☢ test - Í

Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006). “To determine whether a trial setting is inherently prejudicial, courts consider the size of the community, the extent of the media coverage, and the nature of the media coverage. Barnes [ v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998)]. In this case, the trial court reviewed the media coverage of the case at hand and properly determined that it would not affect the jurors’ ability to remain impartial.” Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (October 16, 2006). “Denny contends that the trial court erroneously denied his oral motion for a change of venue and for a mistrial made during trial. The basis of the motion was that on the first day of trial, a local newspaper published an article which detailed the defendants’ criminal pasts, and Denny’s attorney saw at least one juror eating lunch near a stand where editions of the newspaper were being sold. But, the contention of error is without merit. The trial court instructed the jurors not to read any news accounts of the case, and it is presumed that jurors follow trial courts’ instructions. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 68(9) (623 SE 2d 491) (2005). Denny has made no showing that any juror failed to follow the court’s instructions. Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to not conduct further inquiry and to deny the request for a change of venue and a mistrial. Id. See also Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 545(8) (255 S.E.2d 5) (1979).” Isaac v. State, 275 Ga.App. 254, 620 S.E.2d 483 (August 29, 2005). “‘ The inquiry into a request for a change of venue is two pronged. First, the court must consider whether the atmosphere in the community is so inherently prejudicial due to pretrial publicity that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial in the community. Secondly, the court must consider whether the defendant cannot receive a fair trial due to the prejudice of individual jurors.’ Lemley v. State, 258 Ga. 554, 556(4) (372 S.E.2d 421) (1988). Counsel for Isaac filed a motion for a change of venue which the trial court denied. In evaluating the first prong – whether the community atmosphere is prejudicial – the court must determine whether the pretrial publicity was factually incorrect, inflammatory, or reflected a hostile atmosphere. [Cit.] Most of the jurors in this case indicated that they had heard, read, or seen something relating to Isaac’s case, but no evidence of inflammatory, untrue, or inaccurate publicity was brought to the court’s attention. The second prong involves a determination of the individual jurors’ prejudice, which can be shown without dispute by reviewing the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors. See Krist v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 536, 538(2) (198 S.E.2d 161) (1973). Here, the trial court noted that jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. ‘[A] high volume of information does not necessarily cause the information to be inflammatory. The constitution mandates freedom of expression, and the freedom to listen naturally follows. The result may be an informed public or a misinformed public. Being informed or even misinformed is not always the same as being inflamed or prejudiced.’ Lemley, supra, 258 Ga. at 556. All of the jurors, except one, who was excused, informed the court that they would have no problem laying aside any impressions or opinions that they might have formed, or with rendering a verdict based on the evidence presented in court and the charge of the law given by the court. Although Isaac argues that the publicity surrounding the case might have prejudiced the potential jurors, there is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion or that any of the jurors had any fixed opinion as to guilt or innocence from unfavorable pre-trial publicity. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 361(1) (283 S.E.2d 238) (1981). We therefore find no error.” Accord, Crawford v. State , 294 Ga.App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (November 19, 2008) (defendant failed to show either of two prongs). Perkinson v. State, 279 Ga. 232, 610 S.E.2d 533 (March 14, 2005). “Perkinson claims that the trial court erred by refusing to change venue. ‘A trial court must order a change of venue in a death penalty case when a defendant can make a “substantive showing of the likelihood of prejudice by reason of extensive publicity.” [Cit.]’ Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 347(2), 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998). In order to prevail on this claim, Perkinson must show that his trial setting was inherently prejudicial as a result of pretrial publicity or that there was actual bias on the part of individual jurors. See Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 706(2), 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000). When determining whether the trial setting was inherently prejudicial, courts consider the size of the community, the extent of the media coverage, and the nature of the media coverage. Barnes, supra. The trial court found that Bartow County was no longer a small community and that the media coverage, while extensive at times, was not inflammatory or prejudicial. Most of the news reports simply related the allegations in the indictment and other undisputed aspects of the case, such as that Perkinson had been arrested and charged with the murder of [victim] and other offenses, that the district attorney was seeking the death penalty, and that Perkinson was alleging that he was mentally retarded; this is information that prospective jurors were apprised of during voir dire. [Cit.] The trial court was particularly concerned with a lengthy article that appeared in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution at the beginning of voir dire that included some information that would not be admissible during the guilt-innocence phase, such as Perkinson’s juvenile court record, but it determined that relatively few prospective jurors had read this article. See Gissendaner, supra. We conclude, upon review of the record, that the pretrial media coverage was ‘neither so extensive and inflammatory nor so reflective of “an atmosphere of hostility” as to require a change of