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(572 S.E.2d 545) (2002) (licensed clinical social worker could give expert testimony as to whether defendant had a mental disorder; fact that she did not have a medical degree went to the weight the jury gave her testimony). And persons other than medical doctors may testify about medical issues within the scope of their expertise. See Cromer v. Mulkey Enterprises, 254 Ga.App. 388, 392(2) (562 S.E.2d 783) (2002); Hyde v. State, 189 Ga.App. 727, 728(1) (377 S.E.2d 187) (1988).” Accord, Waits v. State , 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (April 24, 2007) (DFCS employee with “extensive experience and training with respect to fatal child abuse and specifically Shaken Baby Syndrome” but no medical degree was properly allowed to testify that child’s injuries were consistent with that syndrome.) 2. Diagnostic opinions and conclusions contained in medical records are generally inadmissable as hearsay unless the person who made them testifies as to their factual basis. See Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga.App. 371, 376(2) (551 S.E.2d 777) (2001). However, an expert may express an opinion based on knowledge gained from hearsay during the practice of his profession . See Joiner v. Lane, 235 Ga.App. 121, 126(4) (508 S.E.2d 203) (1998). An example of this would be a doctor relying on information contained in a patient’s medical record as one of the bases for his opinion. See id. at 125-126. In such circumstances, ‘[e]ven if some of the physician’s expert testimony was based upon records which were hearsay because they had not been introduced in evidence, this would go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 126. See also Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Bonner, 195 Ga.App. 152, 160(3) (392 S.E.2d 897) (1990). Here, Dr. Dunton based his opinion of Taylor’s injuries on both his own examination of her and information contained in her medical records. He personally observed some ‘jitteriness’ which suggested possible seizure activity to him. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Dunton’s testimony relating to seizures noted in Taylor’s medical records. 3. “ A doctor ‘may not base his expert opinion solely on the hearsay opinion of another doctor, thereby acting as a mere conduit for the opinion of the first, ’” quoting Doctors Hosp., above. “Here, however, Dr. Dunton was able to make his own diagnosis of a skull fracture and bleeding on the brain, which were indicators of a brain injury. He relied on a radiologist to evaluate the severity of that injury, specifically whether there had been a lack of oxygen to the brain. Dr. Dunton’s opinion that Taylor had suffered a brain injury was not based solely on the radiologist’s report; the report merely confirmed the extent of an injury that Dr. Dunton already suspected, based on his own observations and other information. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Dunton to testify that Taylor had suffered a brain injury,” citing Joiner, above. Pitts v. State, 260 Ga.App. 553, 580 S.E.2d 618 (March 26, 2003). “Where an expert personally observes data collected by another, his opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based in part on the other's findings.... Where, as here, the expert is available for full and searching cross-examination, the failure of the expert to test independently the control sample, after observing its analytical test results, goes only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.” GBI Crime Lab forensic expert was properly allowed to testify to results of “mass spec” test performed by her lab assistant, in addition to results of her own testing. Accord, Byrd v. State , 261 Ga.App. 483, 583 S.E.2d 170 (June 4, 2003) (“‘[W]here an expert personally observes data collected by another, his opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based in part on the other’s findings.”) In addition, fulfillment of the Crime Lab’s standard operating procedures is not a condition precedent for evidentiary admission. ‘[M]ere contradiction of a recognized expert's method of conducting a scientifically acceptable test is not fatal to admissibility[.]’ Pitts’ argument goes to weight not admissibility.” Mimms v. State, 254 Ga.App. 483, 562 S.E.2d 754 (March 13, 2002). “The decision whether to admit or exclude expert testimony ‘lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’” That discretion was not manifestly abused when court excluded defendant’s proffer of an ophthalmologist as “an expert on alcohol-consumption physiology and on drug interactions.” Expert’s qualifications: his medical school training and a class he took on the Intoxilyzer 5000. In this case, there was no Intoxilyzer test and no evidence of the amount of alcohol in defendant’s system. “Further, because [the expert] was not [defendant]’s prescribing physician, the trial court found that he was not competent to testify as to the purposes for which [her prescription medications] were prescribed, because he would be relying on hearsay.” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; expert witness (FBI DNA analyst) was properly allowed to testify to test results where he “supervised the technicians who performed the testing and he performed the analysis of the results himself.” Carlson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 589, 524 S.E.2d 283 (November 1, 1999). Conviction for misdemeanor marijuana possession affirmed; trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered expert testimony. 1. “The trial court refused to qualify defense witness Alan Gordon, a self-described “marijuana specialist,” as an expert but did allow Gordon to testify. According to Gordon, because he personally suffers from a genetic condition that causes anxiety and impairs his immune system, he regularly uses marijuana for its medicinal benefits. Gordon testified that his use of marijuana improved the