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on date of murder which were inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Held, admission of this testimony was not improper bolstering of Jones’s trial testimony, but “was admissible for both impeaching and substantive purposes. Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858 (286 S.E.2d 717) (1982).” Defendant’s argument was that the testimony bolstered the credibility of Jones’s custodial statement to police, “but the admissibility of her testimony for substantive and impeachment purposes is governed by what transpired at trial when he recanted his original statement and testified to an inconsistent version of the events in question.” Atwell v. State, 293 Ga.App. 586, 667 S.E.2d 442 (September 18, 2008). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; tape of victim’s 911 call was properly admitted during victim’s testimony. Tape did not constitute improper bolstering as a prior consistent statement. “‘“Improper bolstering refers to character evidence intended to show a witness's veracity, that is, his tendency to tell the truth.” ’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hill [ v. State, 290 Ga.App. 140, 146(5)(g), 658 S.E.2d 863 (2008)]. See also Goldey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 198, 199(2)(a), 656 S.E.2d 549 (2008).” Birkbeck v. State, 292 Ga.App. 424, 665 S.E.2d 354 (June 18, 2008). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed. Officer’s testimony did not amount to an improper expression of opinion bolstering victim’s credibility. “Birkbeck … points to [Investigator] Kennedy’s testimony that during his interview of [victim] H.L., he and the other officers ‘looked at behavioral patterns, we looked at, you know, how she speaks, what she’s saying, and what is appropriate to what she is describing to us.’ Finally, Birkbeck cites Kennedy’s response to the prosecutor’s question as to whether Kennedy was satisfied with his investigation. Kennedy stated, ‘Yes, I am. I think I have done everything I can do.’” “Kennedy neither commented on H.L.’s veracity nor stated that she had been molested. Although the jury could infer from Kennedy’s testimony that he believed the charges against Birkbeck were founded, such an inference is unavoidable in any criminal case. The fact that the state charged Birkbeck with the crimes means that the state believes he committed them. We find no improper bolstering in Kennedy’s testimony.” Disapproved on other grounds, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (February 1, 2010). Gray v. State, 291 Ga.App. 573, 662 S.E.2d 339 (May 19, 2008). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. No error in allowing police investigator to testify “that an abrasion on Gray’s arm was consistent with a briar mark obtained when running through the woods, not with a fingernail scratch; that Gray had no injuries consistent with a fight; that the victims’ statements were consistent with the physical evidence; and that the victims’ injuries were consistent with being hit in the head with a metal baseball bat.” “‘Although an expert witness may not testify as to his opinion of the victim’s truthfulness, the witness may express an opinion as to whether medical or other objective evidence in the case is consistent with the victim’s story .’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Satterwhite v. State, 212 Ga.App. 543- 544(2) (442 S.E.2d 5) (1994). See also Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227-228(1) (531 S.E.2d 207) (2000).” Accord, Brown v. State , 293 Ga.App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (September 23, 2008); Mullins v. State , 298 Ga.App. 368, 680 S.E.2d 474 (June 16, 2009) (officer could testify that victim’s injuries and “disarray in the room” were consistent with victim’s story about attack by defendant); Damerow v. State , 310 Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011) (forensic interviewer could testify that molestation victim’s “demeanor during the interview was consistent with her molestation allegations’); Cade v. State , 289 Ga. 805, 716 S.E.2d 196 (October 3, 2011) (medical examiner properly asked if his findings were consistent with different theories of victim’s death); Roberts v. State , 322 Ga.App. 659, 745 S.E.2d 850 (July 3, 2013) (“the witness in question simply stated that [victim’s] in-court testimony was ‘consistent’ with what she told him on the evening of the incident, but he did not provide his opinion of her credibility.”). Hill v. State, 290 Ga.App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (March 7, 2008). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper bolstering. “‘“Improper bolstering refers to character evidence intended to show a witness’[s] veracity, that is, his tendency to tell the truth.”’ Goldey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 198(2)(a), 656 S.E.2d 549 (Jan. 16, 2008). It is not improper bolstering, however, for a witness to ‘express an opinion as to whether ... objective evidence in the case is consistent with the victim’s story.’ Chauncey v. State, 283 Ga.App. 217, 220(3) (641 S.E.2d 229) (2007); see Ross v. State, 262 Ga.App. 323, 324-325(1) (585 S.E.2d 666) (2003). Under these circumstances, where the police officer’s testimony was not a commentary on the witnesses’ veracity but rather evidence of an objective fact – that the exteriors of the Chevrolet Blazer and GMC Jimmy differ only in their badging – we do not find that this testimony impermissibly bolstered the credibility of the witnesses.” Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661 (September 24, 2007). Felony murder conviction affirmed. Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to ask defendant on cross-examination whether other witnesses were lying. “Manzano complains on appeal the questions posed to him were improper because he was being asked to speculate on the credibility of other witnesses. ‘[A] witness, even an expert, can never bolster the credibility of another witness “as to whether the