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before the trial. See Tolver v. State, 269 Ga. 530, 533(4) (500 S.E.2d 563) (1998). Appellant's assertion regarding the small size of the community, ‘standing alone, was not a sufficient basis for a change of venue.’ Williams v. State, 272 Ga. 335, 336(3) (528 S.E.2d 518) (2000). ‘As to actual prejudice, “the question is not the number of jurors who had heard about the case; rather, the question is whether those jurors who had heard about the case could lay aside their opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence. (Cits.)” [Cit .]’ Gear v. State, [288 Ga. 500, 502(2) (705 S.E.2d 632) (2011)]. … Moreover, the mere fact that 21% of prospective jurors were excused for cause because they already had an opinion that they were unable to lay aside ‘is not indicative of such prejudice as would mandate a change in venue .... [Cit.]’ Gear v. State, supra. See also Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 431(5)(C) (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986).” Accord, Simmons v. State , 291 Ga. 705, 733 S.E.2d 280 (October 15, 2012) (no change of venue required where “none of the jurors showed any bias or influence due to pre-trial publicity.”); Reddings v. State , 292 Ga. 364, 738 S.E.2d 49 (February 4, 2013) (in murder prosecution, no change of venue required “where the complained-of pretrial publicity consisted of two local newspaper articles published more than a year before trial and only two prospective jurors indicated they had any familiarity with the case.”); Powell v. State , 297 Ga. 352, 773 S.E.2d 762 (June 15, 2015) (no change of venue required where 34% of jurors were excused for cause and all seated jurors “had some type of pretrial media exposure to the case,” but no showing that they couldn’t be fair and impartial.). Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, “[t]he trial court granted Stinski's motion for a change of venue and determined that the jury would be selected from Bibb County. Stinski argues, however, that the trial court abused its discretion under OCGA § 17-7-150(a)(3) by holding the trial in Chatham County, where local media coverage necessitated the jury's sequestration, rather than holding the trial in Bibb County, where the trial court could have allowed the jurors to go to their homes each night. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 762(5) (620 S.E.2d 778) (2005) (holding that a trial court has discretion to grant or deny a defendant's request that the jury not be sequestered in a death penalty case). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to move the Bibb County jurors to Chatham County and to sequester them. We also hold that Stinski had no legal right to demand that the jurors be instructed that they had been brought to Chatham County over Stinski's objection.” Hubbard v. State, 285 Ga. 791, 683 S.E.2d 602 (September 28, 2009). No ineffective assistance for failing to move for change of venue of defendant’s murder trial; “‘as there is no evidence that any venire member was dismissed for cause due to a fixed opinion as to appellant's guilt, there is no evidence that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. See Tolver v. State, 269 Ga. 530(4) (500 S.E.2d 563) (1998); Lemley v. State, 258 Ga. 554(4) (372 S.E.2d 421) (1988). See also Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126(2) (475 S.E.2d 627) (1996).’ Pittman v. State, 274 Ga. 260, 264(5) (553 S.E.2d 616) (2001).” Edmond v. State, 283 Ga. 507, 661 S.E.2d 520 (May 19, 2008). No abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s motion for change of venue in his murder trial. “‘In a motion for a change of venue, the petitioner must show (1) that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or (2) that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when [Edmond]: (1) made no showing that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial, i.e., that any publicity was factually incorrect, inflammatory, or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility; and (2) failed to demonstrate that (he) could not receive a fair trial due to the prejudice of individual jurors since (no) potential jurors were excused for having a fixed opinion about [Edmond’s] guilt ... (and the remaining prospective jurors who had been exposed to pre-trial publicity about the case indicated they could render a decision based on the evidence).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Morgan v. State, 276 Ga. 72, 75(4) (575 S.E.2d 468) (2003). See also Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730(4) (571 S.E.2d 788) (2002) (excusal of 15.2% of prospective jurors due to exposure to pretrial publicity insufficient to require change of venue).” Accord, Gear v. State , 288 Ga. 500, 705 S.E.2d 632 (February 7, 2011) ( citing Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986), excusal of 40% of venire for cause did not demand finding that jury selection process showed actual prejudice to degree rendering trial fundamentally unfair); Ledford v. State , 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011) (excusal of 22 of 120 jurors questioned did not demand change of venue; “we note that most jurors had heard nothing of particular import to our analysis regarding venue.”); Thomas v. State , 290 Ga. 653, 723 S.E.2d 885 (March 5, 2012) (possible prejudice of 16 of 104 jurors, or 15%, not sufficient to require change of venue, citing Edmond and Gear ); Heidt v. State , 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (January 7, 2013) (possible prejudice of 6 of 59 jurors, or 10%, not sufficient to require change of venue, citing Gear ). Phillips v. State, 284 Ga.App. 224, 644 S.E.2d 153 (March 14, 2007). Although newspapers with article on defendant’s trial were available at the courthouse door, only one prospective juror reported having read the article. “Thus, the jury selection process did not reveal actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. [Cits.] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Phillips’s motion for a change of venue.”