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given county would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, authorize the inference by the jury that the uttering was committed in that same county. Howard v. State, 181 Ga.App. 187, 189-190, 351 S.E.2d 550 (1986) (whole court), citing Goldstein v. State, 94 Ga.App. 437(3), 95 S.E.2d 47 (1956).” Davitte v. State, 238 Ga.App. 720, 520 S.E.2d 239 (June 28, 1999). Evidence supported finding of venue in defendant’s RICO prosecution. “[A]t least one of the predicate acts for the RICO charge must have been committed in the county in which the criminal proceeding is brought. Chancey [ v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 432-433(6), 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986)]; Dover v. State, 192 Ga.App. 429, 432-433(2), 385 S.E.2d 417 (1989).” Venue was proven as to defendant even though he never entered or telephoned the county of venue because his co-defendants committed the offense (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute) there, and evidence supported finding that defendant was a party to the offense. Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (March 15, 1999). “The trial court correctly instructed the jury on venue for kidnapping with bodily injury by charging that ‘[t]here’s no requirement that the bodily injury be inflicted in the venue where the person was seized.’ See Krist v. State, 227 Ga. 85, 91, 179 S.E.2d 56 (1970).” Frisbey v. State, 236 Ga.App. 883, 514 S.E.2d 453 (March 11, 1999). Evidence was sufficient to establish venue: “During the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Carruth testified that he worked for DeKalb County Public Safety and that after he responded to the call concerning Frisbey, he contacted DeKalb Communications to verify the existence of the Cobb County warrant. Under Joiner [ v. State, 231 Ga.App. 61, 497 S.E.2d 642 (1998)], and the cases cited therein, the State is entitled to an inference that Carruth acted within his territorial jurisdiction when he investigated the incident and ultimately arrested Frisbey.” Garrett v. State, 236 Ga.App. 385, 512 S.E.2d 315 (February 10, 1999). Convictions on traffic offenses reversed; State presented no evidence of venue. Trial court ruled that Uniform Traffic Citations constituted proof of venue, but “‘a Uniform Traffic Citation upon which a ... prosecution is based ... is not evidence and cannot provide the factual predicate necessary to establish venue,’” quoting Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998). XX. WITNESSES A. ATTORNEYS AS WITNESSES McNair v. State, 330 Ga.App. 478, 767 S.E.2d 290 (December 16, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. No error in allowing Assistant District Attorney testify about out-of-court statement made by defendant’s cousin/co-conspirator. “McNair argues that the trial court erred in allowing the ADA to testify as to the cousin's prior inconsistent statements because the ADA was a prosecutor handling the case. ‘The practice of trial attorneys testifying is not approved by the courts except where made necessary by the circumstances of the case.’ Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 500(7), 271 S.E.2d 792 (1980). Because allowing an advocate to testify as a ‘witness poses innumerable threats to the integrity and reliability of the judicial process[,]’ Castell v. Kemp, 254 Ga. 556, 557, 331 S.E.2d 528 (1985), courts have often refused to permit a prosecutor to testify as a ‘witness unless there is a compelling need.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1098(IV)(F) (11 th Cir., 1990). Whether to allow a prosecutor to testify as a witness in a case is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. at 501(7), 271 S.E.2d 792. In this case, however, we need not reach the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the ADA to testify because the record shows that the ADA was not acting as a prosecutor in the case. The record shows that the ADA who testified was not responsible for trying McNair and that his only appearance during the trial of the case (other than as a witness) was to enter the courtroom briefly before jury selection commenced because the prosecutor who actually tried the case had planned to have the ADA assist him with jury selection. He did not question any prospective jurors. When it became clear that the ADA might need to offer testimony in the case, [fn] he was removed from the courtroom and was sequestered with the other trial witnesses. Further, defense counsel was notified prior to trial of his status as a potential witness. The record does not support a finding that the ADA was listed as counsel for the trial of the case, nor does the record support an inference that he was present in the courtroom for trial in a capacity that would lead the jury into believing that he was prosecuting the case. In fact, he testified that the instant case was not assigned to him, and he told the jury: ‘I have not been a part of preparing this case outside of meeting at the ... jail [to interview] Willie McNair.’” B. CHARACTER WITNESSES Gaskin v. State, 334 Ga.App. 758, 780 S.E.2d 426 (November 20, 2015). Child molestation conviction reversed. 1. Under