☢ test - Í

purchaser made telephone arrangements to buy from seller in Worth County and sent trucks there to pick up cattle and deliver checks, which proved to be not covered by sufficient funds). And even if Babbitt's fraudulent intent arose in Kansas sometime after the cattle were shipped, the crime was not consummated until he failed or refused to pay. ‘If the commission of a crime under the laws of this state commenced outside the state is consummated within this state, the crime shall be considered as having been committed in the county where it is consummated.’ OCGA § 17–2–2(d). Based on the plain reading of OCGA § 16–9–58, the wording of the bills of lading, and Georgia law regarding venue, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Babbitt's motion to dismiss.” 2. Code section is unlike theft, for venue purposes . “[B]roadly speaking, theft criminalizes the act of taking. And Babbitt was not charged with theft but with violating a statute that criminalizes acting with fraudulent intent to buy certain items and then failing or refusing to pay for those items.” Thus, while venue would have been improper for theft charge outside Kansas, it was proper in Laurens County here. Alexis v. State, 313 Ga.App. 283, 721 S.E.2d 205 (December 8, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; evidence was sufficient to establish venue where officer testified that the “area” where the crimes occurred was in Dekalb County. “Here, the testimony of the victim and of Alexis' co-defendants established that the robbery occurred very near, within human sight distances of, the intersection of two specific roads. The testimony of the officer, who was familiar with the area where the roads intersected, established that the area was in DeKalb County. While ‘area’ near an ‘intersection’ is somewhat vague, the jury was nevertheless authorized to conclude that the officer was using the terms in a broad enough sense to encompass the location of the crime, based upon his familiarity with the area. See Ward v. State, 270 Ga.App. 427, 428 (606 S.E.2d 877) (2004) (testimony that an intersection where a crime occurred was within the county was sufficient to prove venue as to that crime beyond a reasonable doubt).” Dixson v. State, 313 Ga.App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555 (November 23, 2011). Physical precedent only. Theft by receiving and related convictions affirmed. “Although Dixson contends that the State failed to prove venue, OCGA § 16–8–11 provides that, when prosecuting charges for theft by receiving, ‘the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft.’ Here, the State clearly demonstrated that venue was proper in Dawson County, where Dixson began driving away in a vehicle containing the stolen goods.” Adams v. State, 312 Ga.App. 570, 718 S.E.2d 899 (November 15, 2011). Convictions for attempting to entice a child for indecent purposes, and making false statement, affirmed. Venue for attempting to entice child under OCGA § 16–6–5 properly lay where either defendant or the purported child was at time of enticing. “The crime as alleged focuses on Adams's utilization of an online chat service to entice [purported child] Savannah. [Investigator] Still testified that she was located in White County when she posed as Savannah to communicate with Adams on the Internet. Based on the nature of the online service used in this case, we conclude that venue was proper either in White County or in the county in which Adams utilized the online chat service. See Selfe v. State, 290 Ga.App. 857, 861–862(2) (660 S.E.2d 727) (2008) (in a case in which the State alleged a violation of the CPCEA [Computer Pornography and Child Exploitation Act, OCGA § 16-12-100.2] and obscene internet contact, both of which involved the use of online services, venue was proper in the county where the alleged victim was located during the online contact with the defendant); Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 415–416(2) (651 S.E.2d 55) (2007) (venue in a case involving a violation of the CPCEA, which focuses on utilization of an online or Internet service, is properly laid in either the county where the accused transmitted the obscene images and solicitations or the county where the alleged victim received the online contact). See also Rogers v. State, 298 Ga.App. 895, 898(3)(c) (681 S.E.2d 693) (2009) (in case alleging the use of a telephone to facilitate the commission of a felony, the offense was ‘“committed” for venue purposes’ both in the county in which the call was made and county where the call was received).” Accord, Brown v. State , 321 Ga.App. 798, 743 S.E.2d 474 (May 20, 2013) (defendant in Tennessee could be prosecuted in Georgia for communicating online with officer in Georgia posing as child); Lopez v. State , 326 Ga.App. 770, 757 S.E.2d 436 (April 2, 2014) (venue proper despite defendant’s claim that police lured him to Catoosa County by posing as sexually-willing minor online). Zachery v. State, 312 Ga.App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (November 7, 2011). Evidence established venue for financial identity fraud based on application for and use of credit card in victims’ names. “Under the financial identity fraud statutes, … a crime will be considered to have been committed in any county where the consumer or business victim, i.e., the entity whose means of identification or financial information was appropriated, resides or is found, or in any county in which any other part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in such county. OCGA § 16–9–125.” Accord, Manhertz (October 9, 2012), above (venue good as to co-conspirator in county where another possessed identifying information, though she personally was never there).