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and citation omitted). Here, the state presented corroborating evidence in addition to the identification testimony of the victims. Breland’s DNA matched that found in B.T. The license tag number noted by B.T. matched that of a car registered to Breland. Breland argues that this corroborating evidence is flawed and should not be considered, but his challenges go to the weight of the evidence and not to the issue of whether this evidence supports the trial court’s decision to exclude expert evidence on eyewitness identification. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that it was entitled to exclude the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert. See Allen v. State, 268 Ga.App. 519, 527- 528(2) (602 S.E.2d 250) (2004) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of expert in eyewitness identification where victim’s identification was corroborated by evidence connecting defendant to car used in crime and to other items involved in crime); Jividen v. State, 256 Ga.App. 642, 647(2) (569 S.E.2d 589) (2002) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence as irrelevant at new trial hearing involving ineffective assistance of counsel claim).” “The holding in Johnson v. State , supra, 272 Ga. 254 , concerning testimony of an expert in eyewitness identification ‘does not stand for the proposition that defense counsel is required to call an expert witness at trial where one of the primary issues involved is eyewitness identification of the defendant, let alone the proposition that the failure to call such an expert witness amounts to ineffective assistance. Darnell v. State, 257 Ga.App. 555, 559(7)(b) (571 S.E.2d 547) (2002).” Accord, Manley v. State , 284 Ga. 840, 672 S.E.2d 654 (January 26, 2009) (expert testimony properly excluded; eyewitness evidence was corroborated by other evidence; Hunstein dissents.); Hart (July 16, 2010), above; Glass v. State , 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (July 11, 2011) (counsel not required to call expert witness on eyewitness identification in all cases, as here, where witnesses “either knew Glass or recognized him from having seen him in the community.”). Allen v. State, 286 Ga.App. 82, 648 S.E.2d 677 (June 22, 2007). No prejudice shown in failing to obtain expert testimony on eyewitness identification where identification was also based on DNA evidence (defendant’s semen on shirt). “Given this evidence, the trial court would have been authorized to exclude expert testimony regarding identification. See Allen v. State, 268 Ga.App. 519, 526-527(2) (602 S.E.2d 250) (2004) (where there is substantial corroboration of identification, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on the issue of identification).” Best v. State, 279 Ga.App. 309, 630 S.E.2d 900 (May 11, 2006). Witnesses were properly allowed to testify to the certainty of their identification of defendant. Brodes v. State , 279 Ga. 435, 442 (614 S.E.2d 766) (2005), does not make testimony on witness certainty inadmissible, just directs court not to include witness certainty as a criterion for evaluating eyewitness testimony. Wright v. State, 265 Ga.App. 855, 595 S.E.2d 664 (February 25, 2004) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). Counsel was not required to seek funding for an expert witness “on the reliability of eyewitness identifications” in this case, both because it was a tactical decision – such testimony could hurt as well as help – and because it was unlikely to change the outcome of the case. “Although, as the trial court noted, a key element of the State’s case against Wright was the identification testimony, this is not a case where only one witness testified as to the identity of the perpetrator, where the only eyewitness identifications were cross-racial, or where the identification testimony was the only evidence presented by the State. Here, three witnesses, two of whom were trained and experienced law enforcement officers with extensive experience in surveillance and undercover work, identified Wright at trial. Both Agent Dillard and Wright are African American, and Agent Dillard testified he knew Wright by his street name. Lastly, in addition to the eyewitness testimony, an audiotape of the drug buy was played for the jury at trial. Thus, while the expert testimony may have been beneficial, Wright has failed to show that the outcome would have been different had trial counsel sought funds to obtain an expert on identification testimony. [Cit.] We would note further that the case of Brodes v. State, 250 Ga.App. 323, 325 (551 S.E.2d 757) (2001), in which we held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification, does not require a different result. First, Brodes concerned the admissibility of available evidence, not whether funds should have been sought to obtain such evidence. Moreover, Brodes is distinguishable on its facts, because in that case the identification was cross-racial, no other evidence tied the defendant to the crime, and no evidence corroborated the testimony of the victims.” Brodes v. State, 250 Ga.App. 323, 551 S.E.2d 757 (July 2, 2001). Trial court committed harmful error by excluding expert testimony describing problems with reliability of victims’ identifications. Held, where State’s case hinged on victims’ eyewitness identifications and where there was no other evidence tying defendant to the crime, and no evidence corroborating the victims’ identifications, trial court abused its discretion in rejecting expert testimony on eyewitness reliability. The testimony would have aided the jury in evaluating the reliability of the victims’ identifications as the expert would have described factors affecting the accuracy of eye witness identification that were otherwise not likely to be fully understood. Distinguished by Wright (February 25, 2004).