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witness is telling the truth. Credibility of a witness is not beyond the ken of the jurors but, to the contrary, is a matter solely within the province of the jury. [Cit.]” [Cits.]’ Mann v. State, 252 Ga.App. 70(1) (555 S.E.2d 527) (2001). While that principle is true as to witnesses generally, such a question is allowable where the defendant testifies at odds with other witnesses because the question is then merely a rhetorical device intended to challenge the defendant’s credibility and is not an effort to bolster other witnesses’ credibility. ‘The state may challenge the defendant’s truthfulness on cross-examination.’ Dorsey v. State, 259 Ga. 809(3) (387 S.E.2d 889) (1990). When addressed to the defendant, a question such as that of which Manzano complains merely emphasizes the conflict in the evidence, which is the jury’s duty to resolve. Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296(13) (509 S.E.2d 45) (1998). The trial court did not err in overruling Manzano’s objection to the line of questioning. To the extent the holding in Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616(17a) (340 S.E.2d 891) (1986), that ‘[h]ad defense counsel objected to the prosecuting attorney’s questions, the objection should have been sustained,’ conflicts with this holding and with the holdings in Whatley v. State, supra, and Dorsey v. State, supra, it is overruled.” See also Thomas (July 25, 2002), and Hawkins (August 24, 2006), below. Accord, Head v. State , 290 Ga.App. 823, 660 S.E.2d 871 (April 8, 2008). Phillips v. State, 284 Ga.App. 224, 644 S.E.2d 153 (March 14, 2007). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed. Admission of victim’s pre-trial statement did not constitute improper bolstering of victim’s trial testimony. Gonzalez v. State, 283 Ga.App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (March 1, 2007). Methamphetamine trafficking and related convictions affirmed. Not improper for officer to point out inconsistencies between defendant’s two custodial statements. “We do not believe that this testimony, based on the two custodial statements of Gonzalez which had been introduced into evidence, constituted improper bolstering or comment on Gonzalez’ veracity.” Anthony v. State, 282 Ga.App. 457, 638 S.E.2d 877 (November 17, 2006). Rape and related convictions affirmed. No improper bolstering: “[T]he officer testified that she was trained to look for ‘certain behaviors in people who might be making false statements’ and that the victim exhibited none of these behaviors at the time the officer took her statement. Under these circumstances, ‘the inquiry [was] simply whether the [officer] noticed any particular actions or statements that indicated deception, not whether she found the [victim] credible or believable.’ Kendrick v. State, 269 Ga.App. 831, 835(4) (605 S.E.2d 369) (2004). Compare Patterson v. State, 278 Ga.App. 168, 172 (628 S.E.2d 618) (2006).” Accord, Brown v. State , 293 Ga.App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (September 23, 2008); Greene v. State , 295 Ga.App. 803, 673 S.E.2d 292 (January 30, 2009). Anderson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 58, 637 S.E.2d 790 (October 23, 2006). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed. Error, but harmless, where child victim’s aunt was allowed to bolster the child’s credibility as follows: “‘So you believe what she told you?’ The aunt responded: ‘Oh, yeah.’” This one statement not shown to prejudice defendant. Disapproved on other grounds, Schofield v. Hulsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (February 26, 2007). Howie v. State, 281 Ga.App. 730, 637 S.E.2d 134 (October 4, 2006). Family violence battery, and related convictions, affirmed. Trial court erred, but harmless, in allowing officer to bolster victim’s testimony when he was allowed to testify “that he had been involved in ‘hundreds of domestic-violence cases,’ and that it is ‘not uncommon’ for victims of domestic violence to recant and/or change portions of their stories ‘for various reasons.’ The officer went on to explain that ‘[s]ome people regret an outcry because, whether that person is convicted, that will take away their sole income to the family. Other people are afraid of repercussions after the fact.’ Howie contends the above-quoted testimony from the responding officer was irrelevant and improperly bolstered the credibility of the child witnesses. We agree. ‘ The fact that, in the officer’s previous experience, [it was not uncommon for domestic violence victims to recant their stories] was not relevant to explain either the conduct or the testimony of the victim[s] in the instant case. ’ Lott v. State, 206 Ga.App. 886, 887-888(2) (426 S.E.2d 667) (1992). Compare Hawks v. State, 223 Ga.App. 890(4) (479 S.E.2d 186) (1996).” Harmless error, however, in light of evidence as a whole. Accord, Lewis (June 18, 2012), above. Hawkins v. State, 281 Ga.App. 852, 637 S.E.2d 422 (August 24, 2006). State Court traffic conviction affirmed. Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to ask defendant on cross-examination, “Are you calling Officer Goode a liar here today?” “In Dorsey v. State, 59 Ga. 809 (387 S.E.2d 889) (1990), our Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to allow a prosecutor to ask a defendant, ‘So, everybody’s lying about this whole thing but you, is that right?’ Id. at 809(3). The Court explained that ‘[t]he [S]tate may challenge the defendant’s truthfulness on cross-examination.’ Id.; see also Williams v. State, 239 Ga.App. 30, 34(10) (521 S.E.2d 27) (1999). And this question referenced a conflict in the evidence which was to be resolved by the jury. See Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 301(13) (509 S.E.2d 49) (1998). We