☢ test - Í

therefore hold that ‘[w]hile the form of the question was somewhat argumentative, we cannot conclude that the court erred in allowing it.’ Dorsey, supra.” See also Thomas (July 25, 2002), below; Manzano (September 24, 2007), above. Moore v. State, 280 Ga.App. 894, 635 S.E.2d 253 (August 2, 2006). Burglary and related convictions affirmed. Hearsay objection does not preserve an objection of the ground of improper bolstering. Accord, Colzie v. State , 289 Ga. 120, 710 S.E.2d 115 (April 18, 2011); Brown v. State , A15A1637, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1176939 (March 28, 2016) (physical precedent only). Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; investigator’s testimony that witness’s testimony was “consistent” with his prior statement to investigator was not improper expression of opinion of truthfulness or credibility. Accord, Carter v. State , 320 Ga.App. 454, 740 S.E.2d 195 (March 18, 2013). Clark v. State, 278 Ga.App. 412, 629 S.E.2d 103 (March 23, 2006). Physical precedent only. “Clark contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to comment on the witnesses’ credibility by asking the investigating officer if he thought any of the four eyewitnesses were lying to him. The officer responded no. Clark asked the officer on cross- examination, ‘So to the best of your knowledge, these [witness] statements were true?’ The officer replied, ‘I believe the statements were the truth as they saw it that night.’ The State’s question was clearly improper, as it bolstered the credibility of the eyewitnesses. Cline v. State, 224 Ga.App. 235, 237(2) (480 S.E.2d 269) (1997).” Error waived, however, by pro se defendant’s failure to object. Robinson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 537, 621 S.E.2d 770 (September 21, 2005). Defendant, in his custodial statement to police, bolstered child-molesting victim’s credibility, then accused her of lying about the charges against him. Held, trial court did not err in admitting both parts of the statement, notwithstanding that the bolstering came before the attacks on the victim’s credibility. “Robinson’s statements were admissible to rehabilitate the victim against the upcoming attack, an attack about which all parties were aware. [Cit.] Although the bolstering testimony may have been premature, its admission was not error where the parties knew that the victim’s credibility would be undermined immediately thereafter. [Cit.]” Footnote: “see also Redd v. State, 141 Ga.App. 888, 889(2) (234 S.E.2d 812) (1977) (trial court did not err in allowing State to rehabilitate credibility of witness before his credibility actually was attacked where defense counsel asserted in opening statement that she intended to show witness was lying).” Thomas v. State, 279 Ga. 363, 613 S.E.2d 620 (May 23, 2005). “[T]he detective’s testimony explaining his investigation on the day of the crime and his conclusion that [witnesses other than defendant] were not involved in the shooting did not impermissibly convey the detective’s view of the truthfulness of other witnesses at trial,” where he apparently was not asked to comment directly on their credibility. Kendrick v. State, 269 Ga.App. 831, 605 S.E.2d 369 (September 13, 2004). Not error to allow State to ask its witness “whether, during her conduct of the interview, she noticed any deception on the part of the child, to which she responded no. Thus, the inquiry was simply whether the interviewer noticed any particular actions or statements that indicated deception, not whether she found the child believable or credible.” Green v. State , 242 Ga.App. 868, 532 S.E.2d 111 (March 17, 2000). Aggravated sodomy and related convictions affirmed; no error “in allowing the State's attorney to continually force defendant to declare that the State's witnesses were lying.” In Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 631(17)(a), 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that it is improper for the State's attorney to ask one witness if another witness is lying, because witnesses are to testify based on their personal knowledge of the relevant facts and are not to determine the veracity of other witnesses. But since then, without expressly overruling Cargill, the Supreme Court has twice held that it is permissible cross-examination to ask the defendant if other witnesses are lying. Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 301(13), 509 S.E.2d 45 (1998); Dorsey v. State, 259 Ga. 809(3), 387 S.E.2d 889 (1990). We are bound by the latest decisions of the Supreme Court on this question, Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625, 631(3), 216 S.E.2d 839 (1975), and so hold that the trial court in this case did not err in permitting the State's attorney to cross-examine the defendant by asking whether the other witnesses were lying.” Cargill overruled by Manzano (September 24, 2007), above. Accord, Thomas v. State , 256 Ga.App. 712, 569 S.E.2d 620 (July 25, 2002). See also Hawkins (August 24, 2006), above. Booker v. State, 242 Ga.App. 80, 528 S.E.2d 849 (January 26, 2000). Burglary, aggravated assault, and related