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of metabolites that can remain in a defendant’s urine two to four days after the drug was ingested.’ [fn: Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga.App. 44, 45(1) (589 S.E.2d 864) (2003). West argues that we should not rely on Pruitt because it relies, in part, on Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 626(1) (398 S.E.2d 360) (1990), where the Supreme Court required only slight proof of venue. While the slight evidence rule has been overturned, see Jones [ v. State, 272 Ga. 900 (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000)], Pruitt was decided under the current rule and its reasoning is sound. ] In such case, ‘[v]enue is appropriate in the county where the defendant was present immediately before being asked to provide the urine sample. ’ Id.” Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 651 S.E.2d 55 (September 24, 2007). “The plain language of OCGA § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) and (e)(1) reflects that the offenses criminalized therein are capable of occurring in more than one county; hence, venue in [defendant’s] case could legally have been laid in either Cherokee [where defendant was] or Fayette County [where victim was]. See generally State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 6 (622 S.E.2d 836) (2005).” Accord, Selfe v. State , 290 Ga.App. 857, 660 S.E.2d 727 (January 30, 2008). McKinney v. State, 282 Ga. 230, 647 S.E.2d 44 (June 25, 2007). Trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss indictments; charges of violating Georgia Ethics in Government Act by “failing to register with the State of Georgia Ethics Commission after [defendants] organized an independent committee to oppose the election of … a Gwinnett County Commissioner” and “failing to file certain disclosure reports and contribution reports with the Ethics Commission” should have been brought in Fulton County, the only location of the Ethics Commission. “In enacting this law, the Legislature provided no definition for the act of filing and included no statutory component to the crime which would qualify it as a continuing offense. Compare State v. Kell, 276 Ga. 423 (577 S.E.2d 551) (2003) (venue for Medicaid fraud). As a result, under the statute as it is currently written, the only proper venue in this case was Fulton County, the county where the State Ethics Commission is located and the disclosure reports in question are required to be filed. Therefore, the trial court erred by denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment.” In re: J.A.L., 284 Ga.App. 220, 644 S.E.2d 162 (March 14, 2007). Trial court properly took judicial notice of venue; “the juvenile court allowed J.A.L. an opportunity to challenge the State’s evidence concerning venue and to voice his objection concerning whether judicial notice of venue should be taken here.” Burchett v. State, 283 Ga.App. 271, 641 S.E.2d 262 (January 12, 2007). At roadblock, defendant smelled of alcohol, and admitted to officer that “‘he had [had] a beer earlier that evening.’ Burchett did not give any other information about when or where he had consumed that beer, nor did he offer such evidence at trial.” Held, venue for defendant’s prosecution for alcohol possession underage was properly proven: “Under Georgia law, ‘[i]f in any case it cannot be determined in what county a crime was committed, it shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been committed.’ OCGA § 17-2-2(h). In Hanson v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that evidence that the underaged defendant ‘had the odor of alcohol on his person, appeared to be in an intoxicated state, and admitted that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage’ was sufficient to establish venue for possession of an alcoholic beverage by an underaged person in the county in which the officer encountered the person. Hanson v. State, 275 Ga. 470, 471(1), (2) (569 S.E.2d 513) (2002). See also Lee v. State, 201 Ga.App. 827, 828(1) (412 S.E.2d 563) (1991) (evidence that a police officer smelled alcohol on an underaged person’s breath is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the person possessed an alcoholic beverage); Hadaway v. State, 190 Ga.App. 5, 6(2) (378 S.E.2d 127) (1989) (accord). Similarly, the evidence in this case showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense might have been committed in Forsyth County, and the case was properly tried there. OCGA § 17-2-2(h); Hanson v. State, 275 Ga. at 471(2).” Mack v. State, 283 Ga.App. 172, 641 S.E.2d 194 (January 4, 2007). Venue for fleeing and eluding and possession of open container charges was established by proof that residence where chase began was in Stephens County. “Even though the chase may have ended in another county, the offense of eluding the officers was complete at the moment Mack refused at the residence to stop his vehicle despite the visual and audible signals to bring the vehicle to a stop, and thus the continuation of the chase into possibly another county did not destroy venue,” citing, inter alia, Mullady (November 15, 2004), below; Ryan v. State , 277 Ga.App. 490, 627 S.E.2d 128 (2006) (“drugs found in vehicle when stopped in second county allowed jury to conclude drugs were in vehicle when chase began in first county”). Graham v. State, 282 Ga.App. 576, 639 S.E.2d 384 (November 28, 2006). RICO conspiracy : “Although the evidence does not show that [defendant] alone sold or personally possessed any of the stolen or altered vehicles in Newton County or committed forgery in that county, the evidence presented was sufficient to show that at least one predicate act of the conspiracy took place in Newton County and that venue was proper there. See Davitte v. State, 238 Ga.App. 720,