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2013). Peterson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 128, 668 S.E.2d 544 (October 20, 2008). Trial court properly limited defense counsel’s cross-examination “into alternative explanations as to why Peterson ran the red light; limiting his challenge to the second officer's credibility, including demotions on the officer's record; and barring testimony by the Intoxilyzer operator concerning the mechanical workings of the device.” “We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court acted well within its discretion when it limited these portions of Peterson's cross-examination as irrelevant or probative of matters best left to the jury.” Osborne v. State, 291 Ga.App. 711, 662 S.E.2d 792 (May 29, 2008). 1. At defendant’s trial for rape and child molestation, defendant’s cross-examination of child’s mother was not improperly curtailed. Defendant sought to show that the mother wanted to get custody of the child away from defendant “to use the child as a dependent to obtain food stamps and for tax purposes. Osborne claims that this improperly curtailed his cross-examination of the mother on the issue of her credibility and whether she coached the child to lie about the alleged abuse to gain custody. The record shows that defense counsel extensively cross-examined the child’s mother (Osborne’s former wife) about her divorce from Osborne; that Osborne had custody of the child; that she did not get along with Osborne; that they constantly battled over her right to visitation with the child; that she contacted police to enforce visitation and to complain that the child was being physically abused, and that she failed to pay court-ordered child support for the child. The record shows that Osborne was given wide latitude to cross-examine the child’s mother with respect to her credibility and whether she had a motive to fabricate the allegations against him. In disallowing the above questions, the trial court acted within its discretion to control the scope of cross-examination by excluding questions of doubtful relevance that were cumulative of prior questions. Moore v. State, 251 Ga. 499, 501-502 (307 S.E.2d 476) (1983).” 2. No error where trial court kept out document showing mother’s petition for custody of the child, but allowed defendant to cross-examine her on the subject. “Pretermitting whether the document had some relevance and should have been admitted, any error was harmless where the facts at issue were admitted by examining the witness about the document. Buford v. Benton, 232 Ga.App. 102, 103 (501 S.E.2d 272) (1998).” Johnson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 352, 651 S.E.2d 450 (August 7, 2007). “[I]t is within the trial court’s discretion to permit questioning regarding a new matter during recross-examination. See Owens v. State, 205 Ga.App. 824, 825(2) (423 S.E.2d 731) (1992) (trial court ‘in [its] discretion may permit the questioner to inquire about something which he should have asked about during an earlier step but which was overlooked.’) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Holloway v. State, 283 Ga.App. 823, 643 S.E.2d 286 (March 1, 2007). No abuse of discretion where trial court limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of officer regarding errors in incident reports relating to defendants in other cases arising out of the same undercover drug operation. “Under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in ruling that the inquiry was impermissible because it was at best only marginally relevant to the charge filed against Holloway. [Cits.]” Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (June 12, 2006). OCGA § 24-9-84.1, authorizing use of criminal convictions more than 10 years old for impeachment, but only in court’s discretion, does not interfere with defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses. Sims v. State, 280 Ga. 606, 631 S.E.2d 656 (June 12, 2006). “A trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope of relevant cross-examination. Kolokouris v. State , 271 Ga. 597, 523 S.E.2d 311 (1999). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by curtailing the cross-examination and recross-examination of [two witnesses]” when questions were not relevant to the defendant’s justification defense. Adcock v. State, 279 Ga.App. 473, 631 S.E.2d 494 (May 18, 2006). Defendant’s statement on the stand, “I’ve been locked up a few times in my life,” opened the door for the prosecution to explore his prior arrests on cross. “By volunteering this information, Adcock himself raised an issue which the state could fully explore. Richardson v. State, 173 Ga.App. 695, 696(2) (327 S.E.2d 813) (1985). And on cross-examination, Adcock answered questions pertaining to his unsolicited admission that he had been previously jailed. Such questioning by the state was within the permissible scope of a thorough and sifting cross-examination. Richardson, supra; see also OCGA § 24-9-20(b) (as amended in 2005) (if a defendant testifies, he or she may be examined and cross-examined as any other witness). ‘[T]he control of the cross- examination was largely in the discretion of the trial court, and it was not error to allow [defendant] to be cross-examined with regard to the specific circumstances surrounding [his prior arrests] to which he had testified on direct examination.’