☢ test - Í

himself was of the approximate height described by the victim, was male, was of the described minority race, had short hair, was wearing jean pants, was of the approximate age, was standing near a discarded long-sleeve black t-shirt (with something in the middle of the shirt), and was near some bushes where an officer found the described gun. This evidence amply corroborated the victim's subsequent identification of Frazier as the gunman, which identification took place only minutes later when she was immediately brought by other police to Frazier's location. She similarly identified the other man found by police there, who fit her description of the ‘lookout.’ Substantial evidence corroborated the victim's identification, which supported the trial court's exercise of its discretion to exclude the expert's testimony. See Howard v. State, 286 Ga. 222, 228(4) (686 S.E.2d 764) (2009); Allen v. State, 268 Ga.App. 519, 527-528(2) (602 S.E.2d 250) (2004).” Mikell concurs specially to comment “that such expert testimony is problematic and generally unnecessary. … If we allow experts to tell juries that eyewitness testimony is ‘inherently,’ i.e. always, unreliable, [fn] then juries will start insisting on videotape and DNA evidence in prosecutions of life-threatening crimes, when such evidence will often be unavailable.” Barnes dissents, taking issue with the type of “corroborating” evidence used here: “Much of the ‘corroborating’ evidence cited by the majority was related to the identification by the victim/eyewitness, such as Frazier's clothing, height, hairstyle and the like. This self-corroborating evidence is not what I believe can be characterized as substantial corroboration of the eyewitness identification.” In re: D.S., 302 Ga.App. 873, 691 S.E.2d 897 (March 17, 2010). Adjudication of delinquency based on kidnapping affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to present expert on eyewitness identification to challenge credibility of victim’s identification of juvenile, as there was no suggestive pre-trial identification procedure; rather, victim saw juvenile on the street, and called the police. Confuses issues of eyewitness reliability with police identification procedures; for a better analysis of eyewitness reliability, see Breland (August 1, 2007), below. Howard v. State, 286 Ga. 222, 686 S.E.2d 764 (November 23, 2009). At defendant’s murder trial, no error in prohibiting defendant “from calling an eyewitness identification expert,” where “there was substantial corroboration of the eyewitness identifications.” Davis v. State, 286 Ga. 74, 686 S.E.2d 249 (November 2, 2009). No ineffective assistance where counsel made strategic decision not to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. “The type of expert testimony Davis contends trial counsel should have offered, i.e., testimony regarding the effects of stress and suggestiveness on eyewitness memory, would have been inconsistent with counsel's theory that Martin intentionally misidentified Davis in order to shield himself.” Battise v. State, 295 Ga.App. 833, 673 S.E.2d 262 (January 15, 2009). 1. No ineffective assistance for failing to cross- examine detective on studies showing no link between the accuracy of an eyewitness’s identification with the witness’s confidence level in his identification. Detective here only showed the victim a single photograph of defendant, and didn’t prepare a photographic lineup because the victim “had known Battise for years” and “had no doubt that Battise was the person who ran out of his girlfriend’s apartment on the night of the incident.” “Trial counsel's tactical decision about how to most effectively cross-examine the State's witnesses at trial did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 359(4)(b) (589 S.E.2d 90) (2003).” 2. “Battise argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek to suppress Gadson's out-of-court and in-court identifications of Battise. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, trial counsel testified that he did not move to exclude the identification evidence because he thought the identification procedure ‘fit into a pattern that my client ... was a victim of very sloppy police work.’ Given that trial counsel ‘made a strategic choice not to attempt to suppress the identification evidence, but instead to attack the identification testimony on cross-examination,’ Battise cannot establish that his trial counsel was ineffective. Clay v. State, 232 Ga.App. 656, 657(1)(a) (503 S.E.2d 560) (1998).” Further, based on “the totality of the circumstances and especially the fact that Gadson had known Battise for years, Battise has not made a strong showing the identification evidence would have been excluded.” Breland v. State, 287 Ga.App. 83, 651 S.E.2d 439 (August 1, 2007). Trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification where defendant’s identification was corroborated by other evidence. “In Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254 (526 S.E.2d 549) (2000), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that ‘the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is in the discretion of the trial court’ and will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 257(1). If eyewitness identification is a key element of the state’s case and no other evidence substantially corroborates the identification, then the trial court must ‘carefully weigh[ ] whether the evidence would assist the jury in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony and whether expert eyewitness testimony is the only effective way to reveal any weakness in an eyewitness identification.’ Id. (footnote