☢ test - Í

followed in later cases, but see King v. State , 271 Ga.App. 384, 609 S.E.2d 725 (January 25, 2005). Accord, In re: B.R. (December 14, 2007), above; In re: J.B ., 289 Ga.App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (February 14, 2008); Quezada-Barrera v. State , 295 Ga.App. 747, 673 S.E.2d 126 (January 28, 2009) (Gwinnett County officer’s investigation insufficient to prove venue in Gwinnett County) ; Mock v. State , 297 Ga.App. 884, 678 S.E.2d 545 (May 14, 2009) (Statesboro officer’s investigation not enough to prove venue in Bulloch County); Carter v. State , 320 Ga.App. 454, 740 S.E.2d 195 (March 18, 2013) (“‘the investigating officers' county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard,’” quoting Mock .). Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 565 S.E.2d 442 (June 10, 2002). Evidence that case was investigated by Fulton County officer and Fulton County Medical Examiner was sufficient to establish venue in Fulton County. “In light of the well-settled principle that public officials are believed to have performed their duties properly and not to have exceeded their authority unless clearly proven otherwise, the jury was authorized to find the police officer acted within the territorial jurisdiction in which he testified he was employed.” Still cited with approval in Williams v. State , 262 Ga.App. 473, 585 S.E.2d 751 (July 22, 2003), Ruiz v. State , 277 Ga.App. 178, 626 S.E.2d 136 (January 9, 2006), Scott (January 25, 2010), above, Perkins v. State , 319 Ga.App. 651, 738 S.E.2d 106 (February 4, 2013), and Trammell v. State , 328 Ga.App. 45, 761 S.E.2d 470 (July 9, 2014), but questioned in King v. State , 271 Ga.App. 384, 609 S.E.2d 725 (January 25, 2005), In re: B.R. (December 14, 2007), and Twitty (November 2, 2015), above. Cited with apparent approval, but distinguished, Thompson v. Brown , 288 Ga. 855, 708 S.E.2d 270 (March 18, 2011). Sanders v. State, 252 Ga.App. 609, 556 S.E.2d 505 (November 14, 2001). Conviction for possession of marijuana affirmed. Defendant pled not guilty and case was submitted to trial court for decision based on stipulation of facts. Defendant stipulated to all elements of the offense and agreed that the only issue preserved for appeal was validity of search warrant and supporting affidavit. Held, defendant knowingly waived his right to raise the issue of improper venue on appeal by submitting the case in this fashion. In any event, affidavit attached to search warrant set out facts sufficient to establish venue. Stover v. State, 251 Ga.App. 215, 554 S.E.2d 221 (August 15, 2001). Criminal trespass conviction reversed for failure to prove or stipulate to venue. Venue is an essential element of a crime, and the state has the burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt whenever a criminal defendant pleads not guilty, even though a stipulation of fact or an admission as to the act underlying the charge in the accusation may occur during trial, as here. Tunarka v. State, 247 Ga.App. 578, 545 S.E.2d 15 (January 17, 2001). Drug convictions reversed for failure to establish venue. While testimony indicated that a package which was ultimately delivered to defendant was intercepted at the Fed Ex office in Cobb County, there was no evidence in the record of the county in which the defendant’s residence, where the drugs were found, was located. Held, the address alone was insufficient to establish that the address was in Cobb County. Further held, the defendant’s driver’s license list of 033 as the county (which correlates alphabetically to Cobb County) is insufficient to determine venue beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (October 2, 2000). Felony murder and related convictions reversed for failure to establish venue. “Slight evidence” rule as to proof of venue in criminal prosecutions is abolished. Defendant is always deemed to challenge venue, and proof is thus always required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. “At trial, the only evidence regarding venue concerned the county in which the murder victims’ neighbor lived. The neighbor testified, (1) that his home is located on Evans Drive, (2) that Evans Drive is located in Fulton County, and (3) that his home is located directly across the street from the murder victims’ home. However, while this testimony was somewhat relevant to the location of the neighbor’s home, it was irrelevant with regard to the locale of the victims’ home where the murder took place. It is entirely possible that the neighbor’s house is located in one county, while the houses located across the street are sited in an adjoining county. Moreover, a street name, standing alone, is never sufficient to establish venue, because streets frequently run through more than one county. [Cit.] Accordingly, this being the only evidence of record pertaining to venue, we conclude that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that venue for [defendant’s] murder trial was properly laid in Fulton County . ” Compare to Lowther (September 18, 2003), above. Distinguished in Henry v. State , 278 Ga. 554, 604 S.E.2d 469 (October 25, 2004) (testimony that “the address of the residence is in Fulton County” is sufficient to establish location of driveway as well). Cited with approval in Chandler v. State , 248 Ga.App. 154, 546 S.E.2d 296 (February 20, 2001); King v. State , 271 Ga.App. 384, 609 S.E.2d 725 (January 25, 2005); In re: D.D. , 287 Ga.App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (September 11, 2007); In re: B.R. (September 12, 2007), above; Mock v. State , 306 Ga.App. 93, 701 S.E.2d 567 (September 16, 2010) (street location, investigating agency insufficient); Grant (March 12, 2014),