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language of OCGA § 17-2-2(h) (where county where crime occurred can’t be determined, “ it shall be considered to have been committed in any county” where evidence shows it might have been committed). Rather, approved jury instruction replaces “it shall be considered to have been committed” with “ the jury may consider whether it was committed....” Not error to charge the “shall be considered language” at trial pre-dating Napier decision, Glidewell v. State , 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006) (whole court opinion; overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Accord, Edmond v. State , 283 Ga. 507, 661 S.E.2d 520 (May 19, 2008); Epps v. State , 297 Ga.App. 66, 676 S.E.2d 791 (March 26, 2009) (“shall be considered” charge was not burden shifting “where the trial court also charged the jury ‘that each element of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; that venue is an element of any crime; that the State has the burden of proof on each element; and that such burden never shifts to the defendant,’” quoting Edmond .). Allison v. State, 259 Ga.App. 775, 577 S.E.2d 845 (February 7, 2003). Venue in Dekalb County sufficiently proven by evidence “that the Dekalb County police investigated the subject crimes, and that the Chief Medical Examiner for Dekalb County performed the autopsy.” Based on Chapman v. State , 275 Ga. 314, 565 S.E.2d 442 (June 10, 2002); exact opposite ruling from Slate v. State , 255 Ga.App. 796, 567 S.E.2d 86 (June 13, 2002) . Naylor v. State, 257 Ga.App. 899, 572 S.E.2d 410 (October 11, 2002). Victim wired money from his bank account in Fayette County, Georgia, to defendant’s bank account in Jacksonville, Florida, as part of a contract. Defendant never performed his part of the contract, and victim charged him with theft in Fayette County. Held, defendant’s theft conviction reversed for want of venue; “[I]n a prosecution for theft by taking, the crime shall be considered as having been committed, and venue is thus established, in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft.” Where the property in question is money, the prosecution can take place wherever the defendant received it or spent it. There was no evidence that defendant exercised control over the money in Fayette County. Compare to Gould, above (May 3, 2005). Grier v. State, 275 Ga. 430, 569 S.E.2d 837 (September 16, 2002). “[T]he State’s failure to establish venue rendered the judgment void because the court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes, and retrial is permitted under OCGA § 16-1-8(d)(1). For purposes of the trial court’s jurisdiction, there is no distinction between ... the State[’s] fail[ure] to prove venue, and ... a defendant [being] tried in a venue that is incorrect in that county.” Hanson v. State, 275 Ga. 470, 569 S.E.2d 513 (September 16, 2002). “[I]f it cannot be determined in what county a crime was committed, it shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been committed.” Graham v. State, 275 Ga. 290, 565 S.E.2d 467 (June 24, 2002). Murder conviction reversed for failure to prove venue. Evidence established that murder took place in City of Riverdale, but not within Clayton County. Trial court took judicial notice that Riverdale is entirely within Clayton County. Held, it was proper for the trial court to do this, but court then should have so instructed the jury, so that the jury would have a basis for finding that venue was proper. Without such an instruction, the jury, as fact finders, had no basis for finding that venue was proven, and conviction must be reversed. “[B]y taking judicial notice that the crimes occurred in Clayton County but not informing the jury of that noticed fact, the trial court took it upon itself to unilaterally decide the issue of venue. ... [P]roof of venue is essential to a criminal prosecution, and the authorities agree that in a jury trial, the jury determines whether venue has been established. In this matter, the trial court’s actions, in essence, improperly took the issue out of the jury’s hands.” “After taking judicial notice that the City of Riverdale is located entirely within Clayton County, the trial court should have informed the jury that it had taken judicial notice of that fact, ‘thus dispensing with the need for any evidence regarding [it].’ Moreover, we believe that in the future, when trial courts in criminal cases inform a jury that judicial notice of an adjudicative fact has been taken, trial judges would do well to follow Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g), by instructing the jury that it ‘may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.’” “Double jeopardy does not bar the State from retrying [defendant] for the crimes for which he was convicted, because our reversal today is due to an ‘evidentiary insufficiency concerning the procedural propriety of laying venue within a particular forum.’” See also Lynn v. State , 275 Ga. 288, 565 S.E.2d 800 (June 24, 2002). Accord, In re: D.D. , 287 Ga.App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (September 11, 2007). Slate v. State, 255 Ga.App. 796, 567 S.E.2d 86 (June 13, 2002). Evidence that local officer responded to call in performance of his duties at a specific location no longer sufficient to prove venue; evidence must affirmatively show that location is within the county in which court’s jurisdiction lies. Contrary rule in Chapman, below, is more often