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objected to the prosecutor's question on the ground that he had ‘the right to plead not guilty to any charges.’ The prosecutor responded that he was simply asking appellant about the factual basis for his plea. No immediate ruling was made by the trial court. The prosecutor then asked appellant if he was claiming self defense when he first put the shotgun in the bed of his pickup truck (approximately 40 minutes before the shooting). Defense counsel objected again, asserting appellant was not charged with possessing a firearm at that point in time. Thereupon, the prosecutor, defense counsel and the trial court discussed whether the possession of a firearm charge concerned only the time of the shooting or whether it pertained to the earlier time. At the conclusion of that discussion, the trial court stated: ‘Count 2 [felony murder] has commission of the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A felon did cause the death and then, of course, the last count is just possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, so I'm going to overrule your objection.’ On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine appellant as to his plea of not guilty to the count charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We discern no error. See generally Gentry v. State, 226 Ga.App. 216, 218 (485 S.E.2d 824) (1997) (like any other party, State has right to conduct a thorough and sifting cross-examination).” Goodwin v. State, 320 Ga.App. 224, 739 S.E.2d 712 (March 11, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed. No error where trial court prohibited defendant from calling trial prosecutor as a witness at hearing on motion for new trial. “‘The practice of trial attorneys testifying is not approved by the courts except where made necessary by the circumstances of the case.’ Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 500(7) (271 S.E.2d 792) (1980). ‘[T]he advocate as a witness poses innumerable threats to the integrity and reliability of the judicial process.’ Castell v. Kemp, 254 Ga. 556, 557 (331 S.E.2d 528) (1985). ‘[C]ourts have properly refused to permit a prosecutor to be called as a defense witness unless there is a compelling need.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Roberson v. United States, 897 F.2d 1092, 1098(IV)(F) (11 th Cir., 1990). … Here, the circumstances of the case did not make it necessary for the prosecuting attorney to testify on the defendant's behalf during the hearing on the motion for new trial. The evidence sought was available through other means and eventually obtained by Goodwin. Accordingly, we find no error.” Hargrove v. State, 291 Ga. 879, 734 S.E.2d 34 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in “refusing to allow his counsel to ask witnesses whether they were confidential informants. … As appellant was allowed to establish the basis for possible bias or interest of the witnesses, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and appellant's claim lacks merit. See Matthews v. State, 194 Ga.App. 386, 387, 390 S.E.2d 873 (1990).” Angulo v. State, 314 Ga.App. 669, 725 S.E.2d 802 (March 9, 2012). Convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault affirmed; “it was not erroneous for the State to inquire into the knowledge of Angulo's mother or pastor regarding his alibi during cross-examination.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, the questions didn’t “impermissibly shift[ ] the burden of production by questioning his lack of corroborating testimony for his alleged alibi.” Farley v. State, 314 Ga.App. 660, 725 S.E.2d 794 (March 9, 2012). Convictions for terroristic act and aggravated stalking affirmed; trial court properly limited cross-examination of police officer as to whether defendant was Mirandized. Given counsel’s prior representation to the court that defendant’s statement to the officer was “spontaneous,” “the trial court could properly conclude that Farley's Miranda rights were not a relevant issue. See Barrett v. State, 289 Ga. 197, 199(1) (709 S.E.2d 816) (2011) (‘A statement which is spontaneous and unsolicited as not made in response to any form of custodial interrogation is not bound by the strictures of Miranda and is admissible without the warnings having been given’) (citation omitted). ‘[T]he necessity of administering Miranda warnings exists only when the individual is interrogated while in custody.... No right exists to inquire into irrelevant matters, and consequently the trial court did not err by curtailing appellant's cross-examination on this matter.’ Ramos v. State, 198 Ga.App. 65, 66–67(2) (400 S.E.2d 353) (1990) (emphasis in original; citation and punctuation omitted).” Kerdpoka v. State, 314 Ga.App. 400, 724 S.E.2d 419 (February 28, 2012). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in trial court’s control of cross-examination of victim “(1) by requiring defense counsel to stand at a podium while cross-examining her; (2) by asking the victim if she needed to take a break or needed water; (3) by asking defense counsel how much longer the cross-examination would take and commenting that the victim would “need some relief”; (4) by calling for a break in the child's testimony because of concern with the witness being exhausted, and allowing the State to question other witnesses before resuming the child's cross-examination. First, Kerdpoka has not shown how any of the court's actions was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, who was clearly attempting to ensure that the 12–year–old child was treated fairly. … And second, other than a simple assertion that these things ‘harmed the Defendant in this case as the credibility of this witness was the key issue in the case,’ Kerdpoka has failed to