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the trial judge did not invalidate his demand for a speedy trial.” Branton v. State, 279 Ga.App. 300, 630 S.E.2d 787 (April 27, 2006). Trial court was not required to hold hearing on State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s statutory speedy trial demand, “since the demand clearly was untimely.” Webb v. State, 278 Ga.App. 9, 627 S.E.2d 925 (March 6, 2006). 1. Defendant’s statutory speedy trial demand was not effective, and was properly denied, where filed “without serving a copy upon the prosecutor or the trial judge.” 2. “[T]he trial court correctly ruled that Webb may not unilaterally waive indictment in order to file a valid speedy trial demand. This Court has repeatedly held that a demand for trial under OCGA § 17-7-170 is available only to those against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for a non-capital offense. [Cit.] Where a statutory demand for trial is filed before the indictment is returned, the demand is a nullity and provides no ground for granting a plea in bar for failure to try the case within the statutory period. [Cits.]” 3. “[I]n order for a speedy trial demand to attach to a uniform traffic citation, the citation must be filed with the court by the state. [Cits.] Here, it is undisputed that the state did not file the uniform traffic citations with the trial court. The state instead chose to commence the prosecution, not by filing the uniform traffic citations, but by seeking an indictment by a grand jury. This decision did not violate Webb’s rights to equal protection or due process.” Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (July 28, 2005). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of similar transactions on three and six days’ notice where expedited schedule was required by defendant’s statutory speedy trial demand. Sa v. State, 274 Ga.App. 773, 618 S.E.2d 616 (July 7, 2005). Speedy trial demand filed in City Court of Atlanta, “a constitutional court with jury jurisdiction,” remained effective despite transfer to Superior Court of Fulton County where transfer was not initiated by defendant. State thus could not prosecute charges originally filed in City Court – DUI, serious injury by vehicle, hit and run and failure to exercise due care. Vehicular homicide charge added in Superior Court, however, was not covered by speedy trial demand, and remained viable. Accord, State v. Jones , 290 Ga.App. 879, 661 S.E.2d 573 (March 18, 2008) (speedy trial demand as to battery charge still effective when case transferred from state court to superior court without defendant’s consent; but not effective as to related charges added in superior court). Baker v. State, 270 Ga.App. 762, 608 S.E.2d 38 (November 18, 2004). Defendant’s speedy trial demand was ineffective because it was not served “upon the judge to whom the case is assigned,” in addition to the prosecutor, as required in OCGA § 17-7-170(a). Baldwin v. State, 270 Ga.App. 201, 605 S.E.2d 889 (October 27, 2004). Defendant’s speedy trial demand, filed while he was incarcerated in Texas, was unavailing. “Because Baldwin has not been physically available to the court in which he demands a trial, Baldwin’s speedy trial demand has not run, and the trial court correctly denied his motion to dismiss and acquit.” “[A] defendant incarcerated by a different sovereign is not available for trial within the meaning of the speedy trial statute. This is true because ‘[t]here is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign,’” quoting McIver v. State , 205 Ga.App. 648, 423 S.E.2d 27 (1992). Eagles v. State, 269 Ga.App. 462, 604 S.E.2d 294 (September 3, 2004). Statutory speedy trial demand is not timely or effective prior to filing of indictment or accusation, even where defendant waives indictment. Nesmith v. State, 267 Ga.App. 530, 600 S.E.2d 644 (May 20, 2004). “[T]he time for filing a demand for speedy trial does not depend upon whether there are jurors impaneled. Only the time within which the State must try Nesmith is affected by the availability of jurors. [Cit.]” (emphasis in original). State v. Summage, 266 Ga.App. 630, 597 S.E.2d 641 (March 29, 2004). Defendant was indicted on two counts of child molestation in 1998. Defendant filed no speedy trial demand to the original indictment. In 1999, a new indictment was issued against defendant, containing the two original charges of child molestation, and adding three new charges. Defendant then filed a speedy trial demand which was ultimately granted as to the entire indictment. Held, “if a defendant fails to file a demand as to an original indictment, but later files a timely demand with respect to a re-indictment that adds additional charges, he waives his rights with respect to the repeated charges, but not as to the new charges.”