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financial information was appropriated resides or is found, or in any county in which any other part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in such county.’ OCGA § 16–9–125.” “And it is possible for various persons to be parties to ‘a single [criminal] agreement (and thus one conspiracy) even though they do not know the identity of one another, and even though they are not all aware of the details of the plan of operation.’ Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 299(3)(c) (305 S.E.2d 82) (1983).” Sherrell v. State, 317 Ga.App. 571, 731 S.E.2d 790 (September 6, 2012). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove venue: “Here, [victim] C.S. testified that shortly after marrying Sherrell, the couple moved into Sherrell's mother's residence, which was in the town of Shady Dale in Jasper County. And she further testified that she was living at the Shady Dale residence at the time of the May 6, 2010 incident, which was the subject of the charges in the indictment. In addition, the Jasper County Sheriff's deputy who was dispatched to investigate the domestic disturbance at the Shady Dale residence on May 6, 2010, testified that when he met with C.S. at the residence she had bruises on her face and neck and a bandage on her forehead. Given this testimony, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the aggravated assaults that Sherrell inflicted upon his wife occurred in Jasper County.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga.App. 687, 727 S.E.2d 511 (April 19, 2012). Conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; evidence that drug investigation operation was “here in Bulloch County” was sufficient to establish venue. Boyd v. State, 314 Ga.App. 883, 726 S.E.2d 135 (March 19, 2012). Conviction for contributing to delinquency affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove venue. “[T]here was testimony by the officer that Boyd had told him ‘that [victim A.K.] had just been in Cobb County for an hour, and they had left the other gentleman's house and walked down to the park together to spend time together.’ While somewhat vague, this testimony supports a finding that A.K. had been in the present county, Cobb County, for an hour when the officer confronted them. Further, the arresting officer was on duty for the Cobb County Police Department when he received the call from dispatch to investigate the park. This evidence, when taken together and construed in favor of the verdict, was sufficient to prove that venue was proper in Cobb County,” citing Prescott (February 6, 2012), below . Bentley v. State, 314 Ga.App. 599, 724 S.E.2d 890 (March 5, 2012). Child molestation conviction affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove venue. “Here, J.B. testified that the molestation incident occurred near a church close to Yorkville. A police officer from the Paudling County Sheriff's Office, who was investigating the crime, testified that he and the victim located the church in question about a week prior to trial, and that the church was within Paulding County. ‘Where the victim testifies where the crime took place, and an officer identifies that location as being within a certain county, the officer's testimony is not hearsay. In addition to this direct testimony of venue, the testimony that the officer investigating the crime was a [Paulding County] officer provided further evidence that the crime took place in [Paulding County] since public officials are believed to have performed their duties properly and not to have exceeded their authority unless clearly proven otherwise.’ (Citations, punctuation, and footnotes omitted.) Bravo v. State, 269 Ga.App. 242, 245(2) (603 S.E.2d 669) (2004); see also Scott [ v. State, 302 Ga.App. 111, 112(1)(a) (690 S.E.2d 242) (2010)] (holding that while the officer's county of employment did not, by itself, establish venue, the totality of the evidence was sufficient to prove venue). Consequently, the State provided ample evidence to establish venue in this case.” State v. Prescott, 290 Ga. 528, 722 S.E.2d 738 (February 6, 2012). Reversing 309 Ga.App. 541, 710 S.E.2d 672 (2011), evidence was sufficient to prove venue in child molestation case. Evidence showed that offense occurred at Screven County High School; that it “was investigated by a school resource officer who was an employee of the Screven County Sheriff's Office;” and that “Screven County Sheriff's Office forms were used for Miranda waiver purposes.” Babbitt v. State, 314 Ga.App. 115, 723 S.E.2d 10 (January 27, 2012). Trial court properly denied defendant’s “motion to dismiss the State's indictment charging him with ten counts of violating OCGA § 16–9–58, which prohibits a person from acting with fraudulent intent to buy agricultural products and failing or refusing to pay for those products within a certain amount of time.” 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, venue was proper in county where victim shipped cattle to defendant, though defendant never left Kansas and only had contact with Georgia by phone calls to victim. “The Uniform Commercial Code provides that ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed’ payment is due at the ‘time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods ...’ OCGA § 11–2–310(a). Here, the parties agreed that a payment has not been made until ‘remittance is received.’ … Thus, there is some evidence that the place of payment was at the seller's location, i.e., in Laurens County.” “In addition, Babbitt made telephone contact with the seller in Laurens County to effect the purchase, the cattle were shipped from there, and Babbitt sent two payments there. Cf. Garmon v. State, 219 Ga. 575, 579 (134 S.E.2d 796) (1964) (under earlier version of statute, venue was proper in Worth County, Georgia when Kentucky