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show how any of the court's actions affected the cross-examination or his ability to impeach the witness, and he has not shown that the substance of his questions was limited.” Vandall v. State, 290 Ga. 36, 717 S.E.2d 461 (November 7, 2011). Murder conviction affirmed; mistrial wasn’t required although “the trial court acted improperly in actively inserting itself into the cross-examination of the witness, expressing irritation with defense counsel's questioning of the witness, and rephrasing some of the questions asked. In addition, the judge made an inappropriate comment during a bench conference about his reasons for preferring not to work over the weekend. These actions, however, did not deprive Vandall of the opportunity to fairly and fully present his case to the jury. Vandall does not point to any instance where he was denied the right to ask a question. The transcript shows that he was able to question the agent at length about the interrogation strategy and techniques used in the two interviews. Moreover, the trial court's reproofs were not limited solely to defense counsel.” Gonzalez v. State, 310 Ga.App. 348, 714 S.E.2d 13 (June 30, 2011). Convictions for rape, child molestation, and related offenses affirmed. No abuse of discretion in requiring defendant to voir dire victim’s mother about credibility issues pertaining to immigration status before admitting the evidence. “[T]he gist of his appellate argument appears to be that the trial judge erred by requiring him to ‘preview’ his cross-examination during voir dire, which caused him to lose the element of surprise with the witness, undercutting his defense strategy. … Following voir dire of the mother, the judge stated that he would allow the defense to ‘explore with the mother in the presence of the jury those issues that go to motive, interest, bias and prejudice’ since Gonzalez's attorney represented that his sole defense was that the allegations were fabricated by the victim at her mother's behest. But the judge directed defense counsel to stay away from ‘illegally crossing the border and things of that nature.’ The trial judge had previously expressed his concern to counsel that ‘how a victim gets [into the United States] one way or the other is irrelevant .... [because] everybody is entitled to the protection of our law.’ [fn] Having reviewed the voir dire and cross-examination of the mother, we find no abuse of discretion.” Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (November 22, 2010). In defendant’s murder prosecution, no abuse of discretion in “limiting [defendant’s] cross examination of the lead detective regarding the Atlanta Police Department's investigation of the detective for underreporting crimes in violation of Georgia law. The original trial judge reviewed the detective's file in camera and then issued his findings, see generally Dempsey v. State, 279 Ga. 546(3) (615 S.E.2d 522) (2005), that the file revealed only that the detective followed illegal orders and was reprimanded for doing so, but was not implicated in the giving of those orders and was not punished for any wrongdoing or indicted on any charges. Based on these findings, the trial court prohibited appellant from cross examining the detective regarding the matter. Trial courts are granted wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned ‘to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, ... or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’ State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639(1) (571 S.E.2d 752) (2002). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674) (1986). But see Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338(2) (698 S.E.2d 301) (2010) (trial court erred by limiting cross examination on parole eligibility of State witness). We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in limiting appellant's cross examination of this witness.” Westmoreland v. State, 287 Ga. 688, 699 S.E.2d 13 (June 28, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any complaints about limitation on cross-examination by failing to object to same. “ A party who complains about a restriction on cross-examination ‘“must either ask the questions he desires to ask or state to the court what questions he desires to ask and then interpose timely objection to the ruling of the court denying him the right to propound the questions.” [Cit.]’ Gober v. State, 249 Ga.App. 168, 172(3) (547 S.E.2d 656) (2001). However, after the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection, Westmoreland abandoned his line of questioning and posed no objection to the trial court's ruling on the scope of his cross-examination. ‘Because “[e]rrors not raised in the trial court will not be heard on appeal [cit.],” [cit.], [Westmoreland] has waived this [issue].’ Pinckney v. State, 285 Ga. 458, 459(2) (678 S.E.2d 480) (2009).” Latty v. State, 297 Ga.App. 233, 676 S.E.2d 882 (March 31, 2009). “[W]hen a defendant testifies about a witness who could corroborate his defense, but does not call the witness, it is reasonable for the prosecutor to infer that there exists no such favorable witness. Brewster v. State, 205 Ga.App. 770, 772 (424 S.E.2d 8) (1992).” Trial court therefore properly allowed prosecutor to cross-examine defendant “about whether or not he intended to produce Nichelle as a witness to verify his story.” “Even though Latty claimed on cross-examination that he did not know how to locate Nichelle, the prosecutor was entitled to cast doubt on his story by questioning him about why he had not produced Nichelle as a witness to support his defense. Id.” Accord, Benjamin v. State , 322 Ga.App. 8, 743 S.E.2d 566 (May 23,