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the drug GHB.” “‘For an expert to give his opinion based upon a certain state of facts, those facts must be supported by evidence admitted into the record .’ (Citation omitted.) Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 666(5) (513 S.E.2d 498) (1999).” Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 586 S.E.2d 651 (September 22, 2003). Court properly admitted expert’s testimony that fingerprints labeled with defendant’s name matched, despite absence of evidence that fingerprint exemplar actually belonged to defendant, on grounds that expert’s testimony can be based on hearsay. “[T]he print that the expert used in the comparison was otherwise shown to be that of [defendant], because it bore his name and he did not deny that it was his…. [T]he card bearing [defendant]’s name was actually introduced into evidence,” but expert’s testimony would have been admissible even without the card in evidence, per McCoy v. State , 237 Ga. 118, 227 S.E.2d 18 (1976). “ An expert can give an opinion based upon a comparison between a print taken from the scene of the crime and one which, even though never introduced into evidence, is otherwise identified as that of the defendant. McCoy v. State, supra at 120. Here, the expert testified that a fingerprint lifted from the victim’s car matched a print which bore [defendant]’s name. [Defendant] did not dispute that the exemplar print was his, and did not raise a hearsay objection to admission of the evidence upon which the expert's opinion was based.” Chief Justice Fletcher concurs specially, arguing for elimination of Georgia’s rule that hearsay, even where admitted without objection, lacks probative value, noting that no other state or the federal courts maintain this rule. Accord, Davenport v. State , 278 Ga.App. 16, 628 S.E.2d 120 (February 22, 2006) (nurse’s testimony in child molestation case based in part on law enforcement records). Viau v. State, 260 Ga.App. 96, 579 S.E.2d 52 (February 21, 2003). Trial court did not err in excluding expert’s (Citron’s) testimony that Intoxilyzer would be off if the subject’s body temperature was high, since there was no evidence of what defendant’s body temperature was on night in question. There was circumstantial evidence that it was hot that night, and defendant had gone swimming, two factors which expert testified could elevate body temperature, but “there was no proffer from the expert that either of the two cited circumstances had caused Viau’s temperature to remain elevated at the time she was tested. ... [A]ny link between the proffered testimony and machine malfunction is highly tenuous and ... the possibility of harmful error requires sheer speculation.” Mimms v. State, 254 Ga.App. 483, 562 S.E.2d 754 (March 13, 2002). “The decision whether to admit or exclude expert testimony ‘lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’” That discretion was not manifestly abused when court excluded defendant’s proffer of an ophthalmologist as “an expert on alcohol-consumption physiology and on drug interactions.” Expert’s qualifications: his medical school training and a class he took on the Intoxilyzer 5000. In this case, there was no Intoxilyzer test and no evidence of the amount of alcohol in defendant’s system. “Further, because [the expert] was not [defendant]’s prescribing physician, the trial court found that he was not competent to testify as to the purposes for which [her prescription medications] were prescribed, because he would be relying on hearsay.” Campbell v. State, 248 Ga.App. 162, 545 S.E.2d 6 (January 16, 2001). Defense counsel sought to question his expert regarding the Georgia Supreme Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ alleged “approval” of the expert’s testimony regarding a testing method. Held, the appellate court cases merely stand for the proposition that testimony challenging the reliability or accuracy of intoximeter test results is admissible in evidence and defense counsel inappropriately attempted to bolster the credibility of his expert witness through use of the cases. Essentially, the fact that an expert’s testimony has been accepted in other cases is not relevant to whether the present court should accept the testimony. Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 523 S.E.2d 54 (September 29, 1999). Where some of the facts upon which the expert bases his testimony are hearsay and not admitted at trial, court must determine how important those facts are to the expert’s opinion. If the expert’s testimony rests on substantial evidence in the record, the fact that the expert also relied on some inadmissible hearsay goes to weight, not admissibility. Cornwell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 127, 520 S.E.2d 782 (July 14, 1999). At defendant’s DUI trial, trial court properly prohibited defense expert from testifying about the effect of substances on defendant’s breath test where document showing the presence of those chemicals was not admitted into evidence. Evidence showed that defendant was at an auto body shop while a car was spray painted; document showing the chemical make-up of the paint was referenced but not admitted. Testimony established only that the paint contained toluene. “‘ For an expert to give his opinion based upon a certain state of facts, those facts must be supported by evidence admitted into the record. [Cit.]’ Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 666(5), 513 S.E.2d 498 (1999). Because the documents upon which Cornell relied were never admitted into evidence, they did not provide a basis for the expert to give an opinion about the effect of substances other