☢ test - Í

Davis v. State, 303 Ga.App. 799, 694 S.E.2d 381 (April 21, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for statutory rape affirmed; mother’s testimony about child’s out of court statements properly admitted under Child Hearsay Act. “‘[T]he Child Hearsay Statute actually contemplates testimony from both the child and those witnessing the child's later reaction, even if the hearsay may be “bolstering.” Any bolstering can be explored by [the] defendant in cross-examination.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State, 294 Ga.App. 779, 781(4) (670 S.E.2d 476) (2008). The trial court did not err in permitting [mother’s] testimony over Davis's bolstering objection. Id.” McCowan v. State, 302 Ga.App. 555, 691 S.E.2d 360 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s trial for child molestation and related offenses, trial court properly allowed witnesses to testify that child’s statements “did not appear to be ‘rehearsed’ or ‘coerced.’” “Here, the victim's mother and her treating nurse and doctor did not express their beliefs as to the veracity of the victim. … Rather, their testimony was addressed to the issue of whether they saw any indications in the victim's manner of responding that others had told the victim what to say. As we held in Stillwell [ v. State, 294 Ga.App. 805, 806-807(2)(a) (670 S.E.2d 452) (2008)], such testimony did ‘not impermissibly address the ultimate issue before the jury or bolster the [victim's] credibility.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) 294 Ga.App. at 807(2)(a) (family lawyer did not improperly bolster victim's credibility by testifying that he saw no evidence of coaching when the victim disclosed sexual abuse); see also Osborne v. State, 291 Ga.App. 711, 713-714(3) (662 S.E.2d 792) (2008) (expert's testimony that victim's manner of responding in interview showed signs of spontaneity and detail inconsistent with coaching was not improper).” Accord, Towry v. State , 304 Ga.App. 139, 695 S.E.2d 683 (May 20, 2010); Vaughn v. State , 307 Ga.App. 754, 706 S.E.2d 137 (February 9, 2011) (witness properly allowed to testify that victims did not appear to have been “coached.”); Canty v. State , 318 Ga.App. 13, 733 S.E.2d 64 (October 12, 2012). Lee v. State, 300 Ga.App. 214, 684 S.E.2d 348 (September 24, 2009). Defendant, a former doctor, defended charge of aggravated sexual battery saying he was, in fact, conducting a genital exam on his prepubescent daughter. State’s expert witness testified that “she knows of no medical procedure” that would be performed in the manner used by defendant. Held, expert’s testimony did not improperly comment on either defendant’s, or victim’s, credibility, or improperly comment on the ultimate issue before the jury, or merely serve “as a conduit for the opinions of others.” “Claiborne's testimony was limited to describing how she and doctors in the medical community generally perform genital examinations of female patients.” Hilliard v. State, 298 Ga.App. 473, 680 S.E.2d 541 (June 23, 2009). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed. Mistrial wasn’t required where defense counsel cross-examined State’s witness on subject of victim’s credibility, causing witness (victim’s mother) to respond “that she thought [victim] was telling the truth.” Statement wasn’t elicited by State, and court gave curative instruction. Carrie v. State, 298 Ga.App. 55, 679 S.E.2d 30 (May 4, 2009). 1. Not improper bolstering: during interview with child molestation victim, “the psychologist's comment that [victim] I.C. did a good thing by immediately reporting the sexual abuse did not amount to bolstering I.C.'s credibility. See Turner v. State, 253 Ga.App. 760, 762(2) (560 S.E.2d 539) (2002).” 2. Improper bolstering: “Upon direct examination, the State's prosecutor asked the psychologist: ‘In your course of interviewing the victim in this case, [I.C.], did you ever have any reason to believe that she was lying to you?’ The psychologist responded: ‘Not based on her interview with me. There wasn't anything that she said that jumped out at me that I would have a big concern about.’” Hubert v. State, 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). Trial court properly admitted detective’s testimony that child molestation victim “appeared to be emotionally traumatized” during her interview. “ ‘Testimony regarding the victim's demeanor does not express an impermissible opinion on an ultimate issue of whether the victim was sexually abused.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chauncey v. State, 283 Ga.App. 217, 220(3) (641 S.E.2d 229) (2007).” See also Morris (July 2, 2004), below. Jones v. State, 296 Ga.App. 288, 674 S.E.2d 130 (February 23, 2009). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; officer’s testimony “that in his experience, victims of abuse are generally reluctant to report the abuse” was admissible, “particularly in this case where the young girls were repeatedly challenged by defense counsel as to why they did not report the abuse immediately.” “See Keller v. State, 221 Ga.App. 846, 848(2) (473 S.E.2d 194) (1996) (expert witness may testify as to objective, observable matters).” Broner v. State, 284 Ga. 402, 667 S.E.2d 613 (October 6, 2008). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. After co-defendant Jones testified, State called Jones’s wife as a witness. Wife testified about statements made to her by Jones