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demand).” Accord, Higuera-Hernandez v. State , 289 Ga. 553, 714 S.E.2d 236 (July 11, 2011) (court may proceed to trial with less than seven days’ notice to comply with statutory speedy trial demand). Oni v. State, 285 Ga.App. 342, 646 S.E.2d 312 (May 10, 2007). Where statutory speedy trial demand was found on appeal to have been waived by defendant, same demand was of not effect on remittitur. “See Doehling v. State, 238 Ga.App. 293, 294, 518 S.E.2d 137 (1999) (following remittitur, state must comply with statutory speedy trial period only if a ‘valid demand for trial’ exists). Compare Henry [ v. James, 264 Ga. 527, 530(1)(c), 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994)] (statutory speedy trial demand remained in effect following remittitur from Supreme Court, which affirmed trial court’s denial of motion for discharge and acquittal; although appeal involved defendant’s statutory speedy trial demand, the issue was whether defendant had been denied equal protection, not whether defendant had waived his demand).” Cobb v. State, 275 Ga.App. 554, 621 S.E.2d 548 (September 22, 2005). After filing of defendant’s statutory speedy trial demand, at the call of the trial calendar, “the State announced an agreement to ‘pass[ ]’ the case” to a date beyond the end of the term. “Cobb’s trial counsel responded affirmatively to the announcement of the agreement, stating on the record, ‘Okay.’” “As such, Cobb’s consent to the continuance outside the second term of court waived his right to automatic discharge. … Compare Ballew v. State, 211 Ga.App. 672, 673-674 (440 S.E.2d 76) (1994) (mere silence in response to trial court’s continuance announcement is not an affirmative act waiving speedy trial demand).” Griffin v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 604 S.E.2d 155 (October 12, 2004). “Having voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, [defendant] cannot raise as a defense his right to a speedy trial.” Oni v. State, 268 Ga.App. 840, 602 S.E.2d 859 (July 30, 2004). “‘[T]he absence of defendant and by extension his counsel from the calendar call is not, per se, sufficient grounds to find waiver of the trial demand.’ McKnight v. State, 215 Ga.App. 899, 904 (453 S.E.2d 38) (1994). It is also true that the filing of a conflict letter does not constitute an ‘affirmative action’ such as would waive a speedy trial demand, because it is required by the USCR. Fisher v. State, 273 Ga. 721, 722 (545 S.E.2d 895) (2001). But, as the trial court found, counsel here took several actions that amounted to waiver, not only by failing to appear at the calendar call but also failing to file a conflict letter and failing to contact the court when the conflicting trial ended. Counsel had an obligation to notify the trial court once his conflict was resolved. USCR 17.1(C). ‘[F]ailure to comply with USCR 17.1(C) constituted an affirmative act which waived [defendant]’s speedy trial demand.’ Id. at 722.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Summage, 266 Ga.App. 630, 597 S.E.2d 641 (March 29, 2004). With speedy trial demand pending, defense counsel filed leave of absence covering last two weeks of term. Immediately before time for his leave, however, counsel “revoked” his leave and announced ready for trial. Held, trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to discharge based on speedy trial demand. “Through his attorney’s petition for leave, Summage … consented to the passing of his case to the next term.” Counsel’s ‘revoking’ “his petition for leave late in the term … impeded the trial court’s scheduling ability. In light of these facts, we agree with the State that Summage was manipulating the judicial system and that the trial court should have denied his motion for discharge and acquittal on the remaining charges.” Three judges dissent, contending that Court of Appeals should defer to trial court’s determination as to whether counsel’s actions “impeded the trial court’s scheduling ability.” Clark v. State, 259 Ga.App. 573, 578 S.E.2d 184 (February 11, 2003). “Uniform Superior Court Rule 32.1 requires a trial judge to prepare a criminal trial calendar, deliver a copy of it to the court clerk and, not less than seven days before the trial date, give notice in person or by mail to counsel and the defendant at the last address indicated in court records. Compliance with USCR 32.1 must be judged under the circumstances of each case. And if compliance with the rule’s notice requirement would cause a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, then a trial court does not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial in accordance with the speedy trial demand.” In this case, however, “the court had sufficient time to set a trial calendar, give Clark proper notice of the trial, and still meet the speedy trial demand by holding the trial before the November term's end.... Because this is not a case in which the court had to ignore the mandates of USCR 32.1 in order to meet Clark’s speedy trial demand, the court's non-compliance with that rule was an abuse of discretion. And Clark’s failure to appear for a trial that she was not adequately notified of does not amount to an act affirmatively waiving her speedy trial demand.” Conviction reversed. Spencer v. State, 259 Ga.App. 664, 577 S.E.2d 817 (January 30, 2003). Defense’s consent to a proposed scheduling order extending the time for discovery beyond the deadline for trial pursuant to a speedy trial demand, waived the speedy trial demand. “When a defendant undertakes to engage in pre-trial and trial scheduling agreements with the state and then