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considered sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of OCGA § 17-7-170 unless it is presented for what it is – a demand to be tried within the next succeeding term of court.’” Price v. State, 245 Ga.App. 128, 535 S.E.2d 766 (June 9, 2000). Defendant filed one document containing two demands — a trial by jury and a speedy trial — entitled “Demand for Speedy Trial by Jury under OCGA § 17-7- 170.” Defendant later withdrew his demand for a jury trial by filing another single document. This document, however, did not refer at all to the speedy trial demand (“Withdrawal of Jury Demand”). The trial court assumed defendant was withdrawing both demands. Held, “the efficacy of a withdrawal can only be determined in relation to the pleading it purports to withdraw.” Defendant’s original demand did not differentiate between a trial by jury and a speedy trial. Rather, it treated them as one joint demand. In order to withdraw the jury demand without withdrawing the speedy trial demand, defendant should have specifically separated the two in his withdrawal, either in its caption or in its text. Because he did not, the “withdrawal of jury demand” served to withdraw both demands. Bennett v. State, 244 Ga.App. 149, 534 S.E.2d 881 (May 23, 2000). Battery conviction affirmed; defendant’s pleading ‘requesting’ a speedy trial was ineffective to invoke “the extreme relief of discharge and acquittal” under OCGA § 17-7- 170. Defendant’s attorney filed a motion entitled “Entry of Appearance, Waiver of Arraignment, and Request for Jury Trial” in which he “request[ed] a jury trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170.” He did not explicitly “demand” a speedy trial. Held, to invoke the protections of OCGA § 17-7-170, a demand must contain additional language that notifies the court that the defendant requires a speedy trial in addition to a trial by jury. For example, a demand containing a “reference to trial at the next term, reference to a ‘speedy trial,’ use of the language of the Code, or reference to the Code section” would suffice. “The use of the term ‘request’ instead of ‘demand’ cannot ‘reasonably be construed’ to demand a speedy trial, because it is likely to mislead the State as to the true intention of the motion, as it clearly did in this case. Since Bennett's motion failed to demand a trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170, the motion failed to meet the minimum acceptable standard for asserting the defendant's right to a speedy trial. See Green v. State, [191 Ga.App. 873, 875, 383 S.E.2d 359 (1989)].” Schaefer v. State, 238 Ga.App. 594, 519 S.E.2d 248 (June 7, 1999). Defendant filed a pro se “motion to dismiss” his appointed lawyer “and replace him with a more experienced attorney.” Five days later, defendant filed a pro se “demand,” which he asserts was a demand for speedy trial. Held, “[a]s recognized in Goodwin v. State, 202 Ga.App. 655, 656, 415 S.E.2d 472 (1992), a demand for speedy trial has no legal effect whatsoever if filed by a defendant acting pro se at a time when he is represented by counsel. … [E]ven if Schaefer informed [attorney] Greenwald and the court that he no longer desired counsel's services, Greenwald continued to represent him as counsel of record until released by the judge. See Parham v. State, 218 Ga.App. 42, 44(4), 460 S.E.2d 78 (1995); see also Uniform Superior Court Rule 30.2. It necessarily follows that a pro se demand for speedy trial filed by Schaefer before the release was without legal force.” Accord, Works v. State , 301 Ga.App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (November 17, 2009); Smith v. State , 332 Ga.App. 849, 775 S.E.2d 211 (July 8, 2015). Chastain v. State, 237 Ga.App. 640, 516 S.E.2d 362 (April 13, 1999). Defendant’s ‘demand for trial by jury’ was ineffective to invoke statutory speedy trial rights under OCGA § 17-7-170. “‘[A] demand for trial will not be considered sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of ...OCGA § 17-7-170 unless it is presented for what it is – a demand to be tried within the next succeeding term of court. ’ (Punctuation omitted.) Ferris v. State, 172 Ga.App. 729, 731(1), 324 S.E.2d 762 (1984). ‘A written demand for a jury [trial] is not analogous to a demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Boyd v. State, 200 Ga.App. 591(2), 409 S.E.2d 44 (1991). Here, nothing in Chastain’s written demand invokes OCGA § 17-7-170 or demands that he be tried during the current or next succeeding term of court. Rather, the demand simply documents Chastain’s request to be tried by a jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Chastain’s motion for discharge and acquittal. Boyd, supra; Daniels v. State, 235 Ga.App. 296, 298(2), 509 S.E.2d 368 (1998).” 3. GENERALLY Goddard v. State, 310 Ga.App. 2, 712 S.E.2d 528 (June 15, 2011). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on statutory speedy trial demand where defendant failed to appear for trial due to court’s error in sending notice to wrong address. “As Goddard did not waive his statutory right to a speedy trial on the accusations charging him with fleeing and attempting to elude and reckless driving, and the State failed to try him during the term in which the demand was filed or the next succeeding regular term of court, Goddard is entitled to an acquittal on those charges. See Bond v. State, 212 Ga.App. 608, 609–610 (442 S.E.2d 482) (1994).”