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impairment, which could be as obvious to the layperson as to the expert, to such a standard of admissibility. Hawkins, supra at 36, 476 S.E.2d 803. Likewise, the comparison of shoe prints to the external physical characteristics of particular shoes is not a matter of scientific principle or technique. Since Harper and its standards are not applicable to the testimony involved in this case, the trial court did not err in failing to apply it.” Accord, Salinas (January 26, 2012), above (officers’ expert opinion testimony identifying substance as marijuana not subject to Harper analysis). 6. HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS See new OCGA § 24-7-705 Elrod v. State, 316 Ga.App. 491, 729 S.E.2d 593 (June 28, 2012). Child cruelty conviction affirmed; trial court properly allowed doctor to express opinion about whether defense theory of origin of child’s injuries was consistent with facts, based on hypothetical question drawing on evidence of record, though doctor had no personal knowledge of those facts. “Because the hypothetical was supported by the evidence, the trial court did not err by allowing Dr. Greenbaum to respond to the hypothetical. Ga. Dept. of Transp. [ v. Baldwin, 292 Ga.App. 816, 820-821(4), 665 S.E.2d 898 (2008)].” 7. IMPEACHMENT Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007). On habeas petition following murder conviction and death sentence, finding that defendant wasn’t mentally retarded affirmed. “Although ‘a witness may not be impeached based upon a discrepancy relating to a wholly immaterial matter, [cit.]’ Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153, 156(4) (391 S.E.2d 113) (1990), we find no error in the trial court’s admission of impeachment evidence introduced by the State that reflected on the credentials and competency of a defense expert witness, a collateral issue that was indirectly material to the issue in the case. Carswell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 833, 834(2) (589 S.E.2d 605) (2003). The State’s evidence reflected that at the time a defense expert in the field of psychology prepared an affidavit indicating his opinion that Rogers manifested substantially subaverage intellectual functioning before age 18, the expert was on probation following a suspension by the Georgia State Board of Examiners of Psychologists; the State’s evidence rebutted the expert’s trial testimony regarding the grounds for that suspension and included the Board’s decision that the expert’s admitted conduct fell below minimum standards of care. This evidence reflected on the expert’s credentials and competency, thus challenging his credibility and opinion as to Rogers’s intelligence, the issue in this case. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the impeachment evidence. See Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 403(3) (480 S.E.2d 1) (1996) (scope of cross-examination lies in sound discretion of trial court). Compare King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 273(30) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000) (questioning defense expert about pending complaint against him was improper impeachment).” Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 633, 583 S.E.2d 489 (June 12, 2003). Defense presented retired Florida police officer as expert on Intoxilyzer 5000. “He testified that, in his opinion, the acceptable margin of error for the Intoxilyzer 5000 is 0.02 grams, even though the manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer guarantees its accuracy to a plus or minus 0.003 blood alcohol concentration, and Georgia law enforcement officers are trained that the margin of error is 0.01.” Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to ask on cross whether he “would ever charge a person with DUI when his or her blood alcohol level was 0.08 or higher.” The elicited testimony “showed that the state of Florida, for whom the expert had worked, prosecuted DUI cases based on the assumption that this machine has a margin of error significantly lower than 0.02.” Jury could find this impeached the witness’s credibility. Distinguishes Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc. , 275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002) (an expert’s own practice is irrelevant to a medical malpractice case; issue, rather, is standard of care employed in the medical profession generally). 8. MATTERS BEYOND THE KEN OF JURORS Pepe-Frazier v. State, 331 Ga.App. 263, 770 S.E.2d 654 (March 18, 2015). Convictions for human sex trafficking and related offenses affirmed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly qualified witnesses as “expert witnesses in the areas of commercial sexual exploitation of children and in pimping culture.” “[T]he subjects about which these witnesses testified— e.g., the reasons why teenage prostitutes do not run away from their pimps, prostitution terminology, and scare tactics frequently used by pimps upon prostitutes—are certainly outside of the ken of the average juror.” Reinhard v. State, 331 Ga.App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (March 18, 2015). Rape, child molestation, and related convictions affirmed; evidence of “the propriety and effect of interviewing techniques in child sexual abuse cases” was properly admitted. “Contrary to Reinhard's argument, there is no requirement that an interviewer be impeached before a trial court allows testimony regarding interviewing techniques.”