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Thompson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 26, 521 S.E.2d 876 (August 30, 1999). “‘[I]t [is] purely within the discretion of the court as to whether the State's counsel should be permitted to lead the witness, or to cross-examine his own witness.’ Fouraker v. State, 4 Ga.App. 692, 693(3), 62 S.E. 116 (1908). Inasmuch as Driscoll's identity and presence at the scene were not disputed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State's attorney to put leading questions to its witness while on direct examination, where the witness demonstrated a limited command of English. See Fugate v. State, 263 Ga. 260, 265(10), 431 S.E.2d 104 (1993) (ignorance one basis upon which trial court may permit leading questions on direct examination).” Suah v. State, 271 Ga. 614, 515 S.E.2d 614 (May 17, 1999). No mistrial required when murder defendant “testified on direct examination that he had never been involved in any crime and stated during cross-examination that he did his ‘own private thing,’ which was selling ‘my little reefer.’ Given that the defendant voluntarily stated that he had committed no major crime and just did his ‘own thing,’ the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine him about what he meant by that term. See Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 759, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).” Thomas v. State, 238 Ga.App. 42, 517 S.E.2d 585 (May 11, 1999). “The trial court properly granted the State’s request to cross-examine prosecution witnesses Kevin Payne and James Keaton. At a prior hearing, both witnesses entered guilty pleas and gave sworn testimony implicating Thomas. But when called to testify in this case, both recanted their earlier sworn statements and developed memory problems. A trial court is authorized to permit leading questions by the party who called the witness when ‘from the conduct of the witness ... justice shall require it.’ OCGA § 24-9-63; see Hamby v. State, 158 Ga.App. 265(1), 279 S.E.2d 715 (1981).” G. DEFENDANT Howard v. State, 318 Ga.App. 329, 733 S.E.2d 859 (November 2, 2012). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant, about defendant’s conference with defense counsel, was improper, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “We have little hesitancy in concluding that it was improper for the prosecuting attorney to ask Howard what he and his attorney talked about and to raise the implication that Howard and his attorney were fabricating a defense, and to imply Howard's failure to reveal his confidential conversation with his attorney meant he had something to hide. Further, we agree with Howard that the trial judge had an obligation to rebuke counsel, give curative instructions or grant a mistrial after a proper objection was made under the plain terms of OCGA § 17–8–75.” Latty v. State, 297 Ga.App. 233, 676 S.E.2d 882 (March 31, 2009). “[W]hen a defendant testifies about a witness who could corroborate his defense, but does not call the witness, it is reasonable for the prosecutor to infer that there exists no such favorable witness. Brewster v. State, 205 Ga.App. 770, 772 (424 S.E.2d 8) (1992).” Trial court therefore properly allowed prosecutor to cross-examine defendant “about whether or not he intended to produce Nichelle as a witness to verify his story.” “Even though Latty claimed on cross-examination that he did not know how to locate Nichelle, the prosecutor was entitled to cast doubt on his story by questioning him about why he had not produced Nichelle as a witness to support his defense. Id.” Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661 (September 24, 2007). Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to ask defendant on cross-examination whether other witnesses were lying. “Manzano complains on appeal the questions posed to him were improper because he was being asked to speculate on the credibility of other witnesses. ‘[A] witness, even an expert, can never bolster the credibility of another witness “as to whether the witness is telling the truth. Credibility of a witness is not beyond the ken of the jurors but, to the contrary, is a matter solely within the province of the jury. [Cit.]” [Cits.]’ Mann v. State, 252 Ga.App. 70(1) (555 S.E.2d 527) (2001). While that principle is true as to witnesses generally, such a question is allowable where the defendant testifies at odds with other witnesses because the question is then merely a rhetorical device intended to challenge the defendant’s credibility and is not an effort to bolster other witnesses’ credibility. ‘The state may challenge the defendant’s truthfulness on cross-examination.’ Dorsey v. State, 259 Ga. 809(3) (387 S.E.2d 889) (1990). When addressed to the defendant, a question such as that of which Manzano complains merely emphasizes the conflict in the evidence, which is the jury’s duty to resolve. Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296(13) (509 S.E.2d 45) (1998). The trial court did not err in overruling Manzano’s objection to the line of questioning. To the extent the holding in Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616(17a) (340 S.E.2d 891) (1986), that ‘[h]ad defense counsel objected to the prosecuting attorney’s questions, the objection should have been sustained,’ conflicts with this holding and with the holdings in Whatley v. State, supra, and Dorsey v. State, supra, it is overruled.”