to hear the case.” Notes that the speedy trial statute is not a penal statute and thus need not be strictly construed against the state. Two Justices (Hines, Fletcher) dissent. Redstrom v. State, 239 Ga.App. 769, 521 S.E.2d 904 (August 31, 1999). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on speedy trial demand. When speedy trial demand was filed on Friday, jurors had been summoned for that week, but evidence showed that none were available to be impaneled that day or the rest of the term. “According to Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., p. 886) the term ‘“impanel” signifies the act of the clerk of the court in making up a list of the jurors who have been selected for the trial of a particular cause.’ Accord Kirk v. State, 194 Ga.App.