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than toluene on Cornell's breath test. ‘Not even an expert can give an opinion based entirely upon reports which have been prepared by others and which are not in evidence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 871(3), 506 S.E.2d 853 (1998).” 2. BASIS FOR OPINION – HEARSAY/ PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE O’Connell v. State, 294 Ga. 379, 754 S.E.2d 29 (January 21, 2014). Malice murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defense experts from testifying to hearsay about abuse allegedly suffered by defendant at the hands of third persons in Guatemala, as part of the basis for their opinions that defendant suffered from PTSD and battered person syndrome. “The trial court allowed two experts to opine that they had diagnosed appellant as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and battered person syndrome, but it did not allow them to testify with regard to specific abuses allegedly committed by others against appellant in Guatemala even though that evidence helped form the basis of the experts' opinions. [fn: The trial judge allowed appellant's experts to give the broad categories of information used to diagnose appellant. However, her experts were not allowed to ‘go chapter and verse ... about the stuff that happened in Guatemala.’ ] The excluded evidence consisted of statements made by appellant as well as a number of documents—including orphanage and adoption records—created in Guatemala. … That appellant's experts based their opinions, in part, on her statements to them regarding her childhood did not render this evidence admissible. Although a testifying expert can base his or her opinion in part on hearsay, an expert cannot be used as a conduit to introduce inadmissible hearsay evidence. See Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388 (658 S.E.2d 750) (2008); Leonard v. State, [269 Ga. 867, 870–871 (506 S.E.2d 853) (1998)]. See also Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 666(7)(d) (653 S.E.2d 31) (2007). [fn: As for cases tried on or after January 1, 2013, see OCGA § 24–7–703, which provides: ‘The facts or data in the particular proceeding upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, such facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Such facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.’ ] ” Hosley v. State, 322 Ga.App. 425, 746 S.E.2d 133 (June 26, 2013). Kidnapping and convictions affirmed; no error in allowing doctor to testify to diagnosis of defendant from another facility. “Hosley also claims that the trial court erred in allowing the State's witness to testify as a ‘conduit’ for a Veteran's Administration psychiatrist who did not testify at trial. Dr. Hughey testified as a rebuttal witness after Hosley testified that he received treatment for PTSD at the VA facility in Nashville. Dr. Hughey noted that Hosley was diagnosed ‘with malingering’ at the VA facility. There was no error in allowing the testimony. ‘When an expert personally observes data collected by another, the expert's opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based, in part, on the other's findings, and even when such testimony is based on hearsay, the lack of personal knowledge does not result in exclusion of the expert's opinion but merely presents a jury question as to the weight it is to be given.’ Treadwell v. State, 285 Ga. 736, 742, 684 S.E.2d 244 (2009), rev. on other grounds, Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 838, 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012).” Crosby v. State, 319 Ga.App. 459, 735 S.E.2d 588 (December 17, 2012). Physical precedent only. Burglary and related convictions affirmed; testimony of GBI crime lab witness was properly admitted: “during Crosby's trial, a GBI forensic biologist testified regarding her review of the testing of the DNA samples collected from the scene of the burglary and her own testing of the DNA samples obtained from Crosby after he was arrested. Specifically, the GBI biologist explained that the swab samples collected from the screwdriver and the broken window were initially tested by another GBI technician to confirm that the substance found on them was blood. And afterward, the samples were sent to a laboratory in Utah, which isolated the DNA from the blood and developed a DNA profile. Subsequently, the Utah lab returned the evidence and its analysis to the GBI, and the GBI biologist then reviewed the testing procedures employed, as well as the results, and uploaded the information into CODIS. The biologist further testified that once DNA samples were obtained from Crosby, she personally tested those samples and determined that they matched the DNA collected from the blood on the screwdriver and the victim's bedroom window.” Not objectionable hearsay, as “‘an expert may base his opinion on data collected by others’ and … his or her ‘lack of personal knowledge does not mandate the exclusion of the opinion but, rather, presents a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned the opinion.’ Dunn v. State, 292 Ga.App. 667, 671(1) (665 S.E.2d 377) (2008) (punctuation omitted); see also Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 358(2) (676 S.E.2d 196) (2009) (stating that ‘[a]n expert may base her opinions on data gathered by others’). And here, rather than being a mere conduit for the GBI technician and the Utah lab's findings, the GBI forensic biologist reviewed the data and testing procedures to determine the accuracy of those findings. Thus, the GBI biologist's testimony regarding these findings was not inadmissible hearsay. See Rector v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 715–16(4) (681 S.E.2d 157) (2009) (holding that toxicologist's