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‘defendant can make a substantive showing of the likelihood of prejudice by reason of extensive publicity’). The trial court acted properly in reserving its ruling on Gissendaner's motion for a change of venue until voir dire had been conducted because ‘[t]he decisive factor in determining whether a change of venue is required is “the effect of the publicity on the ability of prospective jurors to be objective.”’ Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 822(19), 525 S.E.2d 339 (1999) (quoting Freeman v. State, 268 Ga. 185, 186-187(2), 486 S.E.2d 348 (1997)). During voir dire, it became apparent that a large portion of the pretrial publicity had occurred long before the case was ready for trial. See Freeman v. State, 268 Ga. at 186-187(2), 486 S.E.2d 348; see also Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 574(17), 449 S.E.2d 98 (1994). Furthermore, this early publicity did not implicate Gissendaner in her husband's death. … Nevertheless, we must acknowledge, as did the trial court, that some of the later publicity was potentially damaging to Gissendaner and that its effect upon the jury pool warrants careful consideration. We most carefully consider the publicity surrounding this Court's ruling on interim review that an inculpatory statement by Gissendaner should be suppressed. Gissendaner v. State, 269 Ga. 495, 500 S.E.2d 577 (1998); see Tolver, 269 Ga. at 533(4), 500 S.E.2d 563; see also Tyree v. State, 262 Ga. 395, 395- 397(1), 418 S.E.2d 16 (1992). Upon our review of the newspaper and television coverage documented in the record, we conclude that it was neither so extensive and inflammatory nor so reflective of ‘an atmosphere of hostility’ as to require a change of venue. Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780, 782(2), 514 S.E.2d 205 (1999).” Accord, Warren v. State , 245 Ga.App. 768, 538 S.E.2d 840 (August 31, 2000) (“The mere existence of newspaper stories about a case does not render the trial setting inherently prejudicial.”). 2. Excusal of 14 out of 111 jurors based on exposure to pretrial publicity “is not indicative of the kind of inherently prejudicial environment requiring a change of venue. See Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 111(5), 416 S.E.2d 78 (1992).” Bolick v. State, 244 Ga.App. 567, 536 S.E.2d 242 (June 22, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no change of venue required where “the victim in this case was related to ‘prominent’ members of the legal community.” Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (June 12, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for change of venue. State initially consented to defendant’s change of venue request, and trial court granted it without hearing based on consent. Three years later, however, “the State revoked its consent and moved for an evidentiary hearing on whether venue should remain in Hall County due to the paucity of media coverage in the three-plus years since the crimes were committed. The trial court initially denied this motion, but then it reconsidered and ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether Hall County was inherently prejudicial due to pretrial publicity. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that venue would remain in Hall County.” Held, no abuse of discretion in reconsidering the matter. “[T]he granting of Morrow's motion for a change of venue had been based solely on the consent of the parties and there had not been a finding by the trial court that an impartial jury could not be obtained in Hall County. See OCGA § 17–7–150(a)(1); Johnston, supra. Moreover, no transfer county had ever been designated by the trial court. We conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering an evidentiary hearing on whether an impartial jury could be obtained in Hall County, and that it had the discretion to order that venue remain in Hall County.” Williams v. State , 272 Ga. 335, 528 S.E.2d 518 (May 1, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for change of venue. Defendant’s claim that because town is a small and tightly-knit community, members of the venire were likely to know persons associated with either the crime or the State’s investigation and prosecution of defendant, is unavailing. “The trial court's relevant inquiry in deciding appellant's motion was not whether the community remembered or was familiar with the case being tried, but rather ‘“whether the jurors at ... trial had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.”’ Crawford v. State, 257 Ga. 681, 683, 362 S.E.2d 201 (1987). A movant for a change of venue based upon excessive pretrial publicity has the burden of proving ‘“(1) that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial, or (2) that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible.”’ Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 128, 475 S.E.2d 627 (1996). … The trial court identified only two jurors who stated they had actually either read or heard about the case, and noted that those individuals also stated affirmatively that they were able to set aside what they had heard or read, and to impartially consider the evidence. See Brady v. State, 270 Ga. 574, 513 S.E.2d 199 (1999).” Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). “[T]he trial court ordered a change of venue from Lumpkin County to Cherokee County. However, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-150(a)(3), the trial court ordered that the jury would be selected from Cherokee County, but that the trial would physically take place in Lumpkin County.” Held, this practice was authorized by the code section and by USCR 19.2(B). Distinguishing Hardwick v. State, 264 Ga. 161, 164-165(2), 442 S.E.2d 236 (1994) (procedure was not authorized by statute until July 1, 1995).