☢ test - Í

726(2)(a) (520 S.E.2d 239) (1999).” Hinkle v. State, 282 Ga.App. 328, 638 S.E.2d 781 (November 8, 2006). “We find that there was sufficient evidence of venue as to the offenses of obstructing a police officer and battery, which took place at the time of Hinkle’s arrest, as Officer Kirkpatrick testified that he apprehended Hinkle in Floyd County. See Ward v. State, 270 Ga.App. 427, 427-428 (606 S.E.2d 877) (2004).” Martin v. State, 281 Ga.App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (August 11, 2006). Kidnapping conviction reversed where evidence showed victim was seized in Tennessee, although she was transported through Georgia. “Kidnapping is not a continuous offense and is consummated in the county where the victim was seized and asported to some degree. Robinson v. State, 210 Ga.App. 175, 176(2) (435 S.E.2d 466) (1993); Harris v. State, 165 Ga.App. 249, 250-251(1) (299 S.E.2d 924) (1983). Accordingly, venue for the kidnapping charge would not lie in Walker County if Martin abducted the victim in Tennessee. Miller v. State, 174 Ga.App. 42, 44(3) (329 S.E.2d 252) (1985) (venue for kidnapping charge was not proven where evidence showed that victim was seized in Tennessee and taken to Georgia).” Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (June 12, 2006). 1. Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to satisfy OCGA § 17-2-2(h), that murder “ might have been commited in Dekalb County:” “Hinton and [victim] Melendi left the SBCC [Softball Country Club] within five minutes of each other after Hinton had spent an inappropriate amount of the softball game they worked talking to Melendi, that her car was found abandoned at a gas station adjacent to the SBCC, that a person whose voice characteristics matched Hinton said on the telephone he had taken Melendi at ‘the station,’ and that the SBCC and the gas station were in DeKalb County.” 2. OCGA § 17-2-2(h) does not violate Georgia Constitution’s mandate that criminal prosecutions be conducted “in the county where the crime was committed. That contention is controlled adversely to Hinton by Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180(1) (274 S.E.2d 455) (1981), where this Court rejected the same argument: ‘[OCGA § 17-2-2(h)] does not violate the mandate of [Art. 6, Sec. 2, Par. 6, Ga. Const. 1983]. It merely provides a mechanism by which that mandate can be carried out when the place in which the crime is committed cannot be determined with certainty.’” Accord, Rogers v. State , 290 Ga. 401, 721 S.E.2d 864 (January 23, 2012) (“‘[U] se of subsection (h) to determine venue in a homicide case is not precluded. [Cits.]’ Nelson v. State, 262 Ga. 763, 765(2) (426 S.E.2d 357) (1993), overruled on other grounds, Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 10(5) (515 S.E.2d 155) (1999).”). Nguyen v. State, 279 Ga.App. 129, 630 S.E.2d 636 (April 27, 2006). Evidence sufficed to prove venue: Coast Guard officer testified that place where his vessel encountered defendant’s was within Chatham County, and evidence showed that “members of the Coast Guard boarded the [defendant’s vessel] shortly after the victim was raped.” Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Whole court opinion; overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Proof was sufficient for jury to find venue in Jones County, although body was found in Crawford County years later: “The last time the victim was seen alive she was involved in an altercation with Glidewell at their Jones County home. Glidewell had been provoked by coming home to find that the victim intended to take their four-year-old son from him and go to a hotel where her lover was waiting. If Glidewell did kill the victim and he killed her in a moment of passion, as the jury necessarily found, then the death of the victim at her Jones County home is consistent with this finding. Thus, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was proper in Jones County because the victim died in Jones County. See [ Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 773(2), 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003)] (although evidence was conflicting as to where the victim died, the jury was authorized to conclude that State had proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt). ‘In the alternative, the jury was authorized to find, pursuant to OCGA § 17-2-2(h), that it could not determine in which county the homicide was committed and that the proper venue was [Jones] County because the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that that crime “might have been committed” in that county.’ (Citations omitted.) Cook v. State, 273 Ga. 828, 830(2) (546 S.E.2d 487) (2001).” Lembcke v. State, 277 Ga.App. 110, 625 S.E.2d 505 (December 28, 2005). “ ‘By long-standing precedent, proving that a crime took place within a city without also proving that the city is entirely within a county does not establish venue. ’ Graham v. State, 275 Ga. 290, 293(2) (565 S.E.2d 467) (2002). See Robinson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 186, 187 (581 S.E.2d 285) (2003). Thus, evidence that the false written statement was made in a Rome branch of the bank and that the false police report was made to the Rome police did not prove venue in Floyd County.” Accord, Melton v. State , 282 Ga.App. 685, 639 S.E.2d 411 (December 1, 2006); In re: D.D. , 287 Ga.App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (September 11, 2007); In re: J.B ., 289 Ga.App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (February 14, 2008); McKinney v. State , 294 Ga.App. 366, 670 S.E.2d 147 (November 4, 2008); Frasier v. State , 295 Ga.App. 596, 672 S.E.2d 668 (January 20, 2009) (no proof that entire City of Rome, or the northern part thereof, is in Floyd County) ; Mock v. State , 297 Ga.App. 884, 678 S.E.2d 545 (May 14, 2009)