☢ test - Í

Jackson v. State, 330 Ga.App. 108, 766 S.E.2d 558 (November 21, 2014). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no error in “the admission of testimony regarding the change in demeanor of the victim during the time the evidence showed the molestation occurred. [Defendant] argues that this resulted in the jury improperly considering ‘its own “mental heath diagnosis,”’ and that the State was required to offer an expert to testify concerning the meaning of the victim's conduct. … [W]e find no authority, and Jackson has pointed to none, that prohibits testimony from other witnesses about a victim's demeanor during the time of the alleged acts of molestation. See, e.g., Ochoa v. State, 252 Ga.App. 209, 210(1) (555 S.E.2d 857 (2001) (evidence that showed victim had negative changes in mood and behavior during time of molestation part of sufficient evidence of molestation). Cf. Woods v. State, 304 Ga.App. 403, 404–405(1), 696 S.E.2d 411 (2010) (citing testimony that victim's grades dropped and she became angry around the time of molestation as support for conviction).” Lopez v. State, 326 Ga.App. 770, 757 S.E.2d 436 (April 2, 2014). Conviction for using a computer internet service to seduce or entice another person believed by him to be a child for the purpose of committing child molestation and aggravated child molestation, and related offenses, affirmed. Trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered expert evidence that “Lopez did not have any psychological tendencies to have sex with minor children and that the police e-mails had the psychological effect of enticing him to commit such crimes.” “In general, expert testimony that a defendant does not have the psychological characteristics of a person who is predisposed to having sexual contact with underaged children invades the province of the jury as to the ultimate issue, that is, the defendant's guilt or innocence, and is properly excluded. Duncan v. State, 232 Ga.App. 157, 161–162(4), 500 S.E.2d 603 (1998) [fn: Where a defendant accused of molestation planned to call an expert to testify, based on psychological tests, that the defendant did not have the characteristics of a pedophile, we concluded that ‘there is no authority for the admission of an expert opinion that the defendant who is on trial for sex crimes against a child is or is not a pedophile. The profile testimony sought to be introduced by the defendant goes to the credibility and believability of his own testimony that he did not commit the acts charged and further speaks to the ultimate fact of whether he committed those acts. From the extensive testimony and cross-examination of the various witnesses at trial, the jury, without the help of expert opinion, could have determined the credibility and truthfulness of all the witnesses and could have formed independent opinions as to the victim's truthfulness and the defendant's capability of performing the acts he was accused of. These determinations did not involve unique and mysterious areas of human response necessitating expert testimony. There was no error in excluding this testimony, because such testimony invades the province of the jury as to the ultimate issue, i.e., the defendant's guilt or innocence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Duncan v. State, 232 Ga.App. at 161–162(4), 500 S.E.2d 603. ] ; Hudson v. State, 218 Ga.App. 671, 674–675(4), 462 S.E.2d 775 (1995). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that whether Lopez would have committed the crime charged absent the inducement of law enforcement officers was a question the jury could and must resolve without the assistance of expert opinion evidence and that Dr. Davis's opinions on the subject were therefore inadmissible.” Accord, Abney v. State , 327 Ga.App. 551, 759 S.E.2d 618 (June 11, 2014); Young v. State , 327 Ga.App. 852, 761 S.E.2d 801 (July 7, 2014) (same witness as Lopez ). Lowe v. State, 310 Ga.App. 242, 712 S.E.2d 633 (June 22, 2011). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; trial court properly allowed narcotics investigator to explain slang terms used in recorded conversations admitted into evidence. “[W]e disagree with Lowe's contention that these terms were not outside the ken of the average juror. Expressions such as ‘work’ (meaning cocaine) or sending someone on a ‘hump bug’ (wild goose chase) are clearly not part of the everyday vernacular, or even part of ‘everyday’ slang. In our view, it was permissible to have this unique terminology explained to the jury.” Escoe v. State, 306 Ga.App. 321, 702 S.E.2d 652 (October 5, 2010). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted expert’s opinion testimony “that, based on his experience and training, cobwebs indicated the back door had been opened recently. He also testified that burglars use gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints and place items near the door so they can leave the premises quickly. This testimony does not invade the province of the jury. Ogden v. State, 296 Ga.App. 254, 257(4) (674 S.E.2d 101) (2009).” Nor does detective’s said testimony go to the ultimate issue: “the ultimate issue was not whether the victim interrupted a burglary, but whether Escoe committed a burglary. The expert did not testify that he thought Escoe had committed a burglary, and therefore did not testify as to the ultimate issue.” Works v. State, 301 Ga.App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (November 17, 2009). Expert testimony on “the cycle of domestic violence” was properly admitted where victim contradicted her statement to police at time of the initial attack, accusing defendant: “After being released from the hospital, the victim told the state she wanted to dismiss the case so that she could continue her relationship with Works. In the request for dismissal, the victim stated she did not believe