☢ test - Í

White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 699 S.E.2d 291 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, concealing a death and evidence tampering affirmed; jury could reject defendant’s version of events even if, as he contended, “he was an unimpeached witness whose testimony was not contradicted, incredible, impossible, or inherently improbable. See Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 59 (440 S.E.2d 646) (1994) (Carley, J., dissenting). In affirming the trial court's grant of a motion to suppress (and reversing the Court of Appeals's reversal thereof), the majority in Tate (264 Ga. at 56) ruled that a ‘trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony[,]’ noting that ‘a rational trier of fact can choose to reject even “undisputed” testimony if that factfinder believes that witness's testimony to be unreliable. Facts such as demeanor, contradictory or inconsistent statements and evidence that [a witness] had “ulterior motives” can all lead a trier of fact to disregard testimony....’ Id., at n. 5. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the rule cited in the Tate dissent remains viable in criminal cases in which the unimpeached and uncontradicted testimony is presented by the defense (see Agnor on Georgia Evidence, Sec. 18:6 (4 th ed.) and State v. Hester, 268 Ga.App. 501, 505 n.13 (602 S.E.2d 271) (2004), suggesting such a possibility), appellant does not meet the initial criterium for application of the rule since he was impeached by his prior inconsistent statements concerning the cause of the victim's death and his knowledge of her whereabouts. See State v. Brown, 278 Ga.App. 457, 460-461 (629 S.E.2d 123) (2006).” Tolbert v. State, 300 Ga.App. 51, 684 S.E.2d 120 (September 9, 2009). “On appeal from a motion to suppress, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the trial court's judgment. The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony ‘rest with the trier of fact, who is under no obligation to believe a witness, even in the absence of contradictory testimony.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 118(2), 475 S.E.2d 629 (1996).” Floyd v. State, 297 Ga.App. 736, 678 S.E.2d 181 (May 8, 2009). At hearing on motion to suppress, police officer testified that defendant’s vehicle crossed a line once and touched the line a second time. “In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that the second incident, in which Floyd's car did not actually travel outside his lane, was not a traffic violation. It also found that the first incident, in which Floyd's car traveled a foot outside his lane, was a violation and the court had ‘no reason to doubt’ the officer's version of the incident.” Defendant appeals, contending that “‘In finding that the “second” alleged lane violation did not occur, the trial court implicitly found that [the officer] had testified falsely on a highly material issue,’ thus violating OCGA § 24-9-85(b). That code section provides: ‘If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.’” Court of Appeals disagrees: “Pretermitting whether that section applies to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress, [fn: As the State points out, no reported cases have applied this code section to a motion hearing, a bench trial, or a juvenile adjudication.” ] the officer did not willfully and knowingly swear falsely. The section only applies when a witness admits he swore falsely or when the evidence manifestly establishes purposeful falsification. Without evidence of a manifest purpose to testify falsely, the issue is merely one of witness credibility. Steele v. State, 248 Ga.App. 441, 442(1) (546 S.E.2d 547) (2001) The evidence in this case did not establish that the officer testified falsely, and the trial court did not so find. Rather, it found that the second incident, in its opinion, did not constitute a traffic violation. It disagreed with the officer's characterization of the incident, not with the facts of the incident itself, and found that in isolation it would not have been sufficient to justify a traffic stop.” Daniels v. State, 281 Ga. 226, 637 S.E.2d 403 (November 6, 2006). “[T]he jury determines witness credibility, and it was authorized to disbelieve the alibi testimony. Moore v. State, 268 Ga. 420, 421(1) (489 S.E.2d 842) (1997).” Murray v. State, 239 Ga.App. 659, 522 S.E.2d 48 (August 18, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault although victim couldn’t identify defendant at trial. “Although [victim] Cox apparently pointed to the wrong defendant at trial, the jury could have concluded that this was due to the length of time between the robbery and trial, particularly since Cox prefaced her in-court identification by stating that ‘I'm not for sure, like I said, been a whole year; but, yes, I think I do [see him].’ Moreover, the evidence showed that Murray's appearance had changed in the 17 months between the robbery and the trial in that he wore glasses and no longer had an Afro hairstyle at the time of trial. Given the passage of time, Murray's changed appearance, and Cox's ambivalence about her in-court identification, the jury could have determined that Cox's positive identification of Murray immediately after the incident was not rendered less credible by the fact that she could not correctly identify Murray 17 months later at trial. These types of credibility determinations are particularly within the province of the jury, and our role is limited to determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Jones v. State, 232 Ga.App. 630, 502 S.E.2d 557 (1998).”