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incompetent merely because he speaks English poorly. Schall v. Eisner, 58 Ga. 190, 192(1) (1877).” Teat v. State, 237 Ga.App. 867, 516 S.E.2d 794 (April 23, 1999). “[T]rial counsel successfully impeached Julius Moses as a prior felon and did in fact raise concerns about the competency of this witness, due to a ‘strong odor of alcohol about his body and breath....’ The trial court concluded the witness was not incompetent to testify under OCGA § 24-9-6, but that any possible state of intoxication goes to the credibility of the witness. This ruling was entirely correct. Whitus v. State, 222 Ga. 103, 110(2), 149 S.E.2d 130 (1966), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967).” D. CREDIBILITY – BOLSTERING See also subheading EXPERTS – VICTIM’S CREDIBILITY, below New case! Jones v. State, S16A0498, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2619618 (May 9, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, no improper bolstering. GBI Investigator testified that witness Roach’s information was more consistent with other evidence in the case than it was with Jones’s information. “[A]lthough ‘it is improper to ask a testifying [witness] whether another witness is lying .... [the 11th Circuit has held that] it is often necessary ... to focus a witness on the differences and similarities between his testimony and that of another witness. This is permissible provided he is not asked to testify as to the veracity of the other witness.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1268– 1269(IV)(D) (11 th Cir., 2011).” “Jones’ assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, this testimony did not speak directly to Roach’s truthfulness. Rather, the testimony was elicited in direct response to questions raised about the manner in which Investigator Bigham conducted her investigation, and involved whether aspects of that investigation lined up with information provided by Roach.” Admission of the evidence wasn’t plain error. Pack v. State, 335 Ga.App. 783, 783 S.E.2d 146 (February 23, 2016). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no improper bolstering. “At trial, the prosecutor asked the investigating detective whether anything in N.F.’s forensic interview ‘made [him] concerned about coaching.’ The detective responded: ‘I didn’t see anything in there that showed me any kind of coaching because the victim’s interview to me was very genuine.’” Trial court properly “concluded that the testimony, taken in context, related to whether the victim’s interview involved real or ‘genuine’—rather than coached—responses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by interpreting the detective’s testimony in this way.” Regardless, the trial court gave a lengthy curative instruction. Powell v. State, 335 Ga.App. 565, 782 S.E.2d 468 (February 3, 2016). Child molestation convictions affirmed; no improper bolstering where forensic investigator testified that victim “‘appeared a little—not developmentally 13 in comparison to the other 13 year olds that I’ve interviewed; okay?,’ and then expanded on the relevance and meaning of this statement by indicating that there were ‘some accommodations made on my part to not assume the normal level of development of a thirteen year-old while I interviewed her.’ This does not constitute impermissible commentary on the victim’s credibility.” Dority v. State, 335 Ga.App. 83, 780 S.E.2d 129 (November 20, 2015). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed. Under 2013 Evidence Code, no error in admitting investigator’s statements as part of recording of defendant’s interrogation. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the comments weren’t improper bolstering of victim’s credibility. Officer twice commented that “‘[s]ome of the things that she talked about you can tell weren’t coached, weren’t told to her, because she used words in a child’s version of how to describe things. … You can coach a child but you can’t coach a child in terms of 9–year–old’s talk; you know what I’m saying, something happened to this girl.’ Dority replied that he was willing to believe that something had happened to his child.” 1. General rule prohibiting one witness from commenting on another’s credibility “is inapplicable here because ‘[c]omments made [during a law enforcement interrogation] and designed to elicit a response from a suspect do not amount to opinion testimony, even when a recording of the comments is admitted at trial.’ … But, ‘[l]ike any other evidence, testimony reflecting comments made by an officer in the course of an interview ought not be admitted if the probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by its tendency to unduly arouse emotions of prejudice, hostility, or sympathy.’ Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 406(3)(a) (738 S.E.2d 74) (2013) (citation and footnote omitted); see also Roberts [ v. State, 313 Ga.App. 849, 850–851(2) (723 S.E.2d 73) (2012)] , 313 Ga.App. at 851(2); OCGA § 24–4–403 (‘Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....’).” 2. Investigator’s comments “ had little if any prejudicial effect. First, the comments are not a direct comment on the child’s credibility; they only go to whether the child’s statements revealed evidence of coaching. And ‘this Court has repeatedly held that a witness does not improperly bolster a victim’s credibility by testifying that the witness saw no evidence of coaching.’ Conley v. State, 329 Ga.App. 96, 102(a) (763 S.E.2d 881) (2014), citing McCowan