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venue.’ Id. at 706, 532 S.E.2d 677. Compare Tyree v. State, 262 Ga. 395, 395-397(1), 418 S.E.2d 16 (1992). With regard to whether there was actual bias on the part of individual jurors,” fact that 15 out of 100 potential jurors “were excused for cause due to bias resulting from pretrial publicity. … does not indicate an inherently prejudicial environment for Perkinson’s trial. [Cits.]” Accord, Griffin v. State , 282 Ga. 215, 647 S.E.2d 36 (June 25, 2007); Williams v. State , 286 Ga. 884, 692 S.E.2d 374 (March 29, 2010) (change of venue not demanded where “all jurors stated they could set aside whatever they may have read or heard;” Augusta paper printed 38 articles and six letters to editor over 16 months before trial, but coverage was not “so extensive and inflammatory nor so reflective of an atmosphere of hostility as to require a change of venue,” quoting Perkinson .). Maddox v. State, 278 Ga. 823, 607 S.E.2d 587 (January 10, 2005). No error in trial court’s refusal to change venue: “‘The trial court has the discretion to grant a change of venue and its discretion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. “ In a motion for a change of venue, the petitioner must show (1) that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or (2) that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible.” [Cit .]. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when [defendant]: (1) made no showing that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial, i.e., that any publicity was factually incorrect, inflammatory, or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility; and (2) failed to demonstrate that [he] could not receive a fair trial due to the prejudice of individual jurors since only [one] potential juror [was] excused for having a fixed opinion about [defendant’s] guilt ... [Cit.]’ Eckman v. State, 274 Ga. 63(4) (548 S.E.2d 310) (2001). See also Morgan v. State, 276 Ga. 72(4) (575 S.E.2d 468) (2003).” Here, only “[o]ne of the 36 venire members was excused for cause because of the effect on her of several newspaper articles reporting the commission of the crimes.” Accord as to general standard, Denny v. State , 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (October 16, 2006). Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488, (October 25, 2004). “The trial court ordered a change of venue for Riley’s trial whereby jurors from Walton County would be selected for the Newton County trial. OCGA § 17-7-150(a)(3). Riley alleges that venue should have been changed again because some of the prospective Walton County jurors had heard about the case, but this allegation is without merit due to the relatively few prospective jurors who had heard about the case and the fact that only 8 out of 93 prospective jurors were excused for fixed opinions resulting from pretrial publicity. See King v. State, 273 Ga. 258(4) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000); Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110(5) (416 S.E.2d 78) (1992). Also, the slight racial disparity between the Walton County and Newton County jury pools did not justify another change of venue. See Terrell [ v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 44(7) (572 S.E.2d 595) (2002).]” Groves v. State, 263 Ga.App. 828, 590 S.E.2d 136 (October 2, 2003). Defendant waived right to seek change of venue in his trial for sexual assault against school students based on media coverage and conduct of “Child Abuse Awareness barbecue across the street from the courthouse on the same day that jury selection was scheduled” by failing to raise those issues until after trial although known to him at the time. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). In defendant’s capital murder trial, “the trial court did not err by declining to change venue when only 8.4 percent of the prospective jurors were excused because of opinions formed from their exposure to pretrial publicity and rumors, particularly in light of the soundness of the trial court’s rulings on King’s motions to have jurors excused for cause. See Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 111(5), 416 S.E.2d 78 (1992).” Brown v. State, 246 Ga.App. 60, 539 S.E.2d 545 (September 19, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault with intent to murder, and related offenses, affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying motion for change of venue, based on pretrial publicity. “[I]n denying the motion, the trial court noted that 20 of the 25 articles submitted by Brown with his motion to change venue dealt with his escape. Importantly, the court noted: ‘Defense Counsel admits that there probably would not have been a Motion for Change of Venue without the additional media coverage from the alleged escape.’ In Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 230(14), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985), the court stated: ‘we observe that courts will generally be less likely to closely scrutinize the prejudicial effect of publicity upon a defendant’s trial in cases where that publicity is created by the defendant’s escape attempt than in cases where the publicity stems from other sources.’” Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (July 5, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied change of venue. 1. “A capital defendant seeking a change of venue must show that the trial setting was inherently prejudicial as a result of pretrial publicity or show actual bias on the part of the individual jurors. Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 286(3), 498 S.E.2d 502 (1998); Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592, 594(1)(a), 481 S.E.2d 821 (1997); Jones v. State, 261 Ga. 665, 666(2), 409 S.E.2d 642 (1991) (holding a change of venue is required when a