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State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 571 S.E.2d 752 (October 28, 2002). Trial court erred by refusing defendant’s attempt to cross-examine co-defendant about the amount of prison time he saved himself by agreeing to testify against defendant. State objected and court excluded testimony on mandatory sentence co-defendant would otherwise have faced, because defendant still faced that same charge. “It is important to note that this concern comes about only when the jury knows that the witness and the defendant were charged with the same crimes and that they have similar criminal histories, and the jury sees the two accomplices as equally culpable or the defendant on trial as less culpable than the accomplice who negotiated a deal. The potential for harm suggested by the State could be put to rest by a limiting instruction given the jury by the trial court prior to the receipt of the witness’s testimony, much like the limiting instruction currently given prior to the admission of similar transaction evidence.” Accord, Perez v. State , 254 Ga.App. 872, 564 S.E.2d 208 (March 27, 2002); Green v. State , 254 Ga.App. 881, 564 S.E.2d 731 (March 27, 2002). Mangum v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 555 S.E.2d 451 (November 19, 2001). Trial court erred, and violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers, when it restricted cross-examination based on the confidentiality of juvenile records and disallowed any inquiry into pending criminal charges against the witnesses in an effort to attack credibility directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives. Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), guarantees a defendant in a criminal trial both the general right to cross-examine witnesses against him and the more specific right to cross-examine a key state’s witness concerning pending criminal charges against the witness. A criminal defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause are paramount to the State’s policy of protecting juvenile offenders. Id. at 319. Bowen v. State, 252 Ga.App. 382, 556 S.E.2d 252 (November 9, 2001). Conviction reversed where trial court improperly limited Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim about the victim’s financial interest in the outcome of the trial. Defendant produced evidence that the victim was seeking money from the Georgia Crime Victims Emergency Fund based on the underlying incident and because Defendant’s conviction would have bolstered that claim, evidence of the victim’s financial interest in the trial was relevant to her motive in testifying against Defendant. The Court noted that the evidence was conflicting and Defendant’s conviction hinged on the victim’s credibility. Roseberry v. State, 251 Ga.App. 856, 554 S.E.2d 816 (October 11, 2001). Trial court did not err in sustaining State’s hearsay objections as the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination does not include the right to elicit hearsay. See also Offenses – Offenses Against Public Order and Safety - Harassing Phone Calls, above . Hodges v. Lott, 251 Ga.App. 288, 553 S.E.2d 652 (August 8, 2001). Court held that trial court did not curtail or preclude defendant's general cross-examination into the subject of pain or prior existing injury, but only sustained the specific objection based upon the form and opinion content of the question, which contained unproven expert opinion and was read from a non-witness physician’s records. Hernandez v. State, 244 Ga.App. 874, 537 S.E.2d 149 (July 10, 2000). Defendant had a right to cross-examine his accomplice about his motive for testifying against him, even if the questions showed a difference in sentencing and may elicit sympathy for the defendant. Humphrey v. State, 245 Ga.App. 808, 537 S.E.2d 95 (July 6, 2000). DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred by prohibiting cross-examination of State’s witnesses as to why they failed to attend court at first trial despite subpoenas. “Although the scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the court, cutting off all inquiry on a proper topic of cross-examination was an abuse of discretion. See Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426, 427-428(2), 420 S.E.2d 748 (1992). On retrial, cross-examination should be allowed.” Green v. State, 242 Ga.App. 868, 532 S.E.2d 111 (March 17, 2000). Aggravated sodomy convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant was proper. “To ask the defendant if he himself is lying serves the function of testing his veracity and credibility and so is well within the appropriate scope of cross-examination.” Kelly v. State, 242 Ga.App. 30, 528 S.E.2d 812 (January 21, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly allowed prosecutor to ask defense witness, who said defendant didn’t appear intoxicated on date in question, whether “she had ever seen Kelly intoxicated.” “As this Court recognized in Wood v. State, 218 Ga.App. 563, 564, 462 S.E.2d 625 (1995), … once a witness for the defendant testifies that the defendant did not appear impaired, the State is entitled to cross-examine that witness to determine the facts upon which the witness' observation was based, ‘including [her] observations of [Kelly's] consumption of alcohol on previous occasions.’ Id. ”