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(no proof that Statesboro entirely within Bulloch County); Lee v. State , 305 Ga.App. 214, 699 S.E.2d 389 (July 13, 2010) (no proof that Guyton entirely within Effingham County); Alexander v. State , 311 Ga.App. 95, 714 S.E.2d 739 (July 18, 2011) (no proof that Milledgeville entirely within Baldwin County); In re: G.Q. , 313 Ga.App. 35, 720 S.E.2d 647 (November 29, 2011) (no proof that Hahira entirely within Lowndes County); Carter v. State , 320 Ga.App. 454, 740 S.E.2d 195 (March 18, 2013) (no proof that Jonesboro entirely within Clayton County). Short v. State, 276 Ga.App. 340, 623 S.E.2d 195 (November 14, 2005). Evidence was sufficient to establish venue for defendant’s offenses, committed in a moving vehicle traveling from one county to another . “[W]hen a crime is committed in transit or in more than one county, Georgia law provides special methods for establishing venue. For example, a crime committed on or immediately adjacent to a boundary line between two counties is considered committed in either county. OCGA § 17-2-2(b). Moreover, ‘in any case it cannot be determined in what county a crime was committed, it shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been committed.’ OCGA § 17-2-2(h). And under OCGA § 17-2-2(e): ‘[i]f a crime is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft traveling within this state and it cannot be readily determined in which county the crime was committed, the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the crime could have been committed through which the railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft has traveled.’ Accord, Harris v. State , 279 Ga.App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (May 25, 2006) (child molestation occurring in car traveling between child’s home and bus stop, beginning in county of prosecution; evidence was sufficient to establish venue); Arnold v. State , 284 Ga.App. 598, 645 S.E.2d 68 (March 28, 2007) (victim was kidnapped in Fulton County, but blindfolded and taken somewhere else, where she was sexually assaulted, then again transported and released, again in Fulton County. Venue was proper in Fulton County.); Boileau v. State , 285 Ga.App. 221, 645 S.E.2d 577 (April 12, 2007) (“Boileau entered the camper after the family stopped in Perry, Georgia (Houston County), and … he soon thereafter performed the sex acts against the victim. This was sufficient to establish that the crimes could have been committed in Houston County, Georgia.”); Prudhomme v. State , 285 Ga.App. 662, 647 S.E.2d 343 (June 4, 2007) (sex offense occurred “in a vehicle traveling on a road approximately one mile away from [defendant’s] Gordon County residence.”); Leftwich v. State , 299 Ga.App. 392, 682 S.E.2d 614 (July 7, 2009) (prosecution proper in Fulton County where victim kidnapped there, raped in an unknown location); Saxton v. State , 300 Ga.App. 535, 685 S.E.2d 780 (October 20, 2009) (“Since the victim was assaulted in a vehicle traveling through Fulton County, the state proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Aldridge v. State , 310 Ga.App. 502, 713 S.E.2d 682 (July 5, 2011) (robbery in moving vehicle); King v. State , 320 Ga.App. 90, 739 S.E.2d 654 (February 14, 2013) (defendant lived in Dooly County, sex offense occurred in his truck traveling from his home to Cordele); Taylor v. State , 328 Ga.App. 551, 759 S.E.2d 892 (July 9, 2014) (facts similar to Arnold ). State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (November 21, 2005). Venue for defendant’s identity fraud prosecution was proper in victim’s home county, although none of defendant’s acts occurred there; legislature’s declaration that a person or business’s “identifying information” is “found within the county where the consumer or business victim of the identity fraud resides or is found” means that “the ‘act’ which constitutes the crime of ‘identity fraud’ does occur in the county of the victim’s residence. … There is a valid connection between the act of accessing records and the use of information contained therein. Regardless of where the records were accessed, the use of the information obtained therefrom is consummated in the county where the victim lives. There is not any constitutional impediment to the authority of the General Assembly to define a crime in such a manner as to provide that a defendant’s conduct which takes place in one jurisdiction culminates in an unauthorized act or, as in this case, an unauthorized use occurring in another.” Trial court’s ruling, that the venue provision of the identity fraud statute was unconstitutional, is reversed. Three justices dissent. Replaces prior opinion issued October 3, 2005. Henry v. State, 279 Ga. 615, 619 S.E.2d 609 (September 19, 2005). “The evidence shows that the crimes occurred in an apartment complex located at 900 Conley Road, and that this section of Conley Road is in Fulton County. … ‘[T]estimony that a certain site is on a specific street and that the street is in a particular county is some proof that the site is in that county.’ Robinson v. State, 275 Ga. 143, 144(2) (561 S.E.2d 823) (2002).” Gould v. State, 273 Ga.App. 155, 614 S.E.2d 252 (May 3, 2005). Pretending to act as an investment advisor, defendant, from his office in Floyd County, used victim’s money for his own use. The money was transferred from victim’s Swiss bank account to defendant’s account in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, then used by an agent of defendant in Las Vegas for various purposes for the benefit of defendant and his family members. Held, venue was properly established in Floyd County: “In a prosecution for theft by taking, ‘the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft.’ OCGA § 16-8-11.” “[T]he