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Redman v. State, 281 Ga.App. 605, 636 S.E.2d 680 (August 29, 2006). “Redman argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine his character witness … regarding Redman’s prior juvenile adjudication for child molestation because a certified copy of the juvenile adjudication was not tendered. We disagree. In choosing to have Woody testify as to Redman’s good character, Redman opened the door for the State to introduce all evidence bearing on his character, including ‘convictions of crimes, guilty and nolo contendere pleas, juvenile offenses, and incidents which illustrate the defendant’s character. ’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anthony v. State, 236 Ga.App. 257, 259 (511 S.E.2d 612) (1999). His contention that the trial court erred in allowing this evidence is therefore without merit.” Moye v. State, 277 Ga.App. 262, 626 S.E.2d 234 (January 19, 2006). “As noted by our Supreme Court, ‘ the [S]tate may explore specific acts of bad conduct on cross-examination of the defendant’s character witnesses for the purpose of testing the witnesses’ knowledge of the defendant’s reputation.’ Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 758 n. 8 (363 S.E.2d 529) (1988). In conducting this cross-examination, the State may ask about arrests, convictions, and uncharged bad acts that it could prove. See Glass v. State, 255 Ga.App. 390, 399(9)(d) (565 S.E.2d 500) (2002). Regardless of whether the witness denies knowledge of the conduct, the testimony is evidence that the jury may consider for impeachment purposes. See id. at 399; Strickland v. State, 223 Ga.App. 772, 778(2) (479 S.E.2d 125) (1996).” Accord, Vonhagel v. State , 287 Ga.App. 507, 651 S.E.2d 793 (September 11, 2007); Allen v. State , 293 Ga. 626, 748 S.E.2d 881 (September 23, 2013) (at murder trial, prosecutor could ask defendant’s character witness if he was aware of defendant’s prior arrest for underage alcohol possession). Porter v. State , 243 Ga.App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for child cruelty and contributing to deprivation of a minor reversed on other grounds, but no error in allowing cross-examination of defendant’s character witness on specific events. “‘Once a defendant opens the door for character evidence, specific events may be used in testing the extent and foundation of the [witness's] knowledge and the correctness of his testimony on direct examination.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Morrison v. State, 232 Ga.App. 846, 847, 502 S.E.2d 470 (1998). See also Banks v. State, 113 Ga.App. 661(1), 149 S.E.2d 415 (1966).” Brooks v. State, 236 Ga.App. 604, 512 S.E.2d 693 (February 22, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, trial court properly “refused to allow him to question character witnesses concerning his reputation in the community for treating children appropriately. The trial court excluded this testimony, permitting defense counsel to ask whether Brooks’s reputation was ‘good or bad but nothing specific.’ We find no error. The import of testimony that Brooks had a general reputation for acting appropriately toward children would be that he did not have a reputation for molesting children. Such evidence is inadmissible. See Ware v. State, 191 Ga.App. 896, 897(3), 383 S.E.2d 368 (1989). While the proffer was phrased in terms of Brooks’s general reputation in the community, inherent to the issue of whether he acted appropriately toward children would be the more narrow and specific issue of his actions toward specific children. And evidence of specific acts is inadmissible to show a defendant’s good character. See, e.g., OCGA § 24-9-84; Shelnutt v. State, 234 Ga.App. 655, 656(1), 506 S.E.2d 643 (1998); Davis v. State, 189 Ga.App. 439, 440(4), 376 S.E.2d 230 (1988); Baine v. State, 181 Ga.App. 856, 858(2), 354 S.E.2d 177 (1987).” C. COMPETENCY Moore v. State, 319 Ga.App. 766, 738 S.E.2d 348 (February 14, 2013). Child cruelty convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to inquire into seven-year old victim’s competency as a witness. Under OCGA § 24-9-5(b), “‘in all cases involving deprivation as defined by Code Section 15–11–2, or in criminal cases involving child molestation, and in all other criminal cases in which a child was a victim of or a witness to any crime, any such child shall be competent to testify, and his credibility shall be determined as provided in Article 4 of this chapter. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, as a child victim of a crime, K.M. is excepted from a competency challenge based upon a claim that she does not sufficiently understand the nature of the oath.[fn] See Clemons v. State, 288 Ga. 445, 446(2), 704 S.E.2d 762 (2011); Jeffries v. State, 272 Ga. 510, 513(6), 530 S.E.2d 714 (2000).” Smith v. State, 293 Ga.App. 569, 667 S.E.2d 421 (September 17, 2008). “‘[A] child is not incompetent as a matter of law because of [his] infancy,’ (Citation omitted.) London v. State, 274 Ga. 91, 93(3), 549 S.E.2d 394 (2001).” Gassett v. State, 289 Ga.App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (January 31, 2008). “The mere fact that [witness] Oliver was an admitted crack cocaine addict who had used the drug on the day in question did not render her testimony inadmissible on the grounds that it was unreliable. Rather, this evidence presented an issue as to her credibility for jury determination. See Moore v. State, 219 Ga.App. 818, 819 (467 S.E.2d 5) (1996).”