☢ test - Í

2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred by allowing use of defendant’s prior arrests to rebut defendant’s character witness as to his truthfulness, where the prior arrests weren’t “acts probative of untruthfulness.” Prior arrests here were “for possession, manufacturing, or distribution of marijuana; simple battery; criminal damage to property; and obstruction of a person making a 911 call.” “‘The government may not use impeachment as a guise for submitting to the jury substantive evidence that is otherwise unavailable.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) [ United States v. Morgan, 505 F3d 332, 340(II)(C)(2) (5 th Cir., 2007)]. Cf. United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 907(D) (11 th Cir., 1989) (‘impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be permitted where it is used as a stratagem to get before the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence’) (citations omitted). Therefore, for example, the Eleventh Circuit has found that Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) does not allow the admission of evidence of prior convictions or prior instances of drug use. United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 602(II)(A)(1)(i) (11 th Cir., 1990); United States v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 842(II) (11 th Cir., 1984).” 2. Dicta: Defense counsel’s question to witness, “whether knowing Gaskin’s reputation for truthfulness in the community, [she] would believe testimony that Gaskin gave under oath” was probably improper under the new Code. “Although former OCGA § 24–9–84(4) permitted counsel to ask this question, Georgia’s new Evidence Code does not contain a similar provision, and one commentator has opined that this omission ‘suggests legislative rejection’ of the question. See Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 290–91 (3d ed., 2015).” Watson v. State, 329 Ga.App. 334, 765 S.E.2d 24 (October 22, 2014). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly prohibited defendant from presenting defendant’s “commanding naval officer from testifying about Watson's good character. He proffered that the witness would testify that he knew Watson's reputation among the employees at his job, and that the reputation was ‘very good.’ The witness admitted, however, that he had no knowledge of Watson's reputation in the community outside of his workplace. The trial court ruled the proffered testimony inadmissible on the grounds that Watson's reputation on the job was not relevant. We find no error. Under the rules of evidence in effect at the time of trial, ‘[r]estricting counsel from asking a witness about an individual's reputation at business and among the employees is not error, as this is not the correct test’ for the admission of good character evidence. Haralson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 787, 792(5), 479 S.E.2d 115 (1996) (citations omitted). See also Doss v. State, 264 Ga.App. 205, 208–209(3), 590 S.E.2d 208 (2003); Foster v. State, 170 Ga.App. 222, 225(9), 316 S.E.2d 828 (1984). (Under Georgia's new Evidence Code, OCGA §§ 24–4–404 and 24–4–405 govern the admission of evidence regarding a criminal defendant's good character.)” Reversed on another issue, 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (September 14, 2015). Ellicott v. State, 320 Ga.App. 729, 740 S.E.2d 716 (March 25, 2013). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; no error in excluding testimony from defendant’s coworkers about defendant’s “reputation in the community for nonviolence. … Ellicott cannot show that the trial court excluded admissible character evidence. Neither witness was familiar with Ellicott's reputation in the community in which he resided with the victim, and character testimony is not admissible unless is relies on the defendant's general reputation in the community. See Thomas v. State, 282 Ga. 894, 896(2)(a), 655 S.E.2d 599 (2008).” Tidwell v. State, 306 Ga.App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920 (October 1, 2010). Conviction for aggravated child molestation reversed on other grounds; not improper to ask character witness about specific incidents of misconduct, namely, the acts of molestation on trial. “[T]his inquiry of the character witness was not improper in that ‘[t]he State's questions about specific incidents were asked in good faith and based upon reliable information and admissible evidence.’ Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 770(9) (604 S.E.2d 804) (2004). See Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 626, 627-628(3) (513 S.E.2d 225) (1999) ; State v. Clark, 258 Ga. 464, 464 (369 S.E.2d 900) (1988). Even where the question pertains to the very crime for which the defendant is being tried, such a question of a character witness is permissible. See Franklin, supra, 230 Ga. at 292(1).” Warner v. State, 299 Ga.App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (June 12, 2009). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly sustained objection to defendant’s character witness who admitted he was not “familiar with Warner's reputation in the community in which Warner lived.” “‘The direct examination to prove the character of the accused must be limited to questions concerning his general reputation in the community in which he lives. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Overby v. State, 125 Ga.App. 759, 760(3) (188 S.E.2d 910) (1972). Reputation in the business community or in the school community is not the correct test. See Haralson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 787, 792(5) (479 S.E.2d 115) (1996) ; Clark v. State, 225 Ga.App. 851, 851-852(1) (485 S.E.2d 543) (1997). Because the witness expressly denied having knowledge of Warner's reputation in the community in which Warner lived, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the testimony.”