☢ test - Í

v. State, 302 Ga.App. 555, 557(1) (691 S.E.2d 360) (2010) (victim’s mother’s and nurse’s statements that the victim’s responses did not appear rehearsed did not bolster the victim’s credibility).” “Further, the State presented other evidence from which the jury could assess [victim] M.D.’s credibility, including the consistency of her trial testimony, her forensic interview, and the testimony of the outcry witnesses, as well as Dority’s reactions during his interrogation and items found in Dority’s house that the child mentioned in her testimony.” 2. “ In the remainder of the second paragraph, Bertera stated that based on his experience as an officer and relying on expertise of the forensic examiner as well, something definitely happened to M.D. But this comment had some probative value given that it was followed by Dority stating that he was willing to believe that something happened to M.D. See, e.g., Roberts, 313 Ga.App. at 851–852(2) ( interrogation comments had probative value where they were part of a confrontational technique that yielded an admission from the defendant ); Butler, 292 Ga. at 406(3)(a) (challenged interrogation statements were followed shortly by defendant’s admission that he hit the victim). The comments at issue here may have had some prejudicial effect given that there was no physical evidence of the crime. But a reasonable juror would understand that the only reason an officer was interrogating the suspect was that the officer believed the account of the victim and thought the defendant was a suspect. Roberts, 313 Ga.App. at 851(2).” Pressley v. State, 331 Ga.App. 175, 770 S.E.2d 266 (March 16, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper bolstering by State. “‘A witness's veracity is placed in issue ... if affirmative charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised during cross-examination.’ Thompson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 627, 631(3) (636 S.E.2d 779) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted). Pressley's introduction of evidence, during his cross- examination of Bozeman, that the state had paid for Bozeman's travel expenses and hotel accommodations was a charge that Bozeman had been improperly influenced or improperly motivated to testify in favor of the prosecution, and the state was entitled to rehabilitate Bozeman's credibility by introducing evidence that Bozeman was testifying willingly. See generally Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 221–222(5) (526 S.E.2d 560) (2000); Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 342, 347(3)(a)(ii) ((733 S.E.2d 400) (2012) (‘Although a party normally may not bolster the veracity of an unimpeached witness, the State may rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been attacked.’) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Jarnigan v. State, 295 Ga. 603, 761 S.E.2d 256 (June 30, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed. 1. Trial court properly allowed GBI fingerprint examiner “to testify that another fingerprint examiner had ‘verified’ her work. [fn] Before Taylor said that another examiner had ‘verified’ her work, she explained that GBI fingerprint examiners use a methodology known as ‘ACE–V,’ a term that derives from the four steps of the process, ‘analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification.’ Viewed in this context, the testimony that another examiner had ‘verified’ the work of Taylor tended to show that Taylor had followed a standard and accepted methodology in her field of expertise, and the verification to which Taylor testified, therefore, formed a basis for her own expert opinion. When offered and admitted for such a purpose, testimony about the verification of a fingerprint comparison that is as limited as that to which Davis objected … is not inadmissible hearsay. An expert witness generally is permitted to explain the basis for her opinions, including the standard and accepted methodology that she used to form her opinions. See Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 275(1), 705 S.E.2d 839 (2010).” “FN2: Davis made no hearsay objection when Taylor explained that verification involves an independent analysis by another examiner who reaches her own conclusions based upon her own analysis and comparisons, and Davis likewise made no hearsay objection when Taylor testified that Wargo would have noted any disagreement with Taylor, implying that the absence of such a notation indicated that Wargo agreed with Taylor. Moreover, Davis made no objection at all on confrontation grounds. Accordingly, we have no occasion in this case to consider whether any testimony offered by Taylor was barred by the Confrontation Clause, see Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 682, 685(2), 755 S.E.2d 703 (2014), and about hearsay, we decide only whether the testimony that Wargo ‘verified’ the work of Taylor was inadmissible. See Andrews v. State, 293 Ga. 701, 704(3), 749 S.E.2d 734 (2013). We express no opinion about whether confrontation objections or additional hearsay objections would have had merit, and we caution the reader to keep in mind the limited scope of our decision in this case. We also caution the reader that this case is governed by our former Evidence Code, and we offer no opinion about admissibility under the new Evidence Code.” 2. “FN2: Davis objected on hearsay grounds when Taylor testified that the initials of Jessie Wargo appeared on a fingerprint card, when Taylor identified Wargo as another fingerprint examiner, and when Taylor testified that Wargo had ‘verified’ the work that Taylor had done. But without more, the identification of a person who put initials upon a document is not hearsay. See People v. Mandez, 997 P.2d 1254, 1264–1265(V) (Colo.App., 1999).” Wright v. State, 327 Ga.App. 658, 760 S.E.2d 661 (June 19, 2014). Child molestation conviction reversed; no improper bolstering where victim’s aunt testified: “When I asked her what—he really done that, she said yeah. But it was like—she was crying. And I knew.” “None of the aunt's testimony ‘“directly addresse[d] the credibility of the victim.’” Rather, the aunt was describing the circumstances of the outcry and the victim's demeanor. Her testimony that she ‘knew’