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functioning of his immune system. … Gordon, the founder and executive director of the Drug History Institute, was asked on voir dire about his self-proclaimed expertise concerning marijuana. Gordon claimed he knew about marijuana's therapeutic and medicinal benefits from having ‘been an avid user for more than a decade,’ from being ‘deeply immersed in the underground culture,’ and from having studied the drug. Gordon admitted that he had not conducted any scientific or laboratory research or published any scholarly articles other than one ‘self-published work’ on the Internet. Nor had Gordon earned any academic degree beyond the bachelor's level. In these circumstances, Carlson failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to deem Gordon an expert ‘as to the effects of marijuana on the body.’” 2. “[N]o evidence indicated that Gordon had any firsthand knowledge about Carlson's alleged medical condition or any possible treatment for it. Even had Gordon been qualified as an expert, when an expert's opinion is based solely on out-of-court hearsay not subject to any exception to the hearsay rule, that testimony is inadmissible. McEver v. Worrell Enterprises, 223 Ga.App. 627, 631(2), 478 S.E.2d 445 (1996).” Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 523 S.E.2d 54 (September 29, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for arson affirmed; trial court properly “allowed the State to introduce expert testimony that the fire was intentionally set,” although the opinion was based in part on hearsay. “[T]he fact that an expert's opinion may be based in part on facts not in evidence goes to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the expert's opinion. Roberson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 208, 211(8), 447 S.E.2d 640 (1994).” 3. EXPERT’S CREDIBILITY Guillen v. State, 258 Ga.App. 465, 574 S.E.2d 598 (November 19, 2002). Introducing court-appointed psychiatrist as “Court’s witness” and allowing the State to tender that witness as an expert did not place undue emphasis on the witness, where the Court instructed the jury that it was required to appoint an independent psychiatrist where a plea of insanity was entered, and that both parties were entitled to question that witness; and following that instruction, the court asked no questions of the witness and made no comment on her veracity. Campbell v. State, 248 Ga.App. 162, 545 S.E.2d 6 (January 16, 2001). Defense counsel sought to question his expert regarding the Georgia Supreme Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ alleged “approval” of the expert’s testimony regarding a testing method. Held, the appellate court cases merely stand for the proposition that testimony challenging the reliability or accuracy of intoximeter test results is admissible in evidence and defense counsel inappropriately attempted to bolster the credibility of his expert witness through use of the cases. Essentially, the fact that an expert’s testimony has been accepted in other cases is not relevant to whether the present court should accept the testimony. 4. EYEWITNESS CERTAINTY Washington v. State, 296 Ga. 252, 765 S.E.2d 905 (November 17, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly limited defense expert’s testimony “regarding the specific photos used by police in the photo lineup shown to [witnesses].” “In Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 257(2) n.3 (526 S.E.2d 549) (2000), we explained: ‘While an expert may offer an opinion, based on the facts surrounding an individual eyewitness' identification when posited in the form of a hypothetical question, as to whether scientific research has established a likelihood of unreliability for identifications derived from comparable facts, an expert is not authorized to express his or her opinion regarding the credibility or trustworthiness of any individual eyewitness. An eyewitness' personal ability to identify another person is a matter to be explored exclusively on direct and cross-examination of that witness.’ Therefore, while Washington's expert could have been and actually was posed hypothetical questions, direct questions specifically related to the photos in the lineup were appropriately excluded.” Frazier v. State, 305 Ga.App. 274, 699 S.E.2d 747 (July 16, 2010). Defendant’s armed robbery conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court excluded defendant’s expert witness on reliability of eyewitness identification, given corroborating evidence present. “The victim here called police immediately after the armed robbery, identifying to police the male gender of her attackers, their minority race, their approximate ages (16 to 18 years old), their approximate relative heights, their shirts (the gunman wore a black long-sleeve t-shirt with something in the middle of the shirt and the lookout wore a similarly-marked black short-sleeve t-shirt), the hairstyle of the gunman (short), the hairstyle of the lookout (‘twisties’), the pants worn by the men (the lookout wore jean shorts and the gunman wore jean pants), and the long-barreled gun used by the gunman. She further gave the location where she was robbed and the direction in which the attackers were traveling on foot when they left her. Within two minutes of receiving this dispatch, an officer in a patrol car nearby came to a street some three-to-four blocks away from the crime scene in the described escape direction of the attackers (only two minutes walking time), where at this early hour of the morning there were no other individuals anywhere in the area other than Frazier and a second man, which men fit the description given by the victim. Frazier