☢ test - Í

complains about such agreements without ever raising the speedy trial issue or formally seeking to withdraw from the mutually determined scheduling deadlines, the defendant has waived his claim to a speedy trial.” Williams v. State, 258 Ga.App. 367, 574 S.E.2d 416 (November 14, 2002). Defendant waived speedy trial demand by failing to appear in open court and demand trial during the two terms following the filing of the demand, even though the case did not appear on a trial calendar. Vonslep v. State, 253 Ga.App. 881, 560 S.E.2d 752 (February 21, 2002). Defense counsel’s leave of absence request, “which reduced his availability for trial to eight days in the two terms, ‘completely eroded the State’s ability to call in Defendant’s case for trial within the two terms available’ and thus waived [Defendant’s] right to automatic discharge and acquittal.” Linkous v. State, 254 Ga.App. 43, 561 S.E.2d 128 (February 5, 2002). Counsel’s leave of absence request exceeded 30 calendar days; therefore, it should have complied with USCR 16.2 - ten days’ notice to opposing counsel, followed by presentation to “appropriate judge.” Because it didn’t, it stood denied by operation of USCR 16.4. Therefore, counsel’s absence in reliance on this leave was unauthorized, and resulted in waiver of defendant’s speedy trial demand when it caused the case to be continued. Affirmed sub nom. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 171, 575 S.E.2d 456 (January 13, 2003). Jones v. State, 250 Ga.App. 829, 553 S.E.2d 24 (July 16, 2001). Defendant’s accusations were brought during the January-through-March term of Dekalb County State Court and defendant filed a speedy trial request. Through numerous continuances and leaves of absence, defendant’s attorney only left the judge a seven-day window in which to try the case. In fact, during one of these days, defendant appeared before the court for a hearing without his attorney, who had notified the court of a conflict, and signed a notice rescheduling a hearing outside of the two-term requirement for a speedy trial. Held, defendant’s signature on the notice constituted consent to resetting the case outside the two terms of court and waived the speedy trial demand. The Court of Appeals stated that courts must provide timely justice to defendants while preserving judge’s control over their dockets and reasoned that defense counsel must not be allowed to manipulate the system by forcing trial courts to try cases during a short window between leaves of absence and continuances. Affirmed, 276 Ga. 171, 575 S.E.2d 456 (January 13, 2003). See also State v. Dodge , 251 Ga.App. 361, 553 S.E.2d 831 (August 9, 2001). State v. Dymond, 248 Ga.App. 582, 546 S.E.2d 69 (February 28, 2001). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and a speedy trial demand. Trial court granted the motion to suppress, and State indicated its intent to appeal that ruling. Before the written order on the motion to suppress was entered, the second term after the speedy trial demand expired, and the court entered an order dismissing the case based on the speedy trial demand. Court of Appeals reversed: “by taking ‘affirmative action’ on the issue of admissibility of certain evidence against him, a defendant who files a motion to suppress must be deemed to invoke the entire procedure applicable to that issue including the State’s right to a direct appeal if the motion should be granted. In other words, by filing a motion to suppress, a defendant effectively consents to a delay of his trial pending final resolution of the issue of evidentiary admissibility, if the motion is granted and the State elects to have that appellate determination made.” Quoting State v. Waters , 170 Ga.App. 505, 508(3), 317 S.E.2d 614 (1984). Price v. State , 245 Ga.App. 128, 535 S.E.2d 766 (June 9, 2000). In DUI prosecution, trial court properly denied motion for discharge and acquittal based on speedy trial demand. 1. Defendant’s demand was filed in the third term of court in which the accusation was pending – one term too late to be effective. “OCGA § 17-7-170(a) states in pertinent part that any person against whom an accusation is filed with the clerk may enter a demand for trial at the court term at which the accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term; thereafter, a demand may be filed only by special permission of the court. In this case, the accusations against Price were filed on July 28, 1995, during the July/August term in Fulton County State Court. See Ga. L.1983, p. 4501, § 1. Price's demand was not filed during either the July/August term or the succeeding September/October term. Price filed his demand on November 29, 1995. The record does not show, nor does Price claim, that he received special permission from the court to file untimely. Because Price's demand was not filed timely pursuant to the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-170(a), the trial court did not err in denying his motion for discharge and acquittal. State v. Black, 213 Ga.App. 331, 444 S.E.2d 368 (1994); Ingram v. State, 224 Ga.App. 271, 272(3), 480 S.E.2d 302 (1997).” 2. Dicta: defendant’s later pleading, styled “Withdrawal of Jury Demand,” operated as a waiver of his attempted speedy trial demand – the only prior “demand” he had filed. “Because Price filed a single demand which was specifically captioned and written as a ‘Demand For Speedy Trial By Jury Under OCGA § 17-7-170,’ his subsequent ‘Withdrawal of Jury Demand,’ without more, served to withdraw his