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Bizzard v. State, 312 Ga.App. 185, 718 S.E.2d 52 (October 20, 2011). Aggravated battery conviction reversed for lack of evidence of venue. Judge’s statement at bench trial that “he was familiar with the location of Strickland Street” did not amount to taking judicial notice of venue. “The Georgia Supreme Court has held that ‘if a trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.’ Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 775(4)(a) (504 S.E.2d 679) (1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, Jones [ v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 903, n. 13 (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000)].” In re: E.C., 311 Ga.App. 549, 716 S.E.2d 601 (August 30, 2011). Delinquency adjudication based on motor vehicle theft reversed; street address of offense, without evidence of what county the address was in, was insufficient to establish venue. Brinson v. State, 289 Ga. 150, 709 S.E.2d 789 (April 26, 2011). Evidence was sufficient to establish venue in defendant’s murder prosecution: “Effingham County 911 dispatchers received appellant's 911 call and dispatched Effingham County EMS and Rincon police to appellant's address. See Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 317, 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002) (public employees are assumed to be acting properly and not to have exceeded their jurisdiction). Compare In re: B.R., 289 Ga.App. 6, 8–9(2), 656 S.E.2d 172 (2007) (investigating officer's county of employment alone does not prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt). Moreover, the victim's attending physician at Memorial Health telephoned the Effingham County sheriff's office to report that a crime was committed at appellant's address. Compare Lee v. State, [305 Ga.App. 214, 699 S.E.2d 389 (2010)] (nurse did not state that crime occurred in Effingham County, only that victim and her case came from that county). Finally, an Effingham County arrest warrant showing appellant's address to be in Effingham County was introduced in evidence. See Kimble v. State, 301 Ga.App. 237, 241, 687 S.E.2d 242 (2009) (search warrant is evidence of venue). Viewing the evidence as a whole, we find it sufficient to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 902–903(2), 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000) (State may use both direct and circumstantial evidence to establish venue).” Evidence didn’t show that Rincon is entirely within Effingham County. Accord, Perkins v. State , 319 Ga.App. 651, 738 S.E.2d 106 (February 4, 2013) (investigation by Dekalb police was circumstantial evidence of venue in Dekalb County). Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 709 S.E.2d 780 (April 18, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; venue was properly proven without evidence that Clayton County is in Georgia. “‘The Court sat, and the trial was had in the County of [Clayton], and the proof was that the crime was committed ... in the County of [Clayton]. That the Court was sitting in the County of [Clayton] and State of Georgia was a fact known to the Court from its own records and the public law. When therefore it was proven that the crime was committed in the County of [Clayton], it was proven that it was committed in the County in which the Court entertained jurisdiction over it. Non constat that there is in Georgia any other County called [Clayton]. There is no use in discussing a question like this. If such an exception were sustainable, it could be done alone by taking leave of common sense, and by yielding the solid virtue of judicial investigation to a distinction too subtle to command the least respect.’ Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 619 (1852). See also OCGA § 17–2–2 ( State need only prove the county in which the crime was committed ).” Accord, Cade v. State , 289 Ga. 805, 716 S.E.2d 196 (October 3, 2011). Thompson v. Brown, 288 Ga. 855, 708 S.E.2d 270 (March 18, 2011). Habeas court properly granted defendant relief from his convictions for selling cocaine; 1. appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise State’s failure to prove venue. Evidence showed only that drug sales were made while driving in Vidalia. “The habeas court properly took judicial notice that Vidalia is located in two different counties, Toombs and Montgomery.” State’s reliance on OCGA § 17-2-2(e), allowing finding of venue in any county through which a moving vehicle traveled if “it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed,” is misplaced. “Here, because the informant would have known the general locations where the two sales occurred and because the agents knew the exact route that the informant and Brown traveled, the State could have readily determined whether the drug sales occurred in Toombs County and offered evidence to the jury on that essential point. See Rogers v. State , 298 Ga. App. 895, 899 (681 S.E.2d 693) (2009) (holding that OCGA § 17-2-2(e) was inapplicable ‘because the State could have readily determined where the crime was committed’). OCGA § 17-2-2(e) is therefore inapplicable to this case.” 2. “[T]his Court strongly urges trial courts to begin giving an appropriate charge on venue tailored to the facts of the case. Lynn v. State , 275 Ga. 288, 290 (565 S.E.2d 800) (2002).” Powers v. State, 309 Ga.App. 262, 709 S.E.2d 821 (March 9, 2011). Aggravated child molestation convictions reversed; no evidence that address in Canton was located in Cherokee County.