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denied defendant’s motion for discharge based on statutory speedy trial demand; trial court properly found that “there was no jury impaneled and qualified to try Jones” during the term in which the demand was filed. Evidence at hearing showed that no jurors were available after filing of defendant’s demand the day it was filed; 37 jurors reported for service on the day after the demand was filed; and none were available the following day, which was the last day of the term. On the one day jurors were called for service, all but five were used on other trials. No evidence showed when the prosecutor or judge were served with the demand, and thus trial judge could find that additional jurors [who had been summoned] could not be called in. “Accordingly, we reject Jones's argument that the mere fact that he served the trial judge and prosecutor with his speedy trial demand on November 1 supports the conclusion that the State could have requested jurors for the next day. Rather, Jones, as the movant, bore the burden of establishing that his demand had been served sufficiently early in the day to allow the trial judge and prosecutor to act on the same before the jury clerk's office closed for business. To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to trigger the running of the time period for a statutory speedy trial demand by serving that demand at 4:25 p.m. on the next to last day of a court term. The purpose of OCGA § 17-7-170, however, is not to serve as a tactical tool for defense counsel. Rather, its purpose is ‘to prevent the uncertainty, emotional stress, and the economic strain of a pending prosecution indefinitely’ while at the same time afford[ing] the State a reasonable time frame in which to prepare and try its case against the accused,’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.)” quoting Fletcher v. State, 213 Ga.App. 401, 403(1) (445 S.E.2d 279) (1994). Williams v. State, 296 Ga.App. 888, 676 S.E.2d 303 (March 24, 2009). Defendant filed a statutory speedy trial demand and was timely tried and convicted on charges of aggravated child molestation and related charges. The trial court then granted defendant’s motion for new trial. Two terms of court later, defendant moved for dismissal based on his speedy trial demand. Held, the speedy trial demand “expired at the conclusion of his original trial.” Based on 2003 amendment to OCGA § 17-7-170, adding subsection (c): ““[a]ny demand filed pursuant to this Code section shall expire at the conclusion of the trial ...”. Ga. L.2003, p. 154, § 3. Campbell v. State, 294 Ga.App. 166, 669 S.E.2d 190 (October 21, 2008). “Complaint” filed by district attorney was not a charging instrument sufficient to support a statutory speedy trial demand. “We recognize that the ‘Complaint’ filed after Campbell's arrest was signed by the district attorney and contains wording similar to the statutory language required in an accusation. See OCGA § 17-7-71(d). The prosecutor explained, however, that a complaint is not a charging instrument. It is a procedural mechanism used to notify the court clerk to place a case on the magistrate judge calendar for a bond hearing. At that point, the case has a ‘CP’ number associated with the complaint. Once the case is indicted or accused, it receives an ‘SC’ number that remains with it throughout the proceedings. According to the prosecutor, a ‘complaint is never seen again after the first appearance.’ Campbell has not cited a single document demonstrating that he was arraigned or entered a formal plea to the ‘Complaint.’ And he does not dispute that the prosecutor told his attorney a few days before he filed his speedy trial demand that the state intended to wait on the lab test results before seeking an indictment or filing an accusation. Simply put, nothing indicates that the state elected to proceed by accusation when it filed the ‘Complaint.’ The prosecutor merely followed the standard procedure for triggering a bond hearing. ‘[O]nly a person who has been indicted or otherwise formally charged with a crime can invoke the rights afforded by OCGA § 17-7-170.’ State v. Hicks, 183 Ga.App. 715, 716 (359 S.E.2d 712) (1987). While nomenclature alone does not control our determination here, see State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga.App. 135, 137(2)(a) n. 9 (537 S.E.2d 457) (2000) (‘[T]here is no magic in mere nomenclature, and the inquiry of the Court is always directed to substance and not to form.’), we cannot ignore that the document relied upon by Campbell is designated a ‘Complaint,’ rather than an accusation. Moreover, the record shows that the prosecution did not proceed on the ‘Complaint.’ Instead, the state responsibly waited until it received the lab test results and confirmed the quantity of drugs involved before formally charging Campbell by indictment. Given these circumstances, the ‘Complaint’ cannot be viewed as an accusation. To hold otherwise would allow Campbell to usurp the state's power to decide when and how to bring its case. See Lagyak v. State, 245 Ga.App. 546, 548 (538 S.E.2d 467) (2000) (defendant may not manipulate system to avoid prosecution on speedy trial grounds); Shire v. State, 225 Ga.App. 306, 308(1)(a) (483 S.E.2d 694) (1997) (prosecutor has discretion to determine ‘whether a prosecution should proceed and when within the law it should do so’).” Burdett v. State, 285 Ga.App. 571, 646 S.E.2d 748 (May 25, 2007). Change to OCGA § 17-7-171 effective July 1, 2006, requiring that speedy trial demand in capital cases be served on trial judge, affects substantive rights and hence has only prospective application. “Our courts have long recognized that OCGA § 17-7-171 affords an individual a statutory right to a fair trial-a right which is substantive in nature. See, e.g., Mize v. State, 262 Ga. 489, 490(2) (422 S.E.2d 180) (1992); Nusser v. State, 275 Ga. 896, 899 (622 S.E.2d 105) (2005). A retrospective application of the service requirement at issue here could operate to void an otherwise valid demand for a speedy trial, thereby depriving a defendant of a substantive right. We cannot, therefore, apply this amendment retroactively, and Burdett’s failure to serve