☢ test - Í

Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013). Capital murder conviction and death sentence affirmed; 1. no abuse of discretion where trial court denied change of venue based on alleged threats of violence against defendant. OCGA § 17–7–150(b) provides: “If the evidence submitted shall reasonably show that there is probability or danger of violence, it shall be mandatory on the judge to change the venue to such other county as, in his judgment, will reasonably avoid violence.” “Edenfield presented some evidence of angry comments directed toward him in local media coverage, [fn] as well as some evidence of verbal harassment by fellow inmates at the local jail, where Edenfield was held under special security conditions. The trial court found, however, that adequate security could be afforded Edenfield, but it nevertheless indicated that it would monitor the security conditions during the course of the trial and revisit the issue if necessary. We are satisfied that the trial court fulfilled its obligations under OCGA § 17–7–150(b).” 2. No abuse of discretion in trial judge’s selection of a different county from which to select jurors, based on defendant’s motion due to pretrial publicity. “Slightly more than a third of the prospective jurors in this case indicated that they had heard something about it before trial, but most of what they had heard was limited in scope, was not inaccurate, did not concern matters that would be inadmissible at trial, and revealed little that would not be made known at trial, even as early as voir dire.” Bates v. State, 322 Ga.App. 319, 744 S.E.2d 841 (June 17, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to change venue. “Although Bates showed that the events surrounding the escape from the Hancock County jail and the subsequent robbery of the elderly third victim were widely publicized in the Baldwin County area, he failed to show that the trial's setting ‘was inherently prejudicial, i.e., that any publicity was factually incorrect, inflammatory, or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility.’ Id. Rather, the predominant, if not exclusive, [fn] character of the media relied on by Bates consisted of facts which were established by evidence admitted at trial. See Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 430(5)(A) (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986). There was ‘no evidence of a total inundation of the judicial process by the media at this trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 430(5)(A). Bates did not show that the trial's setting was inherently prejudicial as a result of pretrial publicity. Nor did Bates establish that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice. Bates shows that 20 potential jurors (of 43 questioned) had some prior knowledge of the case. However, the determinative issue was not the number of jurors who had heard about the case, but whether the jurors who had heard about the case could set aside their opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence. See Walden v. State, 289 Ga. 845, 849(2) (717 S.E.2d 159) (2011). … Although, as Bates shows, six potential jurors were struck for cause due to their fixed opinion or independent knowledge of the case, that did not require a finding that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice. See McWhorter v. State, 271 Ga. 461, 462(2) (519 S.E.2d 903) (1999) (finding no error in denial of defendant's motion for change of venue where, although virtually all venire members were familiar with the case, only five jurors were excused for cause for having a fixed opinion about the defendant's guilt, and the remaining prospective jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity indicated they could render a decision based on the evidence); Chancey, 256 Ga. at 432(5)(C) (even though 40 percent of the venire was excused for cause due to prejudice against the defendants, this did not demand a finding of actual prejudice in the jury selection process). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bates's motion for change of venue.” Dennis v. State, 320 Ga.App. 70, 739 S.E.2d 78 (March 1, 2013). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to move for change of venue where no juror indicated they’d seen the one local newspaper story about the assault or were otherwise aware. Heidt v. State, 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (January 7, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying motion for change of venue based on “pretrial publicity and gossip” about the fact that defendant was accused of murdering his father and brother while having an affair with his brother’s wife. “With regard to inherent prejudice, ‘even in cases of widespread pretrial publicity, situations where such publicity has rendered a trial setting inherently prejudicial are extremely rare ... [, and t]he record must establish that the publicity contained information that was unduly extensive, factually incorrect, inflammatory or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility.’ Gear v. State, 288 Ga. 500, 502(2) (705 S.E.2d 632) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, Heidt alleges that there was a lot of gossip, rumor, and innuendo about his affair with Robin, but he does not claim that the stories about the affair were untrue or even disputed at trial, and he fails to show that the pretrial publicity was inflammatory or created a hostile atmosphere. As a result, the record in this case does not support a claim of inherent prejudice. See Gear v. State, 288 Ga. at 502(2); see also Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. 653, 656(3) (723 S.E.2d 885) (2012).” Walden v. State, 289 Ga. 845, 717 S.E.2d 159 (October 17, 2011). Murder, child cruelty, and related convictions affirmed; change of venue not demanded where “nine of the 47 prospective jurors were excused for cause because they had already formed an opinion and that another 24 had heard about the case. “[T]he three newspaper articles on which Appellant relies are not in the record. Moreover, she indicates that they were all published more than a year