☢ test - Í

Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750 (March 17, 2008). Firearms expert’s testimony – that he was told by a manufacturer’s representative that defendant’s holster was made to fit a certain caliber gun – was inadmissible hearsay. “ An expert may not give an opinion that is based entirely on the hearsay reports, knowledge, or opinions of other experts. Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 870-871 (506 S.E.2d 853) (1998); Green v. State, 266 Ga. 237, 239 (466 S.E.2d 577) (1996). ‘A testifying expert is not to serve as a conduit for the opinions of others,’ Leonard, 269 Ga. at 871 and ‘must base his opinion on facts supported by evidence in the case; he cannot base his opinion on what he has heard in private conversations with others.’ Green, 266 Ga. at 239. In the present case, it is clear that the State’s firearms expert based her opinion on what she had been told by the company representative. For this reason, her testimony was inadmissible.” Compare O’Donnell (January 21, 2014), above (expert can testify to opinion based on hearsay, but can’t be used as a conduit for the underlying hearsay). Aal v. State, 290 Ga.App. 252, 659 S.E.2d 609 (January 11, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court prohibited defendant’s expert witness in opthamology from testifying as to defendant’s ability to perform walk/turn and one-leg stand tests based on prior surgeries to his groin. “Dr. Citron had no personal knowledge of the surgery in question or of the medical records in Aal’s file referring to those surgeries. As the trial court observed, this does not satisfy the requirements of Stancil v. State, 155 Ga.App. 731, 733(3) (272 S.E.2d 511) (1981) (proffer is inadequate unless it showed ‘that such testimony was material and would have benefited the complaining party).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.)” Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 655 S.E.2d 806 (January 8, 2008). Trial court properly allowed State’s expert to give opinion about defendant’s competency to stand trial, “ based on her own interview of Velazquez as well as her review of his medical records and conversations with other experts who had evaluated him for competency. In the situation in which an expert personally observes data collected by another, the expert’s opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based, in part, on the other’s findings. Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 202(1) (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003). Even when an expert’s testimony is based on hearsay, the expert’s lack of personal knowledge does not mandate the exclusion of the opinion but merely presents a jury question as to the weight which should be accorded the opinion. Id.” See also Whatley (October 6, 2008), and Treadwell (September 28, 2009), both above. Scott v. State, 281 Ga.App. 106, 635 S.E.2d 582 (August 14, 2006). Rape conviction affirmed; trial court properly allowed doctor to testify about opinions based on statements made to him by rape victim. “‘[M]edical opinions concerning a patient’s physical condition are admissible in evidence even when they are based in part on the physical history elicited from the patient.’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 449-450(1) (349 S.E.2d 684) (1986). ‘An expert may give an opinion upon his own examination, upon his observation, or upon any state of facts, supported by some evidence in the case, which he assumes as true.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 870(3) (506 S.E.2d 853) (1998).” Distinguished from cases where doctor did not hear statements or sought to act “as a conduit for the opinions of others. See [ Leonard ] at 871; Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Bonner, 195 Ga.App. 152, 159(3) (392 S.E.2d 897) (1990). ” State v. A 24 Bail Bonding, 280 Ga.App. 463, 634 S.E.2d 99 (June 28, 2006). At bond forfeiture hearing, trial court erred in admitting investigators’ “expert opinion” testimony of (missing) defendant’s true name. “Determination of the principal’s true name did not require the drawing of a conclusion beyond the ken of the average layman. Under the circumstances present here, A 24 was attempting to use the expert opinion as nothing more than a conduit for admission of the hearsay on which the opinion was based. That is not permissible. Cf. Hall County v. Merritt, 233 Ga.App. 526, 528(2), 504 S.E.2d 754 (1998).” Nichols v. State, 278 Ga.App. 46, 628 S.E.2d 131 (March 7, 2006). 1. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness, a “medical social worker,” to testify that victim’s “injuries were inconsistent with the history of events given by Nichols …. Nichols argues that Luster, who is not a medical doctor, did not have the expertise to determine whether Taylor’s injuries were caused in the way Nichols described. ‘An expert is one whose habits and profession endow that person with the particular skill needed in forming an opinion on the subject matter at inquiry.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 335, 339(2) (612 S.E.2d 521) (2005). Luster is trained and employed as a medical social worker, and his daily duties require him to consider medical evidence provided to him along with his own observations to determine whether factors are present which could indicate child abuse. As such, Luster’s testimony – that the version of events related to him by Nichols was not consistent with Taylor’s injuries as reported by the medical staff – was well within his purview as a medical social worker. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 868(3)