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makeup of the substance, an essential element of the crime, was the supervisor's testimony based solely on the technician's lab report.” “In this case, the technician's conclusions were not submitted to the jury, and the State concedes that admission of the report itself containing the lab tech's conclusions would have violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. The expert's testimony was proper, however, because the supervisor came to her own independent conclusion that the substance was methamphetamine based on the chemical ‘fingerprint’ from the GCMS [gas chromatography/mass spectrometry] test. We have long held that an expert need not ‘testify to the validity of every step that went into the formulation of his results as a foundation for their admissibility.’ Robinson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 368, 370(3), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998), quoting Orr v. Indiana, 472 N.E.2d 627, 633-634(2) (Ind.App. 1984). Also, an expert may base his opinion on data collected by others. Harkness v. State, 225 Ga.App. 864, 869(7), 485 S.E.2d 810 (1997); Caldwell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 46, 495 S.E.2d 308 (1997). In Byrd v. State, 261 Ga.App. 483, 583 S.E.2d 170 (2003), we held that the trial court did not err in allowing a GBI chemist's supervisor to testify that a tested substance was cocaine, based on his review of the lab technician's file and the output generated by two different tests. The supervisor compared the results to published data to determine whether the substance tested was cocaine. We held that an expert's lack of personal knowledge ‘does not mandate the exclusion of his opinion but, rather, presents a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned the opinion. [Cit.]’ Id. at 484, 583 S.E.2d 170.” “Because ‘the critical inquiry is not whether it might be reasonably anticipated that a statement will be used at trial but the circumstances under which the statement was made,’ California v. Geier, [41 Cal.4 th 555, 607, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104 (2007)], the trial court did not err in allowing the expert witness to testify based on the data contained in the technician's report.” Accord, Boone v. State , 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008) (one chemist could testify that substance tested positive based on another chemist’s “analytical findings”); Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 676 S.E.2d 196 (April 28, 2009) (same as Boone ; toxicologist properly allowed to testify to her own opinions after reviewing data and testing procedures from another GBI employee); Bradberry v. State , 297 Ga.App. 679, 678 S.E.2d 131 (May 4, 2009); Reddick v. State , 298 Ga.App. 155, 679 S.E.2d 380 (June 1, 2009); Rector v. State , 285 Ga. 714, 681 S.E.2d 157 (July 9, 2009) ( distinguishing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (June 25, 2009), where expert affidavits ruled inadmissible under Confrontation Clause); England v. State , 302 Ga.App. 12, 689 S.E.2d 833 (December 2, 2009) (“The toxicologist testified that in analyzing blood samples for blood-alcohol content, the lab technician ‘just takes a specimen of the blood, places it in a glass vial and seals it up.’”); Haywood v. State , 301 Ga.App. 717, 689 S.E.2d 82 (December 16, 2009); White v. State , 310 Ga.App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (June 30, 2011). Mullis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 218, 664 S.E.2d 271 (June 25, 2008). 1. Trial court properly allowed testimony of psychologist “about the effects of child abuse on the subjects of that abuse … based on tests developed either in the scientific community or from his own clinical experience.” Accord, Westbrooks v. State , 309 Ga.App. 398, 710 S.E.2d 594 (April 21, 2011). 2. Trial court properly allowed “the psychologist to testify that the victim’s symptoms and accounts were ‘ highly consistent’ with sexual abuse.” 3. Trial court properly allowed psychologist to testify “that a person with the [child abuse] victim’s level of intelligence would have difficulty fabricating a detailed fictional account of abuse. The psychologist explained that the victim had a composite IQ score of 74, merely 5 points above what is considered mentally retarded. … Because the trial court was authorized to conclude that one’s ability to manufacture stories of abuse based upon his or her IQ level fell beyond the ken of the average juror, the challenged testimony was admissible. See In re: B.H., 190 Ga.App. 131, 133-134(3) (378 S.E.2d 175) (1989) (allowing opinion testimony that a child of the victim’s age would have difficulty making up a story of abuse).” Bly v. State, 283 Ga. 453, 660 S.E.2d 713 (April 21, 2008). Reversing 286 Ga.App. 43, 648 S.E.2d 446 (2007). In defendant’s trial for obstruction, trial court erred in allowing GBI agent to express opinion that another officer was acting “appropriately as a police officer in the line of duty” in his encounter with defendant – where agent didn’t personally observe the actions. Distinguishing “ McMichen v. Moattar, 221 Ga.App. 230(2) (470 S.E.2d 800) (1996) and In re: Smith, 143 Ga.App. 358(2) (238 S.E.2d 725) (1977), [holding] that when the subject matter of an inquiry ‘“relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses ”’ that cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury, ‘“the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind.”’ (Emphasis supplied.) McMichen, supra, at 232(2). However, as both McMichen and Smith clearly reflect, this rule applies to witnesses who personally observed the events to which they are testifying and, essentially, authorizes such eyewitnesses to present a ‘shorthand’ impression of those events in situations where language fails to adequately convey their observations to the jury with the ‘“same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness.”’ Id.” Testimony also was not admissible as expert opinion: “whether or not [officer], according to his version of events, ‘acted appropriately as a police officer in the line of duty,’ as [agent] was asked, was a matter regarding which the jurors could have made ‘an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of [agent],” quoting Fordham v. State, 254 Ga. 59 (325 S.E.2d 755) (1985).