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Brooks v. State, 236 Ga.App. 604, 512 S.E.2d 693 (February 22, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena child victim’s teacher to authenticate school records, which “indicated that the victim ‘stretches the truth,’ and ‘copies others to know what she [is] suppose[d] to be doing.’” “It is questionable whether the information concerning the victim’s credibility contained in the school records was even admissible or whether the victim’s teacher could properly have testified as to this information, as such testimony could amount to the teacher’s expert opinion on ‘the truthfulness or credibility of the victim.... [T]he question of a particular child’s credibility is not properly the subject of expert testimony as it is reserved for the jury. [Cits.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Gorski v. State, 201 Ga.App. 122, 123(2), 410 S.E.2d 338 (1991). See also Jennette v. State, 197 Ga.App. 580, 582, 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990).” F. CROSS-EXAMINATION See also CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – CONFRONTATION , above, and subheadings HOSTILE WITNESSES and SCOPE OF CROSS/RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION, below See new OCGA § 24-6-611(b) Nwakanma v. State, 296 Ga. 493, 768 S.E.2d 503 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in restricting confusing and misleading cross-examination of State’s witness. Defense counsel asked cooperating co-defendant ““[I]sn't it true, sir, that your last time in court, the district attorney informed you to testify against these people; correct?” “The cross-examination at issue was referring to a pretrial hearing in which Abdus–Salaam waived his Fifth Amendment rights and was asked by the prosecutor whether he understood that, by such waiver, he ‘could be called as a witness for the State to testify against these four’ co-defendants. So the record shows that the prosecutor neither instructed Abdus–Salaam to testify against the co-defendants nor implied that he should not testify fully and truthfully. And the phrase ‘testify against’ was an appropriate and concise way to refer to the testimony of a witness called by the State. … Accordingly, it appears that the cross-examination of Abdus–Salaam carried with it the potential for confusing or marginally relevant testimony and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination without cutting off all inquiry into the appropriate subject of whether Abdus–Salaam had any belief that he would personally benefit from testifying for the State.” Campbell v. State, 329 Ga.App. 317, 764 S.E.2d 895 (October 20, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly prohibited cross of victim as to “why she had refused to meet with some police officers in the course of the investigation, to which Scott would have responded that she was on probation. The trial court ruled that defense counsel could elicit testimony about Scott's refusal to meet with the officers but not about the fact of her probation.” “In this case, Scott was on probation for the offense of misdemeanor shoplifting, and it does not appear from the record that Campbell made a showing that the shoplifting conviction involved fraud or deceit. Cf. Martin v. State, 300 Ga.App. 39, 41(2), 684 S.E.2d 111 (2009) (requiring defendant to show that witness's misdemeanor shoplifting conviction involved fraud or deceit for it to be used to impeach a witness under former OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3), which contained language similar to OCGA § 24–6–609(a)(2)). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in limiting Campbell's cross-examination to prevent mention of Scott's probation. See id.” Jarnigan v. State, 295 Ga. 603, 761 S.E.2d 256 (June 30, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court didn’t improperly limit defendant’s cross-examination of State’s fingerprint expert. “[Co-defendant] Davis complains that, when he asked Taylor about the precise standards applied by fingerprint examiners in certain other countries, the trial court sustained an objection to the relevance of the question. But the trial court permitted Davis to elicit testimony that there is no national standard in the United States that identifies how similar two prints must be to amount to a match. Moreover, the trial court allowed Davis to elicit testimony that the degree of similarity is determined by each examiner, based on her own training and experience. Davis also complains that, when he tried to ask Taylor about a particular case in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation mistakenly identified an Oregon lawyer as a terrorist based on a fingerprint match,[fn] the trial court sustained an objection. But as to misidentifications in fingerprint comparison, Davis never attempted to cross-examine Taylor about her general awareness of other cases in which faulty fingerprint analysis led to a misidentification. Moreover, Davis was permitted to cross-examine Taylor about the possibility of mistakes in fingerprint comparison. See In re H.A., 311 Ga.App. 660, 660, n. 1, 716 S.E.2d 768 (2011). We see no abuse of discretion in the limitation of the cross-examination of Taylor in this case.” Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. 641, 748 S.E.2d 896 (September 23, 2013). Felony murder conviction affirmed; prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant wasn’t improper. “During cross-examination, appellant admitted he was a convicted felon and that he was in possession of a firearm on the day in question. In view of appellant's admissions, the prosecutor asked appellant why he entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant