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(601 S.E.2d 763) (2004).” Pullin v. State, 272 Ga. 747, 534 S.E.2d 69 (September 11, 2000). Interlocutory appeal in murder prosecution; trial court properly denied “motion in limine seeking to prohibit the prosecution from offering expert testimony based upon an analysis of cellular telephone records to establish the location from which Pullin made certain cellular calls at the time of the shooting.” State here presented sufficient evidence to support trial court’s finding that the science of cell phone tower location “has reached a stage of verifiable certainty that it is competent evidence in a court of law, Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519(1), 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982).” “At the evidentiary hearing, the State produced six expert witnesses who testified to the accuracy and reliability of records establishing the location of a tower which services a particular cellular call. In essence, the evidence established that a radio signal from a digital cellular telephone such as the one Pullin used is transmitted to the cellular tower which is geographically closest to the handset; if the handset moves out of the geographical area covered by the originating site during the call, the call is relayed or ‘handed off’ to the next nearest site; the two cells which are the ‘originating’ and ‘terminating’ point of the call are automatically recorded; this ‘historical data’ is relied upon for billing purposes, and has been an integral part of fraud investigation and prevention. The experts consistently testified that the historical data is accurate and has never been found to be incorrect. One expert opined with ‘100 percent certainty’ that based on the information in this case, the calls at issue could not have originated in Stockbridge. Pullin presented no expert testimony in opposition, but argued that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing admissibility of the evidence under Harper. … Pullin takes exception to the fact that no treatises were offered that dealt with the specific issue now before the Court. However, the State’s expert explained that the basic properties of cellular technology are well understood, and ‘not a source of argument.’ And while we acknowledge that there is no authority precisely on point, the basic principles of cellular technology have been widely accepted. [Cits.] We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in applying the Harper analysis and concluding that the technology in question has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty to be admissible in the trial of this case.” Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (April 28, 2009). Expert testimony proffered by defendant properly excluded by trial court; “there was no showing that ‘false confession theory’ and the ‘Reid method’ satisfied the evidentiary test in criminal cases set forth in Harper v. State , 249 Ga. 519(1), 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982). See Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 101(3), 646 S.E.2d 212 (2007); Lyons v. State, 282 Ga. 588, 595(5), 652 S.E.2d 525 (2007) (overruled on other grounds); Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 682(4), 604 S.E.2d 488 (2004).” “The proffer showed that the defense intended [witness] to testify about an interrogation technique it referred to as the ‘Reid method,’ and its alleged misapplication by the interviewer in Wright's case.” Accord, Humphrey v. Riley , 291 Ga. 534, 731 S.E.2d 740 (September 10, 2012) (expert testimony on police interrogation tactics and false confession theory properly excluded; “the question of whether someone might be persuaded to give a false confession through persuasive interrogation techniques is ‘not beyond the ken of the average juror.’”); Woodall v. State , 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014) (proposed expert “admitted he could not opine to the jury as to whether any particular interrogation resulted in a false confession, stating that the most he could do for the jury was identify the police interrogation techniques being utilized in the video.”). Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court ruled that hair comparison evidence “had reached a scientific stage of reliability sufficient to satisfy the standard in Harper. … Further, hair comparison evidence is not novel and has been widely accepted in Georgia courts. Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296(6), 509 S.E.2d 45 (1998); Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779 (13), 505 S.E.2d 4 (1998). ‘Once a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the laws of nature.’ Harper, supra. We find no error with the trial court's determination that the hair comparison evidence was admissible.” Belton v. State, 270 Ga. 671, 512 S.E.2d 614 (February 22, 1999). Trial court did not err in failing to conduct Harper analysis as to two witnesses “presented … as experts in the identification of shoe prints. … The fatal flaw in Belton’s argument on this position is that although the witnesses were presented as experts, it was apparent that their testimony did not deal with scientific principles but with observation and comparison of physical objects, with matters not of science but of skill and experience. See OCGA § 24-9-67. This issue is comparable to that addressed by the Court of Appeals in Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. 34(1), 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996). There, the Court of Appeals held that although the horizontal gaze nystagmus test was subject to the Harper standard, basic sobriety tests such as the ‘ABCs,’ ‘walk and turn,’ and ‘leg lift’ ‘are physical dexterity exercises that common sense, common experience, and the ‘laws of nature’ show are performed less well after drinking alcohol. The screening of these gross motor skills is hardly the type of ‘scientific principle or technique’ to which Harper referred, and this Court will not hold these physical manifestations of