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Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (February 28, 2000). Affirming 236 Ga.App. 252(5), 511 S.E.2d 603 (1999). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in excluding defendant’s proffered expert testimony on eyewitness reliability, given that State’s case wasn’t built exclusively on eyewitness testimony. “We hereby reaffirm our recent holding in Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375(12), 519 S.E.2d 221 (1999) that the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and disapprove Norris [ v. State, 258 Ga. 889, 890(1), 376 S.E.2d 653 (1989)] to the extent it can be read as requiring the exclusion of such testimony as a matter of law. Under the facts of this case, however, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in excluding the proffered expert testimony.” Traces history of decisions on eyewitness reliability expert evidence in Georgia and elsewhere, concluding that “[w]here eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the State's case and there is no substantial corroboration of that identification by other evidence, trial courts may not exclude expert testimony without carefully weighing whether the evidence would assist the jury in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony [fn: While an expert may offer an opinion, based on the facts surrounding an individual eyewitness' identification when posited in the form of a hypothetical question, as to whether scientific research has established a likelihood of unreliability for identifications derived from comparable facts, an expert is not authorized to express his or her opinion regarding the credibility or trustworthiness of any individual eyewitness. An eyewitness' personal ability to identify another person is a matter to be explored exclusively on direct and cross- examination of that witness. We thus overrule the language in Jones v. State, [232 Ga. 762, 764-765, 208 S.E.2d 850 (1974)] disapproving the use of hypothetical questions by experts to discuss the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification. ] and whether expert eyewitness testimony is the only effective way to reveal any weakness in an eyewitness identification. [ United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230-1231, fn. 6 (3 rd Cir., 1985)]. However, the admission or exclusion of this evidence ‘lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ O'Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1, 3(3), 325 S.E.2d 759 (1985).” Evidence here supported trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony: “[Witness] Ms. Gilpatrick was not under acute stress and was not faced with a deadly weapon at the time she viewed Johnson. As to cross-racial misidentification, the transcript is clear that Ms. Gilpatrick did not identify Johnson based on generalized racial characteristics but on individual details such as the thickness of his eyebrows and neck, the location of his hairline, and the shape of his ears. As to the certainty of Ms. Gilpatrick's identification, the trial court admitted into evidence the composite drawing created less than 24 hours after Ms. Gilpatrick viewed Johnson in the shopping center; the trial court thus knew the jury would be able to compare the composite to Johnson's appearance at trial as well as to photos of Johnson admitted into evidence which depicted his appearance around the time of the crimes. Furthermore, at the time the trial court excluded the proffered testimony of [expert] Dr. Cole, the court had heard the testimony by the victim and Ms. Gilpatrick, the extensive cross-examination of both eyewitnesses by defense counsel, [fn] and the State's similar transaction evidence.” Accord, Washington (November 17, 2014), above. 5. HARPER ANALYSIS/SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES Reinhard v. State, 331 Ga.App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (March 18, 2015). Rape, child molestation, and related convictions affirmed. Therapist’s opinion that victim suffered from PTSD was properly admitted; contrary to defendant’s argument, State established “that the tests that the therapist administered to his daughter were admissible under Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 524–525(1) (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982).” “The therapist explained that the standardized assessments that she uses and that she administered to Reinhard's daughter can only be administered by credentialed therapists, after they have gone through a period of supervised use of the tests. The therapist had been administering these tests for more than five years. The tests are highly reliable; they are designed to give consistent results even if read by different people; they have been used by many people; and research shows that they are accurate and measure what they are designed to measure.” Salinas v. State, 313 Ga.App. 720, 722 S.E.2d 432 (January 26, 2012). Marijuana trafficking and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed “the law enforcement officers to testify as experts in the identification of marijuana.” “Salinas … claims that the officers' testimony was inadmissible since there had been no showing pursuant to Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 524–526(1) (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982), that their visual and olfactory identification techniques had reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty. … ‘“The fatal flaw in [Salinas's] argument on this position is that although the [officers] were presented as experts, it was apparent that their testimony did not deal with scientific principles but with observation ... of [a] physical object[ ], with matters not of science but of skill and experience.’ (Citation omitted.) Belton v. State, 270 Ga. 671, 674(4) (512 S.E.2d 614) (1999). Since the officers' observations were not a matter of scientific principle or technique, the Harper standards did not apply. Id. Moreover, we have held that ‘[t]he expert opinions of the officers — based on visual observation, and sometimes feel or smell — plus that circumstantial evidence is enough, even absent conclusive scientific testing.’ Jones v. State, 268 Ga.App. 246, 249(1)