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convictions reversed. Trial court erred by allowing State to bolster credibility of accomplice (testifying for State) by presenting evidence of accurate pretrial statements made by accomplice regarding unrelated murders, and by showing “that the information McCoy provided had led to the entry of guilty pleas by all identified culprits except Booker.” “Booker also complains of the prosecuting attorney's references to these other crimes in closing argument.” State presented this evidence purportedly for impeachment, after accomplice testified at trial contrary to his prior statements, claiming that defendant hadn’t been involved in the crimes. “The purported impeachment of the witness in this manner amounted to an improper attempt to bolster his credibility by showing his veracity in matters irrelevant to the issues being tried in this case. [fn: [Accomplice] McCoy was, however, subject to impeachment through the State's showing his prior inconsistent statements concerning Booker's involvement in the crimes in this case, as well as the fact that McCoy was motivated to recant these statements because he had not received a prison transfer. ] These matters involved independent offenses, consisting of five homicides, which do not satisfy the requirements for admissibility at Booker's trial. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991); Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 468- 469(6), 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991). And evidence of these crimes harmed Booker by showing his association with individuals who had committed infamous crimes. The court thus committed prejudicial error by admitting this evidence. It follows that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper.” Hayes v. State, 236 Ga.App. 617, 512 S.E.2d 294 (February 9, 1999). Testimony was not improper bolstering: “‘[Prosecutor:] Now, when she [the victim] was telling you all this, what did she look like? What was her demeanor?’ ‘[Detective Plemons:] Her demeanor, she was very serious, very straightforward. She appeared to be a very strong, tough kid who would stand up for what she thought she believed in, or meet the challenge to whatever she needed to do. She was very straightforward and told me what had happened. ’” “The testimony about which Hayes complains was not objectionable as such did not constitute a statement of opinion either as to proof or as to guilt and, thus, did not impermissibly bolster the victim’s credibility. See Najmaister v. State, 196 Ga.App. 345(1)(a), 396 S.E.2d 71 (1990); Hendricks v. State, 157 Ga.App. 715, 716(1), 278 S.E.2d 453 (1981).” E. CREDIBILITY – GENERALLY Sanders v. State, 290 Ga. 637, 723 S.E.2d 436 (February 27, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; jury wasn’t required to disregard testimony by State’s witness pursuant to OCGA § 24–9–85(b). “OCGA § 24–9–85(b) states ‘[i]f a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.’ Although Sanders argues that Rakestraw's testimony was filled with ‘lies, inconsistencies and contradictions,’ there is no evidence that Rakestraw acted with a manifest purpose to testify falsely, thus his credibility was an issue to be evaluated by the jury. See Fugitt v. State, 256 Ga. 292, 298 (348 S.E.2d 451) (1986); compare Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 452–453 (307 S.E.2d 471) (1983). The fact that a witness' testimony may contain inconsistencies does not, standing alone, rise to the level of false swearing necessary to justify striking the testimony. Brooker v. Brown, 307 Ga.App. 10, 11 (703 S.E.2d 692) (2010). See Hardy v. State, 293 Ga.App. 265, 268 (666 S.E.2d 730) (2008).” Johnson v. State, 290 Ga. 382, 721 S.E.2d 851 (January 23, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance. Where defendant failed to ask trial counsel about their conversations at motion hearing, trial court wasn’t required to accept defendant’s “uncontroverted” testimony on the subject. “[A] trial court is not required to credit testimony merely because it is unrebutted. Jones v. Leverette, 230 Ga. 310, 311 (196 S.E.2d 885) (1973). That is so because as the fact finder in such proceeding, witness credibility is a matter for the court. Haynes v. State, 287 Ga. 202, 203(1) (695 S.E.2d 219) (2010).” Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga.App. 232, 704 S.E.2d 470 (December 1, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for motor vehicle theft, including jury’s apparent disbelief of defendant’s denial: “Ferguson testified at trial. Although he denied that he stole either of the two cars, the jury was entitled to weigh his testimony against the other evidence in the case, assess his credibility, and determine whether his testimony was truthful. And if the jury concluded that his testimony was not truthful, as we must assume it did, the jury was entitled to take his untruthfulness as substantive and affirmative evidence of his guilt. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296(II) (112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225) (1992) (plurality op.) (‘As the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to disbelieve West's uncorroborated and confused testimony.... And if the jury did disbelieve West, it was further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt ....’); see also United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1285(II) (11 th Cir., 2009)(same). ‘A proper inference the jury can make from disbelieved testimony is that the opposite of the testimony is true.’ United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1272(II)(D)(1) (11 th Cir., 2003).” Barnes dissents.