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after hearing about the outcry is vague and ambiguous, and she never elaborated what she knew. Because the aunt did not directly comment on the veracity of the victim, her testimony was not improper. See Roebuck v. State, 261 Ga.App. 679, 684–685(5) (583 S.E.2d 523) (2003) (testimony did not directly comment on the veracity of the victim and thus was not objectionable), overruled in part on other grounds, Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 72 (673 S.E.2d 854) (2009). See also Bridges v. State, 293 Ga.App. 783, 785(2) (668 S.E.2d 293) (2008) (testimony about child victim's demeanor was relevant and did not constitute improper bolstering).” Thus, no ineffective assistance for failing to object. Futch v. State, 326 Ga.App. 394, 756 S.E.2d 629 (March 20, 2014). Physical precedent only. Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted “testimony … regarding the victim's religious beliefs being a possible motive for her outcry.” Evidence showed that victim waited two years to make outcry “because she was embarrassed about the sexual abuse. After she was baptized, the victim believed that God had forgiven her, and she then decided to tell her teacher. We find that such testimony is relevant and admissible to explain why the victim waited over two years to make an outcry to a third party. [ Alford v. State, 320 Ga.App. 523, 527–528(2)(a) and (b), 738 S.E.2d 124 (2013)]. As the testimony is admissible for the purpose of showing the effect of the sexual abuse on the victim and to explain the victim's conduct, we conclude that such testimony does not constitute improper bolstering. Id. at 528(2)(c), 738 S.E.2d 124. Accord Ledford v. State, 313 Ga.App. 389, 391–392(2), 721 S.E.2d 585 (2011). Furthermore, as the victim testified at trial, any perceived ‘bolstering’ could have been explored by Futch on cross-examination. See Id., supra.” Distinguishing Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 643(2)(b), 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001) (“background information about the victim that is not relevant to the issues in the guilt/innocence phase, particularly the sort of background information likely to engender the jury's sympathies, should not be presented to the jury during that phase”): “In the context of this particular case, however, the testimony which referenced the victim's baptism was relevant to explain the circumstances surrounding the victim's ultimate decision to come forward after years of sexual abuse. See Brinson v. State, 191 Ga.App. 151, 154(5), 381 S.E.2d 292 (1989) (‘The victim's conduct and veracity are matters concerning which the truth must be found.... [T]he minor victim's credibility, which might be sustained by prompt reporting of the offense or by offering an explanation for the failure to do so, as well as by her reaction to and interaction with defendant, were relevant issues for the jury's consideration’) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Carver v. State, 324 Ga.App. 422, 750 S.E.2d 735 (October 31, 2013). Convictions for pointing a firearm at another and related offense affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing victim to wear his Navy uniform at trial. Case of first impression, based on State v. Mayse, 2006 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Ct. Crim App., 2006) and cases from other states. Quoting Mayse : “While it may be true that the jury looked favorably upon a witness who was serving [his] count[r]y, we cannot automatically assume that the jury afforded [his] testimony more weight or credibility based solely on [his] appearance in military uniform. We find this little different from a police officer testifying in a police uniform. As argued by the State, whether a witness or a victim is a common laborer, an engineer, or a doctor, is a fact which may be considered by the jury but is clearly not determinative of the credibility of that person. Contrary to the Appellant's argument, we cannot equate this to a situation where the defendant is forced to appear in prison attire.” “[E]ven though she raised the issue of the victim's uniform before voir dire was conducted, Carver did not question any of the potential jurors on this issue, including the juror that she now contends may have been prejudiced in the victim's favor. She also declined an instruction tailored to this issue, even though the trial court offered on two occasions to give it. Carver has failed to demonstrate any prejudice in favor of the victim on account of his wearing a military uniform , or that she took any of the steps available to her to protect against any alleged prejudice.” Alford v. State, 320 Ga.App. 523, 738 S.E.2d 124 (February 5, 2013). Child molestation and sexual battery convictions affirmed. 1. Trial court properly admitted evidence of one victim/sister’s reaction to note written by other victim/sister, revealing molestation by defendant. Witness’s testimony about her own reaction to the note wasn’t hearsay because it didn’t directly disclose the content of the communication; rather, it disclosed the hearer’s reaction, for purposes of explaining her subsequent conduct: “E.S. explained that in response to the note from I.S., she cried herself to sleep and felt guilty for failing to protect her sister, which led to her decision not to resist further sexual abuse from Alford in hopes that he would no longer abuse I.S. Her reaction to the note helped explain why she acquiesced to the continued sexual abuse by Alford and waited so long to make an outcry to a third party.” Thus, even the content of the communication was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2. “That statute provides: ‘When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence .’ ‘In Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867, 294 S.E.2d 482 (1982), the Supreme Court of Georgia stated a rule for applying OCGA § 24–3–2; if the conduct and motives of the actor are relevant to the issues on trial, then information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence known to the actor are admissible to explain the actor's conduct.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davenport v. State, 278 Ga.App. 16,